Michael Rell Dotson v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Frank
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MICHAEL RELL DOTSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1541-99-3 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
UPON A REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
Keary R. Williams, Judge
Robert M. Galumbeck (Dudley, Galumbeck,
Necessary & Dennis, on brief), for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
A jury convicted the appellant, Michael Rell Dotson, of
felonious abuse and neglect of his infant son in violation of Code
§ 18.2-371.1(A). On appeal, appellant contends that the trial
judge erred in (1) allowing a doctor to testify that the infant's
injuries were caused by or consistent with abuse or neglect, (2)
allowing a witness to testify about statements the infant's mother
made outside appellant's presence and failing to grant a mistrial
when the prosecutor argued to the jury that those statements
proved appellant's intent, (3) ruling that Code § 18.2-371.1(A)
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
did not require the Commonwealth to prove that an omission or
refusal to provide care was willful, (4) refusing to instruct the
jury that acts of omission or refusal must be willful, (5) ruling
that his attorney could not argue to the jury that the
Commonwealth was required to prove that an omission or refusal to
provide care was willful, and (6) permitting the jury to consider
evidence of improper nourishment and a healed leg fracture
concerning the infant. He also contends the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict. For the reasons that follow,
we reverse the conviction. 1
I.
The grand jury indicted appellant as follows:
Abuse and Neglect of Children
On or about July 13, 1996, [appellant]
did unlawfully and feloniously as a parent,
guardian, or other person responsible for
the care of . . . a child under the age of
eighteen, the date of birth being 11-25-95,
by willful act or omission or refusal to
provide any necessary care for the child's
health cause or permit serious injury to the
life or health of such child.
In violation of § 18.2-371.1 of the Code
of Virginia (1950) as amended.
1
The Court of Appeals issued a memorandum opinion in this
appeal on July 5, 2000. Following the Commonwealth's appeal to
the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court remanded the appeal, by
order of June 8, 2001, to this Court for reconsideration.
- 2 -
The grand jury indicted Anna Marie Dotson, the infant's mother,
on the same charge. The trial judge ruled that appellant and
Dotson would be tried together.
At trial, the Commonwealth's evidence proved that, at the
time of the incident giving rise to this prosecution, appellant
and Dotson lived together for two or three years but were not
married. Appellant and Dotson had two children who were born
during their relationship, a girl, age twenty-two months, and a
boy, age seven months. Appellant also had a teenage daughter, who
lived with his parents. The indictment concerned the baby boy.
On the morning of July 13, 1996, Dotson had arranged for
appellant's daughter, who was then seventeen, to babysit
appellant's and Dotson's baby boy. The teenager testified that
she had been frequently babysitting the baby "since he was born"
and that on this morning she noticed a small bruise under the
baby's eye. She also testified that on several occasions when
appellant and Dotson were not present in the room, she had seen
their twenty-two-month-old girl pinch and slap the baby and throw
bottles at him. The teenager further testified that the baby had
been experiencing problems with food that caused him to "belch
back up [his milk] when you burped him."
The teenager testified that when she arrived in her car to
get the baby, appellant was not at home. She assisted Dotson in
preparing the baby to go home with her, and she carried the baby
to the car in his infant car carrier seat. The teenager testified
- 3 -
that after she left appellant's home, she was driving faster than
she should have been. When she entered a curve in the road, she
saw a car stopped in the middle of the road and "had to slam on
[her] brakes" to avoid a collision. The teenager testified that
when she applied the brakes rapidly, she "heard it go thump." The
baby "fell out of the car seat and the car seat fell on top of him
because [she] neglected to put [the baby] in . . . the seat, the
way it's supposed to be."
After the teenager admitted during her direct examination
that she had not related this incident when she testified at the
preliminary hearing, the trial judge informed her out of the
jury's presence that she would likely be prosecuted for perjury.
She responded to the judge that she was now being truthful. She
said she had not testified about the accident at the preliminary
hearing because she "was scared [and] . . . didn't want [her]
grandparents and [her] father [to know what happened]." She said:
"I knew they would be mad at me. I was scared." When the jury
returned, the trial judge instructed the jury that the
Commonwealth was entitled to prove the teenager had made a prior
inconsistent statement but that the jury could only use proof of
the prior inconsistent testimony "for purpose of contradicting
this witness."
