Mustafa Salaam v. Commonwealth ( 2006 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Kelsey and Beales
Argued by teleconference
MUSTAFA SALAAM
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1882-05-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
DECEMBER 12, 2006
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Lydia C. Taylor, Judge1
James O. Broccoletti (Zoby & Broccoletti, P.C., on brief), for
appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Robert F.
McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Mustafa Salaam, appellant, was convicted, in a jury trial, of first-degree murder, in
violation of Code § 18.2-32, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of
Code § 18.2-53.1. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a
statement made by the decedent just prior to his death. Finding any error harmless, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
On October 15, 1999, Juawann Coward and appellant engaged in a fistfight in the middle
of DeBree Avenue in Norfolk. Nina Fenner, who had known Coward for a month, testified that
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
Judge Johnny C. Morrison denied appellant’s first motion in limine on the first issue he
raises on appeal. Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), appellant filed a second motion in limine. Judge Charles E.
Poston denied that motion.
she witnessed the fight. She testified that she saw appellant retreat into a building and return
with a gun. Coward was still in the middle of the street when appellant returned. Appellant
pointed the gun at Coward and shot him. Coward ran behind an apartment building, and
appellant followed. Coward finally stopped at the doorway of another apartment building where
he fell to the ground bleeding. Ms. Fenner approached Coward, who was on his hands and
knees. She could hear him crying, and testified that he said, “I’m shot. I’m dying, and Mustafa
shot me.”
When initially questioned by police that night, Fenner told police she did not know what
happened, did not see the shooting, and did not want to get involved. The next day, however,
she told police about Coward’s statement and said that she witnessed appellant shoot Coward.
Fenner admitted she has been convicted of two larceny misdemeanors.
Dora Hollowell was returning to her home at 404 West 26th Street when she witnessed
the fight between appellant and Coward on DeBree Avenue. While observing the fight, she saw
Coward take off the t-shirt he was wearing and throw it on the ground. As she was entering her
apartment, she heard the first gunshot. She testified that Coward ran past her screaming, “Ah,
ah, it hurts.” Appellant, running behind Coward, was pointing a black gun which looked like a
“45 or .9mm.” Appellant fired a second shot at Coward as they crossed a grass median,
shouting, “I’m going to kill you.” Coward reached an apartment in the neighboring building at
410 West 26th Street. He began beating on the door and screaming for help. Coward then
collapsed on the doorstep. Appellant stood over him and fired two or three more rounds into
Coward’s body. Appellant then ran quickly away in the direction of DeBree Avenue, heading
north on that road. Hollowell testified that her fiancé, who was inside their apartment during the
incident, had heard the gunshots and screaming and called the police. The day after the shooting,
Hollowell identified appellant from a photographic lineup of six suspects.
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Detective Charles Payne was dispatched to the 400 block of West 26th Street and
observed Coward’s body positioned on his hands and knees. Payne noticed “a considerable
amount of blood” on the doorstep of 410 West 26th Street where Coward had fallen, along with a
gunshot wound to Coward’s back.
Investigator Martin investigated the crime scene. He recovered a white t-shirt from the
2600 block of DeBree Avenue, where Hollowell saw Coward remove his shirt during the fight.
Martin collected six .9mm cartridge casings that followed appellant’s pursuit of Coward from the
location of the initial fight on DeBree Avenue to the location where Coward’s body was found in
front of 410 West 26th Street.
Corporal Huffman, who was working as a homicide detective at the time of the shooting,
also investigated the crime scene. He testified that a blood trail led from the area of the initial
fight to the door of 410 West 26th Street where Coward’s body was found.
Vernetta Boyd lives at 436 West 29th Street, which is located three blocks north of the
crime scene between DeBree and Colonial Avenues. She was mowing her lawn on October 19,
1999, and discovered a gun in her yard. She turned the firearm over to police, who were able to
identify the weapon as an unloaded .9mm pistol. Police investigators recovered no prints of
value from the gun.
