Mary Lee Frances Keene, Admini.etc v. Boothe, P&C ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Salem, Virginia
MARY LEE FRANCES KEENE, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF HARRISON KEENE,
DECEASED
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2641-00-3 JUDGE G. STEVEN AGEE
MAY 22, 2001
THERESA M. BOOTHE, t/a
P & C PAINTING AND
UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Paul G. Beers (Jerry L. Falwell, Jr.; Glenn,
Feldmann, Darby & Goodlatte, on briefs), for
appellant.
Robert L. Walker, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; John J.
Beall, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee Uninsured
Employer's Fund.
No brief or argument for Teresa M. Boothe,
t/a P & C Painting.
Mary Lee Frances Keene (the claimant) filed a claim for
death benefits against Theresa M. Boothe, t/a P & C Painting
(P&C) on September 13, 1999 with the Virginia Workers'
Compensation Commission (commission) as a result of the drowning
death of her husband, Harrison Keene (Keene), on April 27, 1999.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
After an evidentiary hearing, Deputy Commissioner Herring
denied the claim finding P&C had an insufficient number of
employees to bring it under the jurisdiction of the Virginia
Workers' Compensation Act (the Act). The claimant appealed the
decision to the full commission.
In a review opinion, dated October 20, 2000, the full
commission affirmed the denial of benefits, but on different
grounds. While finding that it had jurisdiction to consider the
matter, the commission also found that the accident did not
occur during the course of Keene's employment with P&C and,
therefore, was not a compensable claim.
Both the claimant and the Uninsured Employer's Fund (Fund)
noted an appeal. As P&C was uninsured, the Fund would be liable
for an award in favor of the claimant in accordance with Code
§ 65.2-1203. The claimant challenges the commission's decision
that her husband's death did not occur during the course of his
employment. The Fund challenges the commission's assertion of
jurisdiction. 1
For the following reasons we affirm the commission's
decision.
1
The Fund withdrew its separate appeal, assigning as
cross-error, as an appellee in this appeal, the commission's
finding as to jurisdiction.
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I. BACKGROUND
P&C's 1998 payroll records reflect that nine people were
paid by the business during that calendar year. The records
reflect that P&C paid three people for the week ending September
18, 1998. All other weeks reflect payment to either one or two
employees. The 1999 payroll records showed payments to three
people: Keene, Mike Nichols and Edward Woolridge. While Keene
and Nichols were paid over several months, Woolridge was paid
once on January 15, 1999.
While the payroll records only mention those three
employees, Paul Boothe (Boothe), the former owner of the
company, regularly represented P&C by providing customers with
estimates for jobs, negotiating contracts, supervising jobs and
doing some painting. Boothe admitted that he cancelled P&C's
Workers' Compensation insurance without the owner's knowledge
because he did not think the firm needed the coverage. He
affirmed the owner, his ex-wife, was the boss and directed his
actions, although he did not always follow her instructions.
Boothe disclaimed any ownership interest in P&C and testified
P&C paid for his expenses in cash but he was not on the payroll.
P&C employed Keene as a painter and as Boothe's driver.
Keene would routinely pick up Boothe and take the "work van" to
the job site. He did so on the date of his death, April 27,
1999, when Keene fell from a boathouse/deck complex on Smith
Mountain Lake and drowned.
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The property where Keene was working when he died was
Edward Waters' private residence. Waters had previously used
P&C to paint some of his commercial property with Boothe having
acted as P&C's agent for those jobs. Waters had asked for and
received a certificate of Workers' Compensation insurance when
P&C began doing work on his commercial properties showing
coverage through May 28, 1999.
According to Waters, he hired P&C to paint the boathouse at
his private residence, again making arrangements with Boothe,
who provided a written estimate on P&C letterhead.
Boothe nonetheless testified that he and Waters had reached
a subsequent oral agreement when Boothe related that he and
Keene could do the work for less than P&C would charge.
According to Boothe, he and Keene were to split what money was
left after material costs were covered. Boothe also claimed
P&C's owner was not aware that Boothe and Keene were painting
this property as a "side job" despite the P&C van being driven
to the site and the use of P&C equipment. At the completion of
the boathouse job, Waters paid Boothe in cash. Boothe then paid
the claimant with a personal check.