The teenager then testified that on a prior occasion she said
she had driven slowly from appellant's residence and arrived home
without incident. She explained that she had lied at the
- 4 -
preliminary hearing because she "didn't want [her] grandparents to
know what [she] had done [and] . . . didn't want [her] father to
know because they would be mad at [her] and they wouldn't let
[her] have anything to do with [the baby] any more." She
testified that she "didn't think that anything was going to go
this far . . . [and] didn't think that it would go further than
little court." She further testified that she "was trying to
protect [her]self."
The teenager testified that instead of putting the infant
carrier on the back seat, she had placed it on the front seat of
the car so that the baby "could look out the window . . . [while
she] was driving." She could not strap the carrier on the front
seat and had not secured either the baby or the seat properly.
Thus, when she slammed on the brakes, the carrier seat had fallen
onto the baby. Aware that the baby "was crying and screaming when
he was in the floorboard" and was red in the face, the teenager
"panicked." She continued to drive "up the road a little bit"
before stopping and putting the infant carrier seat on the back
seat of the car. She then gave the baby a bottle and tried to
calm him before continuing home.
Appellant's sister testified that she received a telephone
call from the teenager, her niece, and told the teenager to bring
the baby to her house. When they arrived, the teenager's aunt
immediately noticed that the baby was bruised and his arm was
injured. The aunt believed the baby's arm, which was red and
- 5 -
swollen, may have been broken, and she called the baby's
pediatrician, Dr. Ranje Patel. He directed her to take the baby
to the hospital emergency room. She testified that she has never
seen appellant or Dotson hit their children.
The triage nurse who examined the baby in the emergency room
testified that she saw multiple bruises on the baby's face, a
healed scab under his left eye, and bruises on his back and both
legs. The baby's left arm was swollen and deformed. Whenever she
touched or moved the arm, the baby cried. She testified that the
healed wound on the face could have been caused by a fingernail.
Although she testified that the color of the bruises on the baby's
back and legs indicated they occurred at different times, she
admitted that the color of a bruise does not always indicate age
but may depend upon how hard an area is hit and how much blood
comes to the area. She testified further that bruises "over bony
prominences are usually darker than [bruises] over a fatty area."
The nursing supervisor also testified that she saw bruises of
different colors on the baby's body.
Dr. Sabry Radawi examined the baby and saw bruises all over
his body and around his eyes. Some of the bruises appeared to be
recent and others appeared older. He testified that the
appearance of a bruise may vary because of the strength of a blow
or the location on the body. Dr. Radawi also testified that if a
person, who is falling or involved in an accident, brings his
hands to the front of his face and receives a sudden blow, the
- 6 -
impact of hands into the face could cause "raccoon" eyes, the type
of injury that the child had. After he viewed x-rays of the
child's facial bones, skull, and left arm, Dr. Radawi diagnosed a
fracture of the upper left arm. At his direction, the hospital
personnel contacted the Department of Social Services and
transferred the baby to a hospital in Roanoke.
In Roanoke, Dr. Hugh Johnson Hagan, an orthopedic surgeon,
reviewed the x-ray and ordered an x-ray of the baby's major long
bones. The x-ray revealed a fracture in the baby's left leg,
which was in the process of healing. Dr. Hagan testified that the
fracture most likely had occurred within one or two months and
most likely had resulted from a direct blow to the bone. He
further testified, however, that without knowing anything else
except the existence of the break, it would be guesswork to say
when and how it happened.
Dr. Donald Keys, a pediatrician, examined the baby two days
after he was admitted to the hospital. Dr. Keys testified that
"getting into the ages of bruises" from coloration "is a little
bit difficult to say . . . [or] to be specific about." Dr. Keys
testified that it is generally accepted that color indicates
different onset; however, he could not "say whether [the baby's
bruises] all occurred on the same day or whether they occurred
several days apart." He testified that "[t]hey could have
potentially all occurred on the same date" and could have occurred
on the day the baby was taken to the hospital. Dr. Keys also
- 7 -
testified that the baby's leg fracture was more than six weeks old
and could have occurred at anytime after the baby's birth. He
further testified that the x-ray indicated that another break in
the leg had healed itself. He agreed that because the
seven-month-old baby was not putting weight on his legs, the
fracture might only manifest itself by the baby occasionally
becoming "irritable and fussy." He testified that the break in
the baby's arm "was a very recent break."
