Alexander C. Graham, Jr. v. Terrell C. Graham ( 1995 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
ALEXANDER C. GRAHAM, JR.
v. Record No. 0718-95-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
TERRELL C. GRAHAM NOVEMBER 7, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY
F. Ward Harkrader, Jr., Judge
(Donald K. Butler; Morano, Colan & Butler, on brief),
for appellant.
No brief for appellee.
Alexander C. Graham, Jr., (husband) appeals the decision of
the circuit court awarding Terrell C. Graham (wife) $200,000 of
the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. Husband
argues: (1) the trial court based its award on an erroneous
appraisal; (2) the facts do not justify the award; (3) the award
is irreconcilable with the decision to give husband the larger
portion of the equity in the marital residence; and (4) the award
was an abuse of discretion because it failed to effect an
equitable distribution of the principal marital asset. Upon
reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that
this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm
the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
Our review of an equitable distribution order pursuant to
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Code § 20-107.3 requires deference to the chancellor's resolution
of the equities. The decision will be disturbed only if it fails
to comport with the statutory scheme, is without support in the
evidence, or reflects an abuse of discretion. Banagan v.
Banagan, 17 Va. App. 321, 326, 437 S.E.2d 229, 231-32 (1993).
The commissioner's initial report estimated the value of the
marital residence at $864,500, which was the listing price at the
time of the hearing. The commissioner found that husband had
provided virtually all the funds used to acquire and construct
the marital home, and determined husband was entitled "to a share
of the value of the real estate which is at least twice the
amount to which [wife] is entitled." However, the commissioner
also determined that wife was entitled to a lump sum payable from
the proceeds of the marital home, in part due to her substantial
nonmonetary contributions to the family's well-being and also
because of "the circumstances and factors which led to the
dissolution of the marriage." The lump sum payment to wife,
subtracted from husband's share, would "result in an equal
division of the proceeds." Therefore, the commissioner
determined that, on balance, the parties should roughly share the
equity, but that wife should be guaranteed $200,000 from the net
sale proceeds. The subsequent commissioner's report confirmed
that wife was to receive the first $200,000 of the sales
proceeds, regardless of the sales price.
While husband alleges that the commissioner's report was
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based upon the erroneous conclusion that the home would sell for
over $800,000, the record demonstrates that the commissioner's
recommendation, as accepted by the chancellor, remained the same
even when the listing price was substantially lower. Therefore,
there is no evidence to support husband's argument that the
commissioner relied on an erroneous fact.
The marital residence was the largest single marital asset.
Wife made few monetary contributions to the marriage, but made
substantial nonmonetary contributions. Husband deserted the
marriage, which necessitated the sale of the home. Husband
acquired a separate residence prior to the divorce, while wife
and the parties' children had not yet moved. While husband
alleges that no facts justify the award of $200,000 to wife, we
cannot say on review that the chancellor's decision to give wife
a lump sum award was unsupported by evidence or an abuse of
discretion.
There was no irreconcilable conflict between the
commissioner's recognition of husband's greater financial
contributions to the acquisition of the marital home and the
commissioner's recommendation to award a minimum lump sum payment
to wife. The commissioner listed husband's greater financial
contributions as a factor which would justify husband receiving a
greater share of the sale proceeds. However, husband's financial
contributions were balanced by wife's nonfinancial contributions
and husband's desertion of the marriage. The commissioner
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therefore recommended that the parties share the proceeds of the
sale of the marital home, subject to the condition that wife
first receive at least $200,000. In the event the proceeds were
less than $400,000, wife was to receive $200,000 nonetheless.
Therefore, husband has not demonstrated that an irreconcilable
conflict existed within the commissioner's recommendations.
Finally, the fact that husband might receive less than wife
from the sale of the marital home did not amount to an abuse of
discretion. The commissioner listed the factors warranting a
minimum lump sum payment to wife. "The term 'equitable
distribution' does not mean 'equal distribution.'" Marion v.
Marion, 11 Va. App. 659, 663, 401 S.E.2d 432, 435 (1991). We
cannot say the chancellor abused his discretion by accepting the
commissioner's recommendation.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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