Commonwealth of Virginia v. Melvin Maurice Johnson ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Lemons and Senior Judge Baker
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1244-99-1 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
NOVEMBER 9, 1999
MELVIN MAURICE JOHNSON
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Jerome James, Judge
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
Michelle J. Harris (Abrons, Fasanaro &
Sceviour, on brief), for appellee.
In this appeal by the Commonwealth, the sole question is
whether the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (trial court)
erroneously suppressed Melvin Maurice Johnson's (Johnson)
inculpatory confession to robbery and related charges. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that Johnson knowingly and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights and that his confession
was voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court.
I.
On an appeal from a trial court's decision to suppress a
defendant's confession, "[w]e are bound by the trial court's
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
findings of historical fact unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support them." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App.
193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). But "[w]e review
de novo questions of law and the trial court's application of
defined legal standards to the particular facts of a case."
Timbers v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 187, 193, 503 S.E.2d 233,
236 (1998).
"In considering the standard of review in this case, we are
confronted with two separate questions: (1) the standard of
review of a trial court's finding of the voluntariness of a
confession; and (2) the standard of review concerning the
finding of the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights." Goodwin
v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 249, 252, 349 S.E.2d 161, 163
(1986). Whether a statement provided by a defendant to police
is voluntary is a legal rather than a factual question, subject
to independent review by this Court. See Bottenfield v.
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 316, 324, 487 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1997).
"[T]he inquiry whether a waiver of Miranda rights was made
knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact, and the trial
court's resolution of that question is entitled on appeal to a
presumption of correctness." Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va.
576, 581, 423 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992).
- 2 -
II.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, the
prevailing party below, the evidence proved that on January 28,
1999, Detective Crawford's investigation of a January 4, 1999
home-invasion robbery led him to Johnson's residence. After
talking to Johnson's cousin, Crawford had reason to believe that
Johnson, who was then seventeen years old, had been involved in
the robbery. Upon his return home from school that afternoon,
Johnson spoke briefly with Crawford and agreed to accompany
Crawford to the police operations center (POC) for questioning.
Johnson resided with his grandmother, Gladys Lindsey, who
was also his legal guardian. After talking to Johnson, Crawford
spoke briefly with Lindsey and told her he wanted to question
Johnson at the POC. He asked Lindsey to come to the POC so she
could witness Johnson's signature on the Miranda waiver form.
Initially, Crawford did not tell Lindsey that Johnson was a
suspect in the robbery investigation.
At the POC, Crawford obtained Lindsey's signature on a
Miranda waiver form, which Johnson also read and signed. At the
suppression hearing, Lindsey testified that the form was blank
when she signed it. Johnson initially testified that Crawford
escorted Lindsey out of the interview room after he, Johnson,
signed the form, but Johnson later testified that Lindsey was
not present when he signed the form. Crawford testified that
Lindsey signed the rights form in Johnson's presence, after
- 3 -
Johnson executed the form. Johnson admitted reading and signing
the Miranda waiver, and Crawford testified that Johnson
indicated he understood his Miranda rights.
After Lindsey signed the waiver form, Crawford escorted her
from the interview room because his "personal policy" showed
that usually "if you are talking to someone, they are less
inclined to speak if their parents are in there." Crawford told
Lindsey that he was not interested in Johnson as a suspect, but
that he was after the more culpable participants in the robbery.
He also told Lindsey that Johnson would be released to go home
in approximately two hours.
Johnson arrived at the POC at 1:45 p.m., and Crawford began
interrogating Johnson at 2:15 p.m. Johnson initially denied any
involvement in the robbery. Crawford indicated that he did not
believe Johnson and explained to Johnson the seriousness of the
offense. The initial interview concluded at 2:55 p.m., after
Johnson asked for some time to "think about it for a while."
Crawford resumed the interrogation with Johnson at 4:35 p.m. At
6:00 p.m., Crawford and Johnson visited the crime scene,
returning to the POC at 6:25 p.m. At 8:50 p.m., Crawford
resumed the interrogation, and Johnson subsequently admitted his
involvement in the robbery. The interrogation concluded at
9:18 p.m., after Johnson signed a written statement prepared by
Crawford.
- 4 -
While Johnson was at the POC, Crawford allowed Johnson to
take bathroom breaks, and he offered Johnson food and drink on
several occasions.
Johnson claimed he confessed only after becoming frustrated
and because he wanted to go home. He also testified that he had
smoked a marijuana "blunt" about twenty minutes before he
initially met Crawford and that he was still "high" when he
signed the confession. Johnson admitted that he never told
Crawford he was under the influence of marijuana, and Crawford
testified that Johnson did not appear to be intoxicated or
otherwise "under the influence."
While Crawford was interrogating Johnson, Johnson's father
and uncle both came to the POC and attempted to see Johnson.
Police denied both men access to Johnson.