Dr. Keys also testified that the baby was "very underweight."
He weighed eleven pounds when admitted to the hospital and gained
ten ounces during his four-day stay. Although Dr. Keys had not
reported evidence of dehydration, he testified that two and
one-half percent dehydration would not be detected during a
physical examination. Dr. Keys agreed that if the baby was
dehydrated two and one-half percent and rehydrated while in the
hospital, the baby's weight gain would be about ten ounces.
Dr. Keys testified that, although the baby had been premature
at birth, "at seven and a-half months [the baby] should have had a
lot more fat and been heavier." Based on a growth chart and his
examination of the baby's records, Dr. Keys testified that the
baby initially "made nice progress" but then "flat-lined," which
meant the baby did not grow, between five and seven months. He
testified that the baby's pattern was "definitely abnormal" and
indicated that the baby "didn't receive adequate nourishment
during [the] time period [when he flat-lined]." He opined that
- 8 -
the bruises, broken bones, and lack of weight gain indicated "that
[the baby] has been abused and there's no other explanation for
that."
Dr. Keys testified that the lab reports which were done for
anemia and total protein were within normal limits except "[t]he
albumin was below the range of normal intake." Although he
testified that the baby suffered from malnourishment or
malnutrition, he testified that those terms simply mean that there
is faulty nutrition. On cross-examination, he further testified
as follows:
It just sounds like what you're asking is,
if you give diluted formula, does the baby
grow well? The answer to that is no and
that's true; however, for the first five and
a-half months this baby grew appropriately,
so that tells me the baby got the proper
amount, the proper dilution, and then at
five months something changed. I don't know
what that something was. You're supposing,
and I have no knowledge of this, that she
started changing the way she prepared the
formula; that is a possibility; that's all I
can say. . . . I couldn't say . . . It
could have resulted from lack of knowledge.
He testified, however, that most parents by the time they have a
second child are more familiar with feeding and what is proper
feeding.
The Commonwealth proved that two deputies from the
sheriff's department and two employees of the county's social
services department met with appellant and Dotson at their
residence the same afternoon the baby was taken to the hospital.
- 9 -
They informed appellant and Dotson that they were investigating
a complaint of child abuse and had taken custody of the baby.
The trial judge instructed the jury that statements made by
Dotson "may not be considered in [their] deliberations regarding
[appellant]."
The social worker testified that Dotson "became upset."
Both parents "were surprised" to learn the baby had been taken
to the hospital and said they did not know how the baby's arm
could have been broken. When asked if the baby had any
injuries, Dotson said the older child had hit the baby two days
earlier with the baby's feeder, causing a bruise under the
baby's eye. Dotson said the older child "appeared to be
jealous" and tried to hit the baby if Dotson held the baby
during feeding.
During the interview, appellant and Dotson also "stated
that they frequently fight and hit on each other." Dotson said
they sometimes fought because appellant did not believe the baby
was his. Dotson also said she was afraid of appellant and that
the beating and fighting had occurred "ever since they had been
together." Both appellant and Dotson "indicated that they were
aware that [the older child] was watching them fighting and then
that [the older child] was going to the crib and climbing in and
hitting on [the baby]." Dotson also said that when she was
doing housework the older child would climb in the crib and hit
the baby.
- 10 -
Appellant told the deputies and one of the social workers
that he had "done very little of the child rearing, but that he
did . . . play with the children when he came home from work."
He also said he did not know how the injuries occurred. The
social worker testified that the older child appeared healthy
and seemed to be "on target developmentally." A social worker
also testified that appellant and Dotson received public food
assistance and Medicaid for their children.
After the Commonwealth presented its case-in-chief, the
trial judge overruled motions to strike the evidence. Dr. Ranje
Patel, the baby's pediatrician, then testified for the defense.
Dr. Patel testified that he had seen the baby six times prior to
July 13 and had treated the baby on July 9 for congestion and
coughing. He thoroughly examined the baby on July 9 and saw no
bruises on the child. Dr. Patel testified that he saw no broken
bones or other injuries during the seven months he treated the
baby. Although he said that a minor fracture in a baby's bone
could remain undetected unless there are symptoms, he testified
that he performed thorough examinations of the baby and saw no
bruises and detected no broken bones. He testified that during
the course of his treatments he had no need to order x-rays of
the baby.
