Isiah Edwards, Jr. v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
ISIAH EDWARDS, JR.
v. Record No. 0115-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA FEBRUARY 6, 1996
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
E. Everett Bagnell, Judge
Timothy E. Miller, Public Defender (Office of the
Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Isiah Edwards, Jr. (appellant) appeals from his bench trial
conviction by the Circuit Court of the City of Suffolk (trial
court) for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The
sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court
erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress the evidence of
the drugs found in appellant's possession. Finding no error, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App.
1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). Our review includes
evidence adduced at both the suppression hearing and the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
trial. Greene v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 606, 608, 440 S.E.2d
138, 139 (1994).
Appellant contends that the cocaine was discovered in his
possession as a result of an unreasonable search by a Suffolk
police officer, in violation of the mandate of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. We disagree.
The record discloses that a reliable informant told Suffolk
Police Officer Marvin Loudenback (Loudenback) that on June 30,
1994, appellant was selling crack cocaine on a street corner one
block from where the information was being given by the
informant. The street corner identified by the informant was
known by police to be a "drug area." The informant further told
Loudenback that appellant kept his supply of cocaine in the front
of his pants around the groin area and that he had observed
appellant make a sale just fifteen minutes before. Loudenback
radioed Detective E. C. Harris (Harris) and relayed the
information supplied by the informant. Harris proceeded to the
street corner where appellant was alleged to have been selling
drugs. Upon arriving, Harris found appellant sitting on a crate.
Harris knew appellant, as two weeks earlier he had observed
appellant involved in a drug transaction in which appellant was
the supplier.
Harris was in full uniform when he approached appellant. A
second officer (Vidrine) arrived moments after Harris and stayed
off to the side. Coming within ten feet of appellant, Harris
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advised appellant that the police "had information that
[appellant] had cocaine down the front of his pants" and "just
wanted [appellant] to give it to [Harris]." Appellant denied
having any drugs and advised Harris that he could search him.
Harris repeated that he knew appellant "had it down the front of
his pants" and said "just give it to me." Appellant then asked,
"Am I going to jail?" Harris responded, "Maybe not. Just give
me the drugs." At that time, appellant reached down the front of
his pants and produced a clear plastic bag that contained three
pieces of suspected crack cocaine. Harris placed appellant under
arrest. There is no evidence that Harris made any threat or used
any force before appellant produced the crack cocaine.
Here, the initial encounter between appellant and the
officers was clearly consensual. Appellant gave no indication
that he desired not to have any contact with the police. In
fact, almost immediately, he denied possessing any drugs and
voluntarily gave permission to Harris to search him. That
consent was followed by producing the drugs from the place where
the informant had stated the cocaine would be found.
It is clear that the officers articulated evidence that was
sufficient to show reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot; that the investigation conducted was warranted; and
that the record does not indicate that the ensuing encounter was
unnecessarily intrusive or protracted. We hold that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation in the encounter and that the search
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was consensual. See Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162,
455 S.E.2d 744 (1995).
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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