At the accident scene, Boothe informed the investigator
that he and Keene were employees of P&C. In addition, OSHA
cited and fined P&C for the accident.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The Fund challenges the commission's finding that it had
jurisdiction to consider the claim. The Fund argues that P&C
did not fall under the authority of the Act because it did not
"regularly" employ three persons at the time of the accident.
We disagree.
"'Employee' means . . . [e]very person . . .
in the service of another under any contract
of hire or apprenticeship, written or
implied, except . . . one whose employment
is not in the usual course of the trade,
business, occupation or profession of the
employer." Both full-time and part-time
employees who are regularly employed to
carry out the trade or business of the
employer must be counted in determining the
number of employees "regularly in service"
to the employer. "Any person hired by the
employer to work in the usual course of the
employer's business is an 'employee' under
the Act regardless of how often or for how
long he may be employed." The number of
employees regularly in service of the
employer is the number "used to carry out
the established mode of performing the work
of the business . . . even though the work
may be recurrent instead of constant."
Smith v. Hylton, 14 Va. App. 354, 356, 416 S.E.2d 712, 714
(1992) (citations omitted).
The commission found that the firm did employ three or more
persons at the time of the accident, and on appeal we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant, who
prevailed on this issue below. Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Briggs,
28 Va. App. 662, 672, 508 S.E.2d 335, 340 (1998). "'"Decisions
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of the commission as to questions of fact, if supported by
credible evidence, are conclusive and binding on this Court."'"
Id. at 673, 508 S.E.2d at 340 (citations omitted).
It is the employer's burden (here, the Fund's burden) to
produce sufficient evidence upon which the commission can find
that the employer employed fewer than three employees regularly
in service in Virginia and that it is thus exempt from the Act.
Craddock Moving & Storage Co. v. Settles, 16 Va. App. 1, 2, 427
S.E.2d 428, 429 (1993), aff'd per curiam, 247 Va. 165, 440
S.E.2d 613 (1994). Here, the employer failed to meet this
burden.
We hold the commission's finding that P&C regularly
employed three employees in April 1999 to be supported by
credible evidence. Payroll records show that P&C paid both
Keene and Nichols from February 26 through April 30, 1999.
Additionally, while the payroll records do not reflect payments
to him, the firm employed Boothe. Boothe worked 40 hours per
week negotiating, supervising and painting; he was reimbursed by
the firm for his expenses; he used without charge the firm's
vehicle, driver and equipment; he took direction from Theresa
Boothe, the firm's owner; he was perceived as an employee and
agent of P&C by clients such as Waters; his name and telephone
number appeared on P&C business cards; and he informed the
investigating officer that he and Keene were employees of P&C.
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Under these circumstances we are persuaded that an implied
contract to pay wages or reimbursement existed between Boothe
and P&C, and the commission's finding of a third employee is
thus supported. We find this case distinguishable from
Charlottesville Music Center, Inc. v. McCray, 215 Va. 31, 205
S.E.2d 674 (1974), cited and relied on by the Fund. In McCray,
fifteen-year-old Jeffrey McCray stopped in at the
Charlottesville Music Center to help a friend, who had a summer
job at the store, install shelving. While the owner of the
Music Center knew McCray was present, he had not agreed to pay
the boy for his efforts. Id. at 35-36, 205 S.E.2d at 678.
McCray was killed as he assisted in the shelving project,
and his administrator sued the store for death benefits under
the Act. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial
court's conclusion that McCray was not an "employee" within the
meaning of the Act and therefore the administrator could not
recover benefits. The Supreme Court held that McCray was not an
employee because no "implied contract of hire" existed between
the decedent and the store. Id. at 35, 205 S.E.2d at 678.
The Court held that an "implied contract of hire" may be
presumed from the circumstances surrounding the parties' working
relationship:
An implied contract of hire exists where one
party has rendered services or labor of
value to another under circumstances which
raise the presumption that the parties
intended and understood that they were to be
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paid for, or which a reasonable man in the
position of the person receiving the benefit
of the services or labor would or ought to
know that compensation or remuneration of
some kind was to be exchanged for them.
Id. The circumstances surrounding McCray's voluntary passing
presence at the Music Center did "not permit a presumption that
decedent and defendant, by their conduct, intended that decedent
would be paid for his work." Id. at 35-36, 205 S.E.2d at 678.
