Willard Smith v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1999 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    WILLARD SMITH
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.            Record No. 2130-97-2       JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    MARCH 2, 1999
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Donald W. Lemons, Judge
    Robert P. Geary for appellant.
    Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from his conviction for maiming, in violation of
    Code § 18.2-51, Willard Smith contends that the evidence is
    insufficient to support his conviction.        We agree and reverse the
    judgment of the trial court.
    On appeal, we review the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    granting to it all reasonable inferences
    fairly deducible therefrom. The judgment of
    a trial court sitting without a jury is
    entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict
    and will not be set aside unless it appears
    from the evidence that the judgment is
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support
    it.
    Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418
    (1987).
    On March 28, 1997, at an unspecified time, Andrew Taylor and
    another man were standing on a street corner drinking beer, which
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    they had been doing since 6:00 a.m.     Sometime later that day,
    Smith approached Taylor and said, "I know you are mad . . .
    because I got your wife."   When Taylor walked away, Smith hit him
    in the back and stomach.    Taylor walked around the corner and
    passed out.   When he woke up, he was being treated in the
    emergency room for stab wounds.
    When questioned by the police, Taylor told them he had been
    attacked by "Smoky," which is Smith's nickname.    He testified
    that he did not perceive that he was being stabbed, but that some
    of the stab wounds were in the same places that he recalled being
    hit by Smith.   Taylor testified that Smith hit him with his fists
    and that he saw no weapons in Smith's hands.
    No evidence disclosed the time of Smith's attack on Taylor,
    the length of time Taylor was unconscious on the sidewalk, the
    time at which he was taken to the hospital, or what transpired
    between Taylor's loss of consciousness on the sidewalk and his
    arrival at the hospital.    Although at least one witness saw the
    altercation, only Taylor and an investigating detective
    testified.
    Smith told police he knew that Taylor had been stabbed, but
    that he had not wounded Taylor.   Smith acknowledged an
    altercation between the two men but stated that he only hit
    Taylor and did nothing to break his skin.
    The Commonwealth's case is based wholly on circumstantial
    evidence.    "The circumstances of motive, time, place, means, and
    conduct must all concur to form an unbroken chain which links the
    - 2 -
    defendant to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."      Sam v.
    Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 312
    , 319, 
    411 S.E.2d 832
    , 836 (1991)
    (citation omitted).   Here, no evidence disclosed what time the
    altercation took place or what time Taylor arrived at the
    hospital.   There is no way to determine how long he was
    unconscious on the sidewalk or what may have happened to him
    after the altercation.   Taylor had consumed a great deal of
    alcohol and could easily have passed out from intoxication.         He
    was not aware that he had been stabbed until after he was at the
    hospital.
    The evidence raises no more than a suspicion of Smith's
    guilt.    Suspicion will not support a conviction.    See Betancourt
    v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 363
    , 374-76, 
    494 S.E.2d 873
    , 878-79
    (1998).
    The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the charge
    is ordered dismissed.
    Reversed and dismissed.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2130972

Filed Date: 3/2/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014