Dr. Patel also testified that Dotson had raised issues with
him concerning feeding the baby, that he had continuously
discussed feeding issues with Dotson, and that he advised her
- 11 -
how to properly feed the baby. He testified that there was a
"problem ongoing from day one, the speaking about the [baby's]
formulas," and that he addressed the issue of proper feeding
during most of the baby's visits. Appellant offered no other
witnesses.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge again
overruled motions to strike the evidence. Appellant tendered a
jury instruction defining "willful" as "an act or omission done
with bad purpose, without justifiable excuse and without ground
for believing it is lawful." When the Commonwealth objected
that Code § 18.2-371.1(A) did not require proof that an omission
or refusal be willful, appellant argued that willful modified
act and omission. The trial judge refused the instruction and
ruled that neither the omission nor the refusal to provide care
had to be willful. The judge also instructed appellant's
attorney that he could not argue to the jury that an omission or
refusal to provide care must be willful. This appeal followed
from the jury's verdict convicting appellant of "Abuse and
Neglect of Children by Willful Act or Omission or Refusal to
Provide Necessary Care, Causing or Permitting Serious Injury as
charged."
II.
Appellant contends the trial judge erred in permitting
Dr. Keys to testify that the baby had been abused. The
- 12 -
Commonwealth argues that the testimony was not a comment on the
ultimate issue of fact.
The principle is well established that "[e]xpert opinion on
an ultimate fact in issue is inadmissible in a criminal case
because it 'invade[s] the province of the jury.'" Jenkins v.
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 333, 336, 492 S.E.2d 131, 132 (1997)
(citation omitted). Moreover, "an opinion of a witness the
judge has found to be an expert carries great weight with
[jurors]." Bond v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 534, 538, 311 S.E.2d
769, 772 (1984).
In response to the prosecutor's question whether he "would
. . . consider these [injuries] consistent with child abuse,"
Dr. Keys testified that "look[ing] at everything together . . .
means that [the baby] has been abused and there's no other
explanation for that." It is true, as the Commonwealth argues,
that although Code § 18.2-371.1 is styled "Abuse and neglect of
children," the body of the statute does not contain that precise
wording. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court indicated in Webb v.
Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 33, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963), the
doctor's testimony was an opinion upon "the very issue in this
case." His testimony "had the effect of stating a conclusion"
which was the heart of the matter the jury had to decide. Id.
Any doubt in that regard is dispelled by the wording of the
indictment, which is styled "Abuse and Neglect of Children." In
addition, the finding instructions to the jury state that "[t]he
- 13 -
defendant is charged with the crime of abuse or neglect of a
child" and contains the words "offense of abuse or neglect" in
three other places. The finding instruction concerning
punishment also recites that the offense is "Abuse and Neglect
of Children" and the verdict form likewise recites that the
offense is "Abuse and Neglect of Children."
Because of the similarity of the wording used in these
instances, this case differs from Hussen v. Commonwealth, 257
Va. 93, 511 S.E.2d 106 (1999), cited by the Commonwealth.
There, the Court allowed an expert's testimony because she said
an alleged rape victim's injuries were not consistent with
consensual sexual activity, but did not comment specifically on
"whether the defendant's conduct was against the victim's will."
257 Va. at 99, 511 S.E.2d at 109. In this case, the expert's
words clearly addressed "one of the ultimate issues of fact to
be determined by the jury," id., as the instructions and verdict
form communicated that issue to the jury. Thus, this case more
closely resembles Jenkins, where the Court found that an
expert's testimony that a child "'had been sexually abused,'"
254 Va. at 336, 492 S.E.2d at 133, improperly influenced the
jury's sentencing in a case where "sexual abuse" was an element
of the crime. Id. at 337-38, 492 S.E.2d at 133-34.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge erred in allowing that
opinion testimony.
- 14 -
III.
Appellant contends the trial judge erred by permitting a
witness to testify about statements which Dotson made to the
social worker outside his presence and which alleged prior bad
acts.