The circumstances in this case, as set out above, however, do
permit such a presumption. Finding Boothe to be a third
employee of P&C, the commission correctly found it had
jurisdiction in this matter.
B. Compensable Accident Occurring During Employment
The commission found as a fact that the boathouse job was
not performed under a contract between Waters and P&C, but was
instead a direct contract between Keene and Boothe (as the
vendor) and Waters (as the vendee). Having found that Keene was
not engaged in P&C work at the time of the accident, the
commission accordingly held Keene's death did not occur during
the course of employment with P&C and was therefore not
compensable. Bound by basic principles of appellate review, we
must affirm the commission's decision.
An injury is compensable under the Act if it results from an
accident and arises out of and in the course of the claimant's
employment. Code § 65.2-101. The requirement that the injury
be "arising out of" employment pertains to the origin or cause
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of the injury. Combs v. Virginia Electric & Power Company, 259
Va. 503, 509, 525 S.E.2d 278, 282 (2000). In contrast, the
requirement that the injury arise "in the course of employment"
refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the
accident occurred. Id. at 511, 525 S.E.2d at 283. "An accident
occurs in the course of employment when it takes place within
the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may
reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties
of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental
thereto." Id. (citing Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335,
196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938)).
The determination of whether Keene's death arose out of and
in the course of his employment is a mixed question of law and
fact. See Norfolk Community Hosp. v. Smith, 33 Va. App. 1, 4,
531 S.E.2d 576, 578 (2000). We review mixed questions of law
and fact de novo. Fairfax County Sch. Bd. v. Rose, 29 Va. App.
32, 37, 509 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1999). However, the claimant urges
a broad scope of de novo review that essentially asks this Court
to make new findings of fact as opposed to applying the law to
historical fact as determined by the commission. While
distilling mixed questions of fact and law can be a murky
business, we are not at liberty to retry factual findings on
appeal. See Roanoke Belt, Inc. v. Mroczkowski, 20 Va. App. 60,
68, 455 S.E.2d 267, 271 (1995).
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The claimant argues that the commission should have
accorded her a presumption that Keene died during the course of
his employment based on the rule established in Southern Motor
Lines Co. v. Alvis, 200 Va. 168, 171, 104 S.E.2d 735, 738
(1958):
Where an employee is found dead as the
result of an accident at his place of work
or nearby, where his duties may have called
him during the hours of this work, and there
is no evidence offered to show what caused
his death or to show that he was not engaged
in his master's business at the time, the
Court will indulge the presumption that the
relation of master and servant existed at
the time of the accident and that it arose
out of and in the course of his employment.
This claim fails on two grounds.
First, assuming we could ignore the factual findings of the
commission that Keene was working a "side job" at the time of
his accident, the Alvis presumption cannot be applied where
there is any evidence to show Keene "was not engaged in his
master's business at the time." Id. at 171, 104 S.E.2d at 738.
Here, there clearly was evidence in the record (Boothe's
testimony that he and Keene were working a "side job") that
Keene was not engaged in P&C business at the time of his death.
Accordingly, the Alvis presumption is not available. See Thomas
Nelson Ltd. Partnership v. Fritz, 11 Va. App. 269, 397 S.E.2d
891 (1990).
Moreover, while Keene was an ongoing employee of P&C,
according to the testimony of Boothe, Keene was not engaged in
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P&C's employ at the time of the accident. The commission found
as a fact that he was engaged in a "side job" essentially as an
independent contractor. We cannot set aside this finding of
historical fact as it is supported by credible evidence in the
form of Boothe's testimony and the uncontradicted evidence of
the method of payment by Waters to Boothe and then Boothe to the
claimant. While this Court may have reached a different
conclusion based on the evidence, as the concurring opinion
reflects, we cannot substitute our judgment on appeal for that
of the trier of fact as to the weight of the evidence and
witness credibility when reviewing its findings of fact. Dollar
General Store v. Cridlin, 22 Va. App. 171, 176, 468 S.E.2d 152,
154 (1996). Since Keene was not on P&C business at the time of
his death, the Alvis presumption cannot apply.
