Cassandra Anne Gullion v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Agee
Argued at Salem, Virginia
CASSANDRA ANNE GULLION
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2385-00-3 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
OCTOBER 23, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
Charles M. Stone, Judge
Joseph R. Winston, Special Appellate Counsel
(Public Defender Commission, on brief), for
appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant
Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
The trial court convicted Cassandra Anne Gullion of eight
counts of forgery and five counts of uttering. She contends the
trial court abused its discretion in crediting the victim's
testimony because the victim's testimony "was delusional and
ought not to have been believed as a matter of law. It was an
abuse of discretion to credit such testimony." Finding no
error, we affirm.
The defendant stipulated that she signed and uttered the
checks in question, but claimed the owner of the account gave
her permission to do so. The owner, Michael B. Cockram,
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
testified he did not give permission. Cockram suffered from
schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder and depression,
and he smoked marijuana. He was hospitalized for his mental
illness and taking medication when the defendant wrote the
checks. At trial, he was still taking medication for his
illness.
The defendant maintains the mental illness and medication
made Cockram delusional at trial. She contends his testimony
shows he was obviously delusional thereby making his testimony
inherently incredible as a matter of law. She maintains the
trial court abused its discretion in believing the testimony.
Mental illness does not automatically render a witness
incompetent. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 865,
875 (1874), overruled on other grounds, 246 Va. 174, 431 S.E.2d
648 (1993); Tate v. Chumbley, 190 Va. 480, 495, 57 S.E.2d 151,
158 (1950) (testamentary capacity). The trial court, in the
exercise of its discretion, determines the competency of a
witness on a case-by-case basis. "[T]he test is whether . . .
the witness can [accurately] observe, recollect, and communicate
the facts in question." Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence
in Virginia § 6.3, 214 (4th ed. 1993) (citing Helge v. Carr, 212
Va. 485, 487, 184 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1971)). A witness must
understand the questions posed, be able to formulate intelligent
responses, and understand the importance of speaking the truth.
Helge, 212 Va. at 488, 184 S.E.2d at 796. "If at the time of
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the examination he has this share of understanding, he is
competent." Coleman, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) at 875. Once the trial
court determines a witness is competent, the trier of fact must
assess the credibility of the witness' testimony. "The trier of
fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses,
unless, as a matter of law, the testimony is inherently
incredible." Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70-71, 515
S.E.2d 565, 575 (1999) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1125 (2000).
In this case, the trial court found Cockram's testimony
about not giving consent to be credible and of sufficient weight
to convict. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to
strike and stated that while Cockram's testimony "was rambling
at times . . . he was very specific on the issue of whether or
not he granted consent to the Defendant to write these checks
. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The record supports a finding that Cockram was both
competent and credible. Cockram comprehended the questions
posed and responded with reasonable intelligence. Cockram
testified clearly and consistently that he did not give the
defendant permission to write checks on his account. He denied
authorizing anyone to use his checks. Nothing suggests he
failed to comprehend, remember, and communicate his knowledge of
the events about which he testified. Indeed, other evidence
supports his testimony about related matters. While still in
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the hospital, Cockram put a hold on his checking account as soon
as he learned about the unauthorized checks. Upon discharge, he
closed the checking account and transferred the balance to a new
savings account.
The record does not reflect that the testimony was
inherently incredible or so contrary to human experience or to
human behavior as to be unworthy of belief as a matter of law.
Barker v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 500, 503, 95 S.E.2d 135, 137
(1956). Reasonable men could believe the victim's testimony.
The trial court did not err in refusing to strike the evidence,
and accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
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