The evidence proved that while the social worker was
questioning appellant and Dotson in their home, appellant left
the room to show the deputies another room in the house. Dotson
continued her conversation with the social worker. She said
that she and appellant fought often, that she had sole
responsibility for the housework and child rearing, and that, if
she did not have appellant's dinner ready when he came home,
appellant would "start hitting on her." Dotson also said they
fought frequently because appellant believed the baby was not
his son. In addition, Dotson related an incident in which
appellant threw a lamp at her when she was pregnant with the
baby. She said she was afraid of appellant.
Appellant contends the testimony was hearsay and
prejudicial to him. Prior to this testimony, however, the trial
judge gave the jury a cautionary instruction that they were to
consider Dotson's statements only in her case and not against
appellant. In final instructions to the jury before their
deliberations, the judge again instructed the jury as follows:
In considering your verdict against
[appellant], you may not consider any
statement made by Anna Dotson which was
- 15 -
introduced as evidence in this trial. Such
statement may only be considered in your
deliberations in the case of Anna Dotson.
Appellant assumes that the jury considered that evidence in
convicting him. We do not make that assumption. The trial
judge twice cautioned the jury to consider the evidence only in
its deliberation in Dotson's case. We presume that the jury
"follow[ed] prompt cautionary instructions regarding the
limitations placed upon evidence." Burley v. Commonwealth, 29
Va. App. 140, 147, 510 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1999) (citing LeVasseur
v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983)).
Nothing in the record clearly shows that the jury disregarded
those instructions.
Although appellant also contends the admission of these
statements violated his rights under the confrontation clause,
that argument was not made at trial and, therefore, is now
barred by Rule 5A:18.
IV.
Appellant contends that when the prosecutor made her
closing argument and referred to Dotson's statements, the trial
judge erred in refusing his motion for a mistrial.
The record indicates that when the prosecutor made her
closing statements about the social worker's conversation with
Dotson and appellant at their residence, she pointed to
appellant and said "he . . . took a lamp and threw it at her."
The trial judge sustained appellant's objection, ruling that the
- 16 -
prosecutor "has gotten a little untracked in view of the Court's
ruling regarding this testimony." Later, in her rebuttal
argument, the prosecutor referred to appellant's attorney's
argument that appellant did not generally carry the baby and
said, "Well, he didn't think it was his child . . . continually
fighting with his wife, accusing that he wasn't his child." The
trial judge again sustained appellant's objection, and denied
the motion for a mistrial.
The principles governing the review of this issue are well
established.
The grant or denial of a mistrial falls
within the sound discretion of the trial
court. A mistrial should not be granted for
minor irregularities and mistakes in a trial
which can be cured by a direction from the
trial court to disregard the irregularity or
mistake. A mistrial is not appropriate
unless "there is a manifest probability that
objectionable evidence or statements before
the jury are prejudicial to the adverse
party."
Clark v. Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 661, 385 S.E.2d 885, 888 (1989)
(citations omitted).
Although the evidence had been admitted in the prosecution
against Dotson, in each instance, the trial judge sustained
appellant's objection. Moreover, the trial judge twice had
cautioned the jury to use the evidence only against Dotson, and
not against appellant. In view of these circumstances, we
cannot say there was a manifest probability that the
- 17 -
prosecutor's action and statement were so prejudicial that they
were not cured by the trial judge's rulings.
V.
Appellant contends the trial judge erred in ruling that
Code § 18.2-371.1(A) did not require the Commonwealth to prove
omissions or refusals of care were willful, in refusing to
instruct the jury as to the definition of willful, and by
forbidding appellant's attorney to tell the jury that an
omission or refusal of care must have been willful. The
Commonwealth argues that the trial judge's rulings are not
reversible error because they did not prejudice appellant.
In pertinent part, the child abuse and neglect statute,
which is charged in the indictment, provides as follows:
A. Any parent, guardian, or other person
responsible for the care of a child under
the age of eighteen who by willful act or
omission or refusal to provide any necessary
care for the child's health causes or
permits serious injury to the life or health
of such child shall be guilty of a Class 4
felony. For purposes of this subsection,
"serious injury" shall include but not be
limited to (i) disfigurement, (ii) a
fracture, (iii) a severe burn or laceration,
(iv) mutilation, (v) maiming, (vi) forced
ingestion of dangerous substances, or (vii)
life-threatening internal injuries.