Johnson moved to suppress his confession on the ground that
it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the Constitution of the United States and Code § 16.1-247. The
trial court found that Johnson was not deprived of any physical
comforts; that he was doing well in the 11th grade of school and
appeared to be intelligent; that he had not had "appreciable"
contact with the police nor had he previously experienced
"police interrogation"; that he had smoked a marijuana "blunt"
sometime on the day of his arrest; that he continued to be
questioned after denying any involvement in the robbery; that he
was deprived of the presence of his guardian who had been
- 5 -
removed from the interview room after being used to witness
Johnson's signing of the rights waiver; and that Crawford's
tactic of not permitting Lindsey to be present as Johnson was
being questioned violated the very purpose of a guardianship.
Based on these findings, the trial court suppressed Johnson's
confession.
III.
Where a defendant moves to suppress a confession pursuant
to Miranda,
[t]he prosecution bears the burden of
proving that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to counsel. "[T]he prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination." Although the
defendant may waive these rights, it must be
shown that "the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently."
Goodwin, 3 Va. App. at 252, 349 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
Whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights
is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances.
See Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352,
357 (1987). This totality-of-the-circumstances test is equally
applicable when a juvenile is involved. See Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
- 6 -
The totality approach permits--indeed, it
mandates--inquiry into all the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation. This
includes evaluation of the juvenile's age,
experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and into whether he has the
capacity to understand the warnings given
him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment
rights, and the consequences of waiving
those rights.
Id.One unique factor that is considered when a juvenile
decides to waive his Fifth Amendment rights is the presence or
absence of a parent or legal guardian. "[I]t is desirable to
have a parent, counsel or some other interested adult or
guardian present when . . . a juvenile waives fundamental
constitutional rights and confesses to a serious crime.
However, it is well established that the mere absence of a
parent or counsel does not render the waiver invalid." Grogg v.
Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 598, 613, 371 S.E.2d 549, 557 (1991).
Once the Commonwealth has established a valid waiver, it
must also establish that the defendant's confession was
voluntary. On appeal, in deciding whether the Commonwealth has
met this burden,
[w]e must determine whether, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, including not
only the details of the interrogation, but
also the characteristics of the accused, the
statement was the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker,
or whether the maker's will was overcome and
his capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.
- 7 -
Goodwin, 3 Va. App. at 253, 349 S.E.2d at 163-64. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973).
As in determining whether there has been a valid waiver, in
determining whether a juvenile confessed voluntarily, we look to
the totality of the circumstances. See Novak v. Commonwealth,
20 Va. App. 373, 386-87, 457 S.E.2d 402, 408 (1995). The mere
absence of a parent or legal guardian when a juvenile is
interrogated does not render the juvenile's confession
involuntary. See Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 637-38,
499 S.E.2d 538, 546 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 796 (1999);
Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 185-86, 427 S.E.2d 379,
385-86 (1993), judgment vacated on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1217(1994); Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 613, 371 S.E.2d at 557.
Denying family members access to a juvenile defendant is
generally immaterial to the issue of the voluntariness of his
waiver. See Jackson, 255 Va. at 638, 499 S.E.2d at 546 (holding
that a juvenile defendant's confession was not involuntary
merely because, unbeknownst to the defendant, his mother was
initially denied access to him). "Events occurring outside of
the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely
can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly
relinquish a constitutional right." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 422 (1986). The rights guaranteed under the Fifth
Amendment are personal to the defendant, and our focus,
therefore, must be on the defendant's wishes and his state of
- 8 -
mind. See Lamb v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 307, 310, 227 S.E.2d
737, 740 (1976) (holding that an attorney could not invoke the
right to counsel that the defendant validly waived).
IV.
Johnson does not deny that Miranda warnings were given or
that he signed a waiver that his legal guardian also signed.
The trial court found that Johnson was doing well in the 11th
grade of high school and was intelligent. In addition, it found
that Johnson was not denied creature comforts while being
interviewed. Johnson never asked for the presence of his
grandmother, another adult, or an attorney while he was being
interrogated. He was unaware of his father's and uncle's
attempts to see him. There was no evidence that Crawford
threatened Johnson, or otherwise coerced him into confessing.
Finally, the fact that Crawford may have misled Lindsey, while
disconcerting, was immaterial to the voluntariness of Johnson's
confession.
The evidence in this case was insufficient to support any
conclusion other than that Johnson knowingly and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights. 1 Moreover, based upon our independent
examination of the record in this case, we conclude that
Johnson's will was not overcome, that his capacity for
1
Although the trial court noted Johnson's testimony that he
had smoked marijuana prior to meeting with Crawford, the court
did not make a specific finding that Johnson's Miranda waiver
was invalid because of the marijuana use.
- 9 -
self-determination was not critically impaired, and that his
confession was the product of a free and unconstrained choice. 2
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and
remand this case to the circuit court for such further action as
the Commonwealth may be advised.
Reversed and remanded.
2
Johnson's assertions that his statement should be
suppressed under the Sixth Amendment and pursuant to Code
§ 16.1-247 are without merit. At the time he was interrogated,
Johnson had not been charged, so his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had not yet attached. See Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 609, 371
S.E.2d at 554 (the right to counsel under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments attaches "once charges are brought, by way
of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment"). We have previously held that Code § 16.1-247
"governs the placement of juveniles in detention facilities" and
was "not intended to safeguard a juvenile's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights." Roberts v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554,
559, 445 S.E.2d 709, 712 (1994).
- 10 -