The claimant also argues that the commission's factual
determination as to whether the boathouse job belonged to P&C or
Keene and Boothe individually is not binding on this Court as
there is no credible evidence in the record to support that
finding. We must disagree.
We cannot hold, as a matter of law based on the record,
that there is no credible evidence to support the commission's
finding. While we may question the commission's conclusions, as
the concurring opinion reflects, there was direct evidence from
Boothe verifying the nature of the boathouse work as a side job.
There was no direct testimony to contradict Boothe's version
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which was further supported by the method of payment. We cannot
say as a matter of law that Boothe's testimony was inherently
incredible and, therefore, we are bound by the commission's
finding of fact that the boathouse job was not a P&C contract.
Since Keene was not in P&C's employ at the time of the
accident, the commission did not err in determining the accident
was not compensable as the death did not arise out of and in the
course of employment with P&C.
The decision of the commission is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Coleman, J., concurring.
Although I am obliged to concur in the majority holding
that credible evidence supports the commission's factual finding
that the job to paint Edward Waters' boathouse was a "side job"
entered into between Paul Boothe and Edward Waters, I write
separately to express my view that on this record the commission
has unjustly permitted Theresa M. Boothe, t/a P & C Painting and
Paul Boothe to avoid their responsibility under the Workers'
Compensation Act for the death of their employee, Harrison
Keene. Admittedly, the testimony of Paul Boothe, if believed,
which obviously the commission accepted, would prove that Keene
was not working on a job for P&C when he died in a work-related
accident. However, had I been the fact finder, in my view, a
preponderance of the evidence proved that Keene died while
working for P & C Painting, and not while working independently
for Paul Boothe. I feel compelled to write separately on this
occasion to express to the commission my concern for the unjust
result, in my opinion, occasioned by their fact finding role in
this case.
The evidence makes clear, and the commission obviously
found, that Paul Boothe, the former owner of P & C Painting, and
the former husband of Theresa Boothe, the ostensible owner of
P & C Painting, was an employee and agent of P & C Painting.
Despite Paul Boothe's effort to have P&C's financial records
reflect that he received no financial gain from P&C and that he
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did not work for P&C but merely volunteered his extensive
services in obtaining business for P&C and performing daily
management and labor responsibilities, the commission obviously
did not believe Paul Boothe as to whether he was an employee of
P&C. The evidence makes clear, and the commission so found,
that Boothe was an employee of P&C despite his efforts to make
it appear that he was not an employee. The obvious reason that
Boothe was attempting to exclude himself as an employee was to
avoid P&C's responsibility of being required to provide workers'
compensation insurance under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Boothe admitted that he canceled P&C's workers' compensation
insurance without Theresa Boothe's knowledge because he did not
think that P&C needed the coverage. On these facts, the
commission rejected, as not credible, P&C's evidence that Boothe
was not an employee of P&C.
As to whether Keene's death occurred while working for P&C
or while he was performing an independent "side job" with Paul
Boothe, the evidence is equally compelling, in my opinion, that
Boothe was attempting to also avoid P&C's responsibility of
having Keene's death covered by the Act when he testified that
the Waters' job was a "side job." Obviously, the commission, as
fact finder, believed Boothe that the work was a "side job," and
the commission believed this despite Paul Boothe's other
transparent attempts to avoid responsibility under the Act and
despite Edward Waters' testimony that he hired P & C Painting,
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with whom he had done business before, to paint the boathouse.
As fact finder I would have rejected Paul Boothe's testimony
that he had accepted the Waters' job on a personal basis at a
lesser price than what his employer, P & C Painting, would have
done the job and that he did so using P&C's van and equipment,
all of which was unknown to and contrary to the business
interest of his employer and former wife for whom he was
performing duties like a full-time employee/foreman on a
"volunteer" basis. Moreover, the fact that Paul Boothe paid
Keene's widow, after the fact, the wages to which Harrison Keene
would have been entitled, a fact that the commission relied upon
to believe Paul Boothe, is scant evidence, in my opinion, upon
which the commission should have relied to believe Paul Boothe
that he and Keene were performing a "side job."
My oath requires that I give deference to the commission's
factual finding, but had I been the trier of fact I would have
concluded that Harrison Keene died as the result of an accident
that arose out of and during the course of his employment with
P & C Painting and that he was not performing a "side job" with
Paul Boothe.
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