B. Any parent, guardian, or other person
responsible for the care of a child under
the age of eighteen whose willful act or
omission in the care of such child was so
gross, wanton and culpable as to show a
- 18 -
reckless disregard for human life shall be
guilty of a Class 6 felony.
Code § 18.2-371.1 (emphasis added).
The statute explicitly contains the disjunctive elements of
"willful act or omission or refusal to provide any necessary
care." Id. We would strain the meaning of the statute to read
it to require a "willful act" but an "omission" or "refusal"
that was not willful. In Ellis v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App.
548, 513 S.E.2d 453 (1999), we addressed the requirements of
proof to establish a violation under Code § 18.2-371.1. We held
that "something more than negligence must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to support [the] conviction" under the statute.
Id. at 555, 513 S.E.2d at 457. The ordinary definition of the
statutory element, "omission," means "[a] failure to do
something; esp., a neglect of duty." Black's Law Dictionary
1116 (7th ed. 1999). In addition, although a refusal is an
intentional act, it is not necessarily a willful act. Refusal
is defined to mean a "rejection of something demanded."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1910 (1981).
In Ellis, we held that a negligence standard was
insufficient to support a conviction under the statute. We also
noted that "inattention and inadvertance have not been
heretofore equated with actions taken willfully." 29 Va. App.
at 556, 513 S.E.2d at 457.
"Willful" generally means an act done with a
bad purpose, without justifiable excuse, or
- 19 -
without ground for believing it is lawful.
See Richardson v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App.
93, 99, 462 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1995). The
term denotes "'an act which is intentional,
or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished
from accidental.'" Snead v. Commonwealth,
11 Va. App. 643, 646, 400 S.E.2d 806, 807
(1991) (quoting United States v. Murdock,
290 U.S. 389, 394, 54 S. Ct. 223, 78 L. Ed.
381 (1933)). The terms "bad purpose" or
"without justifiable excuse," while facially
unspecific, necessarily imply knowledge that
particular conduct will likely result in
injury or illegality. See Murdock, 290 U.S.
at 395-95, 54 S. Ct. 223.
Id. at 554, 513 S.E.2d at 456 (footnote omitted).
Thus, we hold that to sustain a conviction under this
statute, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt a
"willful act or [willful] omission or [willful] refusal"
regarding the proscribed conduct. This conclusion necessarily
follows from the application of ordinary grammatical principles
and the general rule that "proper grammatical effect will be
given to the arrangement of words in a sentence of a statute."
Harris v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 620, 624, 128 S.E. 578, 579
(1925). "We presume that when drafting this statute, the
legislature understood the basic rules of grammar." Frere v.
Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 460, 464, 452 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1995).
Moreover, even if there is a choice to be made in reading the
statute, the principle is well established that "[c]riminal
statutes are to be 'strictly construed against the Commonwealth
and in favor of [a] citizen's liberty' . . . [and] must be
construed so as to proscribe only conduct which the legislature
- 20 -
clearly intended to be within the statute's ambit." King v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 351, 354-55, 368 S.E.2d 704, 706 (1988)
(citations omitted).
The trial judge incorrectly ruled that the statute did not
require the Commonwealth to prove that acts of omission or
refusal of care were willful and, likewise, erred in barring
appellant's attorney from arguing to the jury that such proof
was required for conduct alleged to be an omission or a refusal
of care. Because the judge's error lessened the conduct on
which the jury could convict, we cannot say that the error was
not prejudicial. The defense's inability to argue fully
hindered its ability to suggest reasonable doubt and taints the
legitimacy of the jury's verdict.
As a consequence of the judge's ruling on the statute's
meaning, he also refused to instruct the jury that "'Willful,'
in this case, means an act or omission done with bad purpose,
without justifiable excuse and without grounds for believing it
is lawful." The instruction was a correct statement of the law.
See Ellis, 29 Va. App. at 554, 513 S.E.2d at 456 (citing
Richardson, 21 Va. App. at 99, 462 S.E.2d at 123).
