William Darnell Briggs v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2008 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Humphreys and Millette
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
WILLIAM DARNELL BRIGGS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1258-07-1 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
JULY 1, 2008
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
A. Joseph Canada, Jr., Judge
Aleasa D. Leonard (Office of the Public Defender, on brief), for
appellant.
Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. McDonnell,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
William Darnell Briggs (“Briggs”), appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm
after having been found guilty of a delinquent act that would have been a violent felony if
committed as an adult, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. He argues that the evidence introduced
at trial was insufficient to establish a prior finding of guilt for a felony. We disagree and affirm
his conviction.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, “the trial court’s judgment will
not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Hunley v.
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 556, 559, 518 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1999). “The credibility of a
witness and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder’s
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
determination.” Holley v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 158, 163, 562 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2002)
(quoting Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998)).
“When the fact of a prior conviction is an element of a charged offense, the burden is on
the Commonwealth to prove that prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” Palmer v.
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 203, 207, 609 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2005). “As provided by statute, a
judgment order must reflect, among other things, the plea of the defendant, the verdict or
findings of the fact finder, and the adjudication and sentence of the court.” Id. (citing Code
§ 19.2-307). “The mere notation of a sentence, although suggestive of a conviction, does not
establish the fact or nature of any conviction.” Id.
“‘A court may not engage in conjecture or surmise in determining the offense for which a
defendant was convicted.’” Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724, 728, 652 S.E.2d 95, 97
(2007) (quoting Palmer, 269 Va. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310). “Thus, when the Commonwealth
seeks to prove a prior conviction as an element of a crime by presenting an order entered in that
prior case, the order must show that a judgment of conviction was entered in adjudication of the
charge.” Palmer, 269 Va. at 207, 609 S.E.2d at 310.
In making his argument, Briggs relies on Palmer. In that case, the Supreme Court of
Virginia addressed another conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon. Id. at 205, 609
S.E.2d at 308. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced four petitions and accompanying
disposition orders from Halifax County Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court
(“J&DR”). Two of the petitions alleged that Palmer had committed the delinquent act of grand
larceny, while the other two petitions alleged that Palmer had committed the delinquent act of
burglary with intent to commit larceny. Id. at 205, 609 S.E.2d at 309. The orders did not contain
any notations providing an adjudication of the four charges, but each order directed Palmer to:
(1) pay restitution to the victim; and (2) be committed to jail for twelve months, with six months
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suspended. The orders directed the sentences to run concurrently. Id. at 206, 609 S.E.2d at 309.
Palmer was eighteen years old at the time he was sentenced. Id.The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the conviction, holding that the orders did not
establish the fact or nature of Palmer’s adjudication. Id. at 208, 609 S.E.2d at 310. The Court
noted that the orders did not disclose if Palmer had pled guilty to four misdemeanors rather than
felonies. Because he was eighteen years of age at the time he was sentenced, the Court reasoned
that the J&DR was permitted to sentence Palmer to jail for acts that would have been a
misdemeanor if committed by an adult. Id. (citing Code § 16.1-284).
In Overbey v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 231, 623 S.E.2d 904 (2006), our Supreme Court
again reversed a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. In that case, the
Commonwealth introduced a petition from the Hampton J&DR with two pages of notes relating
to the proceedings in the juvenile court attached. Id. at 232, 623 S.E.2d at 904. Overbey was
charged with both burglary and petit larceny. The notes read: “based on the plea of guilty,
stipulation & summary of evidence, Ct finds def guilty and refer for PO report.” Id. at 233, 623
S.E.2d at 905. The Court held that the language in the notes was ambiguous and could mean that
Overbey had pled guilty to petit larceny, to burglary, or both. Our Supreme Court also held that
“the trial court [necessarily] had to engage in pure conjecture or surmise to determine . . . that the
defendant pled guilty to both [offenses].” Id. at 234, 623 S.E.2d at 906.
By contrast, our Supreme Court upheld a conviction for the same charge in Perez v.
Commonwealth. In that case, the Commonwealth introduced three documents into evidence in
order to prove Perez’s prior conviction. The first two documents were petitions from the Prince
William County J&DR, and the third was a disposition order entered by the Fairfax County
J&DR. Id. at 726-27, 652 S.E.2d at 96. One petition alleged that Perez had committed burglary,
while the second alleged that he had committed grand larceny, listing him as fifteen years old at
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the time of the offense. Id. at 727, 652 S.E.2d at 96. The disposition order matched the case
numbers from the petitions, and listed the type of case as “felony.” 1 Id. The findings of the
court read “child has been found guilty of two counts – B&E + Larceny.” The order directed
that “child be committed to D.J.J.” Id.Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, the Court noted that the
disposition order clearly indicated that Perez had been found guilty of two specific offenses, and
at least one of those charges was a felony. Id. at 730, 652 S.E.2d at 98. The Court also noted
that the order clearly indicated that Perez was a “child” at the time he was convicted, and by
necessity, must have been a “child under age 18 when he was convicted for the felonies of
breaking and entering and larceny.” Id. 2
Palmer and Overbey do not control the outcome of this case, because they are both easily
distinguishable. The facts of this case are more similar to those in Perez. Here, the case
numbers are consistent throughout the three documents from the Norfolk J&DR. The disposition
order clearly states that Briggs was found guilty of aggravated sexual battery, a felony.
Furthermore, the petition lists Briggs’ age as fifteen years old at the time of the offense, and the
disposition order directs Briggs to be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice. As such,
the evidence was sufficient for the court to find, without “conjecture or surmise,” that Briggs, a
juvenile, had been found guilty of a delinquent act that would be a violent felony if committed by
an adult. 3
1
The disposition of the charges was apparently transferred to the Fairfax County J&DR
after adjudication. Such a transfer is authorized by Code § 16.1-243(B)(1).
2
In making this determination, the Court cited Code § 16.1-228, which defines a “child”
as a person less than 18 years of age.
3
Code § 17.1-805(C) lists aggravated sexual battery as an offense that constitutes a
“violent felony” for purposes of Code § 18.2-308.2.
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For these reasons, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove Briggs’ status as a
person found guilty of an act as a juvenile that would have been a violent felony had it been
committed by an adult.
Affirmed.
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