Matthew Douglas Harley v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Bray
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    MATTHEW DOUGLAS HARLEY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.           Record No. 0843-95-1         JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    JULY 9, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
    Dennis F. McMurran, Judge
    Alberto Z. Herrero (Dianne G. Ringer,
    Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for
    appellant.
    Brian Wainger, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Matthew Douglas Harley (defendant) was convicted in a bench
    trial on two counts of malicious wounding and the related uses of
    a firearm.    Defendant complains on appeal that the evidence was
    insufficient to establish the requisite malice, proving instead
    self-defense, or alternatively, heat of passion.    We disagree and
    affirm the convictions.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record in this
    case, and we recite only those facts necessary to a disposition
    of this appeal.
    Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    therefrom.    Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).    The judgment of a trial court, sitting
    without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict
    and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence
    to support it.     
    Id. On the
    evening of May 30, 1993, Kenneth Peele and Michael
    Whitfield, both unarmed, entered a convenience store.    Defendant
    was already inside, visiting the store clerk, and Peele 1 declared
    to defendant that he wasn't "going to make it out of here
    tonight," and "asked [him] to step outside."    During the
    encounter, defendant had secretly secured a gun from the stock
    room and hidden it beneath his shirt.    When Peele observed
    defendant reaching into his pants, he struck defendant in the
    face with his fist, causing him to fall to the floor.    Defendant
    immediately "got up," removed the weapon from his pants, and
    began firing.    The first bullet struck Whitfield, who had taken
    no part in the hostile exchanges and was then twelve to fifteen
    feet away.    Defendant continued "shooting [the gun] in the air"
    and pursued Peele as he fled, wounding him in the shoulder.
    "'Malice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act
    intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of
    ill will.'"     Long v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 194
    , 198, 
    379 S.E.2d 473
    , 475 (1989) (citation omitted).    Malice may be
    1
    Approximately two weeks previously, Peele had challenged
    defendant to a fight and, on another occasion, defendant had shot
    at Peele.
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    inferred from the use of a deadly weapon.     Gills v. Commonwealth,
    
    141 Va. 445
    , 449, 
    126 S.E. 51
    , 53 (1925).    The presence of malice
    is a "'question of fact to be determined by [the trier of
    fact].'"     
    Long, 8 Va. App. at 198
    , 379 S.E.2d at 475-76 (citation
    omitted).    Malice and heat of passion cannot co-exist.   Miller v.
    Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 22
    , 25, 
    359 S.E.2d 841
    , 842 (1987).
    Like malice, "whether the accused acted in the heat of passion is
    a question of fact . . . ."     
    Id. at 25,
    359 S.E.2d at 843.   "In
    order to determine whether the accused acted in the heat of
    passion, it is necessary to consider the nature and degree of
    provocation as well as the manner in which it was resisted."       
    Id. at 25,
    359 S.E.2d at 842.
    It is well established that "a person who reasonably
    apprehends bodily harm by another is privileged to exercise
    reasonable force to repel the assault . . . . The privilege to
    use such force is limited by the equally well recognized rule
    that a person 'shall not, except in extreme cases, endanger human
    life or do great bodily harm.'"     Diffendal v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.
    App. 417, 421, 
    382 S.E.2d 24
    , 25-26 (1989) (citations omitted).
    "Whether an accused proves circumstances sufficient to create a
    reasonable doubt that he acted in self-defense is a question of
    fact."     Smith v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 68
    , 71, 
    435 S.E.2d 414
    , 416 (1993).
    Here, in response to Peele's threats, defendant armed
    himself with a gun and advanced toward Peele and Whitfield, both
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    unarmed.   When Peele struck defendant with his fist, defendant
    began discharging the weapon and pursuing Peele, seriously
    wounding both Peele and his uninvolved companion, Whitfield.   Such
    evidence supports the finding that defendant acted maliciously,
    not in self-defense or heat of passion.   Accordingly, we affirm
    the convictions.
    Affirmed.
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