It is a well established, elementary principle, "that a
jury must be informed as to the essential elements of the
offense; a correct statement of the law is one of the essentials
of a fair trial." Darnell v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 485, 488,
370 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1988) (internal quotations and citation
- 21 -
omitted). "Unless [the essential] elements [of an offense] are
defined by instructions . . . to . . . the jury . . . , they
cannot properly determine whether the Commonwealth has carried
its burden [to prove each essential element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt]." Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
114, 116, 255 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1979). Moreover, a hallmark of a
fair trial is that "'instructions . . . should inform the jury
as to the law of the case applicable to the facts in such a
manner that [the jury] may not be misled.'" Cooper v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 497, 500, 345 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1986)
(citation omitted).
The rejected instruction would have informed the jury of
the level of culpability required to convict appellant of the
offense. Although the trial judge instructed the jury on the
meaning of "gross" and "culpable" conduct, which are elements of
the lesser-included offense, without further instruction, the
jury was left to predicate a conviction upon a finding of a mere
omission or a non-willful refusal. The jury received no
instruction as to what type of acts were "willful." "[W]hen a
principle of law is vital to a defendant in a criminal case, a
trial court has an affirmative duty properly to instruct a jury
about the matter." Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 250,
402 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1991).
Because the jury, as instructed, could have convicted
appellant of an omission or refusal that was not willful, we
- 22 -
cannot say that the trial judge's errors did not prejudice
appellant.
VI.
Appellant contends that the trial judge erred by failing to
strike the Commonwealth's evidence regarding malnourishment and
the healed fracture. He argues that the evidence permitted the
jury to speculate as to causation. The Commonwealth argues that
those circumstances were discovered after the baby was delivered
to the hospital and presented a jury issue.
These issues were circumstances that the jury was entitled
to consider in weighing the evidence. The principle is well
established that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is as competent and
is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is
sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except that of guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53,
307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). We find no error.
VII.
"Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after
conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). As
constitutionally required by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970),
"the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . is whether,
- 23 -
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979).
So viewed, the evidence proved that on July 13, 1996, when
the significant bruising and injuries were first discovered on
the baby, he was in the presence and care of appellant's teenage
daughter. The teenager testified that, with the exception of a
small bruise on his face, the baby was normal when she arrived
at appellant's house and did not appear to have any injuries.
She further testified that before leaving appellant's house with
the baby in her car, she failed to secure the baby in the infant
carrier and she put the infant carrier on the front seat. That
failure, she testified, resulted in the baby falling to the
floorboard of the car and being hit by the falling infant seat
after she sped along the highway, entered a curve, and slammed
on the brakes to avoid a stopped vehicle.
The Commonwealth argues that the jury could have
disbelieved the teenager, the Commonwealth's witness, because
she admitted at trial that she had testified differently at the
preliminary hearing in order to avoid incurring the wrath of her
grandparents and her father for injuring the child. We agree,
of course, that the jury, as "fact finder . . . may reject
testimony that has been impeached." Doss v. Commonwealth, 23
Va. App. 679, 685, 479 S.E.2d 92, 95 (1996). Even if we assume,
- 24 -
however, that the jury rejected this testimony, no evidence
otherwise explains the cause of the baby's broken arm and severe
bruising, which were evident when he was taken to the hospital
that same day by the teenager and her aunt. Dr. Keys, a witness
for the Commonwealth, testified that the bruises "could have
potentially all occurred on the same date." The jury would have
been left to speculate that the baby had those bruises when the
teenager drove away from appellant's home with the baby.
The evidence clearly established that the baby's broken arm
was a very recent injury. The baby's pediatrician testified
that he examined the baby on July 9, four days before he was
taken to the emergency room. At that time, the baby was
congested and coughing. He thoroughly examined the baby and
detected no bruises or broken bones. Although the triage nurse
testified that four days later when she touched or moved the
baby's arm, the baby cried, the teenager never testified that
the baby cried when she was preparing to leave appellant's house
or putting the baby in the car.
Even if we conclude that the jury disbelieved the baby's
pediatrician, the evidence in this record establishes that some
event likely occurred on July 13 that caused the teenager to
seek medical treatment for the baby. If that event, however,
was not the one described by the teenager, in which the baby was
injured in the car, then the record clearly fails to establish a
cause for the baby's bruises and broken arm. Simply put, except
- 25 -
for the teenager's testimony, the evidence does not otherwise
prove the circumstances in which the broken arm and bruising
occurred or who caused injury to the child.