Paul Murphy, a firearms expert, testified that the bullet casings recovered from the scene
matched the gun found in Boyd’s yard. The gun also matched two bullets taken from the
decedent during an autopsy.
The medical examiner testified that the deceased sustained five separate gunshot wounds.
She was able to determine that two gunshot wounds entered the decedent through his back, and
one gunshot wound entered the decedent through the back of his thigh. She opined that either, or
both, of the wounds to Coward’s back were the cause of death.
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In two separate motions in limine, appellant asked the trial court to exclude Coward’s
statement to Fenner. The court denied both motions, and this appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that Coward’s statement to Fenner does not qualify as a dying
declaration exception to the hearsay rule and, thus, should have been excluded from trial.
Alternatively, he contends that the statement violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in admitting Coward’s statement at
trial, we find that, in light of the other evidence adduced at trial, the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
“‘It is a well recognized principle of appellate review that constitutional questions should
not be decided if the record permits final disposition of a cause on non-constitutional grounds.’”
Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 58, 64, 628 S.E.2d 74, 77 (2006) (en banc) (quoting
Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 516, 352 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1987)). Similarly, “an appellate court
decides cases ‘on the best and narrowest ground available.’” Id. (quoting Air Courier
Conference v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 531 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
“‘[V]iolations of the Confrontation Clause . . . are subject to harmless error review.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004)).
“When a federal constitutional error is involved, a reviewing court must reverse the
judgment unless it determines that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Clay v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 253, 259, 546 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2001). “‘We decide whether the
erroneous admission of evidence was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal on the basis of
our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact on the
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fact finder.’” Corado v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 315, 323, 623 S.E.2d 452, 456 (2005)
(quoting Green v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 438, 446, 528 S.E.2d 187, 191 (2000)). “‘An
error is harmless only when it plainly appears from the record and the evidence that the error has
not affected the verdict. Whether an error does not affect the verdict must be determined without
usurping the jury’s fact finding function.’” Id. (quoting Hooker v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.
454, 457, 418 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1992)).
We acknowledge that Fenner gave conflicting testimony, that she failed to appear in court
for the second trial, and that her credibility was impeached by her three prior misdemeanor
convictions. However, even removing Fenner’s testimony altogether, including her recitation of
Coward’s dying declaration, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming.
Hollowell, whose credibility was not challenged by appellant at trial, was an eyewitness
to the shooting. Hollowell positively identified appellant as the shooter, both at trial and at a
photographic lineup presented to her by police. Hollowell testified that she saw appellant shoot
Coward multiple times. The gunshot wounds to Coward’s back and back of his leg are
consistent with Hollowell’s testimony that appellant ran behind Coward as he shot him, and with
her testimony that appellant stood over Coward, who was on his hands and knees, when
appellant fired the last shots into him.
Observations of the police officers responding to the scene also corroborated the account
of events given by Hollowell. Officers found a white t-shirt in the area where Hollowell testified
that she saw Coward remove his shirt. A blood trail led from the area where Hollowell observed
the initial fight to the apartment door where Coward’s body was found. The .9mm cartridge
casings recovered from the scene corresponded to the three different locations where Hollowell
testified that shots had been fired. The gun that was recovered from Boyd’s yard matched the
description of the gun Hollowell saw appellant holding, and police determined that weapon fired
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the shots that killed Coward. The location where the gun was found was consistent with the
direction that appellant took while fleeing the scene.
Coward’s dying declaration as to the identity of his shooter was merely cumulative of the
testimony of the eyewitness Dora Hollowell. Even if this statement, and Fenner’s entire
testimony, had been excluded at trial, it plainly appears from the remaining evidence that the
verdict would not have been affected. Thus, we find that any error in admitting Coward’s dying
declaration was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that any error in admitting Coward’s statement into
evidence at trial was harmless. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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