"[E]vidence is not sufficient to support
a conviction if it engenders only a
suspicion or even a probability of guilt.
Conviction cannot rest upon conjecture. The
evidence must be such that it excludes every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
giving by the accused of an unclear or
unreasonable or false explanation of his
conduct or account of his doings are matters
for the jury to consider, but they do not
shift from the Commonwealth the ultimate
burden of proving by the facts or the
circumstances, or both, that beyond all
reasonable doubt the defendant committed the
crime charged against him."
Hyde v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 950, 955, 234 S.E.2d 74, 78 (1977)
(citation omitted). As the Supreme Court held in Christian v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1078, 1083, 277 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1981),
"[w]hile the defendant's opportunity to injure her [child] and
certain other circumstances in this case may raise inferences
which 'create a suspicion of guilt . . . or even a probability
of guilt', we are of opinion the evidence is insufficient to
exclude a reasonable hypothesis that someone other than the
defendant was the criminal agent."
The Commonwealth's evidence concerning the other claims of
abuse and neglect is similarly deficient. The teenager
testified that when she was at the appellant's house preparing
to leave, she noticed a small bruise on the baby's face. When
the social worker and the police arrived at appellant's house on
- 26 -
the afternoon of July 13, and informed appellant and Dotson that
the baby had been injured, Dotson informed them that the only
injury she was aware of was a small bruise on the baby's cheek
that occurred when her twenty-two-month-old child had hit the
baby two days earlier with the baby's feeder. Even if the jury
disbelieved that explanation for the bruise on the child's
cheek, no evidence proved that it was caused by appellant's
willful conduct.
When the baby was examined in the hospital, an x-ray showed
that the baby had a healed fracture in a bone in his left leg.
The doctor testified that the fracture was at least six weeks
old and could have occurred anytime from the baby's premature
birth until six weeks prior to the examination. He also
testified that, because the seven-month-old baby was not bearing
weight on his leg, the fracture might only have been manifested
by the child being "irritable and fussy." Another doctor
testified that "[c]hildren heal fractures very quickly" and that
it would be guesswork to say when and how it occurred merely by
viewing the x-ray. The baby's pediatrician testified that the
baby had been his patient since December 1995 and that he had
examined the baby six times during regular office visits. He
testified that he never saw bruises on the child and never
detected any broken bones; he found no reasons or indications
during his treatments to order x-rays to look for broken bones.
He testified that on July 9 when he examined the baby, the baby
- 27 -
"was essentially normal" and, except for a cold, the baby was
healthy.
Dr. Keys testified that the growth chart he prepared showed
that the baby, who was born prematurely, made "nice progress"
until his fifth month. No evidence tended to show that anyone
other than the appellant and Dotson were caring for the baby
during that period. Dr. Keys testified that "from five months
to what we saw in the seven and a-half months, [the baby]
basically didn't grow; didn't gain any weight, so he
flat-lined." He considered the lack of growth during that two
and a-half months "abnormal" and testified that "if [the baby]
was fed in the right way, he would gain weight." The doctor
testified that he did not know the cause of the feeding problem
and that "[i]t could have resulted from a lack of knowledge" by
the parents. In short, his testimony is consistent with proof
of faulty nutrition.
The Commonwealth had the burden of proving each element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth on
brief contends "[t]he jury reasonably could conclude, based on
all the evidence, that [appellant] was guilty of violating Code
§ 18.2-371.1(A)."
"Suspicion of guilt, however strong, or even
a probability of guilt, is insufficient to
support a conviction." And, when the
evidence is wholly circumstantial, as in
this case, "all necessary circumstances
proved must be consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence and exclude
- 28 -
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
The chain of necessary circumstances must be
unbroken."
Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 317-18, 410 S.E.2d 621, 627
(1991) (citations omitted).
Even if the judge had properly instructed the jury
concerning the Commonwealth's obligation to prove willful
conduct, the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, failed to establish sufficient evidence from
which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant engaged in willful acts, or willful omissions, or
willful refusals to provide any necessary care for the baby's
health. The jury could not have found without speculation that
appellant acted willfully. Accordingly, we reverse the
conviction and dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and dismissed.
- 29 -