Lendell C. Bryant v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2012 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, Huff and Senior Judge Clements
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
LENDELL C. BRYANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0092-11-1 BY JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY
JULY 10, 2012
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
Williams C. Andrews, III, Judge Designate
Adam M. Carroll (Riddick Babineau, P.C., on brief), for
appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Senior Assistant Attorney General
(Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Lendell C. Bryant appeals his conviction for selling or distributing stolen property in
violation of Code § 18.2-108.01(B), claiming it is not a lesser-included offense of the crime for
which he was charged: grand larceny with the intent to sell or distribute the stolen property, a
violation of Code § 18.2-108.01(A). We agree and reverse his conviction.
I.
Code § 18.2-108.01(A) prohibits a person from committing “larceny of property with a
value of $200 or more with the intent to sell or distribute such property.” A defendant violates
Code § 18.2-108.01(B) in one of three ways: when he “sells” or “attempts to sell” or “possesses
with intent to sell or distribute” any stolen property with an aggregate value of $200 or more
where he knew or should have known that the property was stolen.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
A grand jury indicted Bryant for grand larceny “with the intent to sell or distribute”
stolen property in violation of Code § 18.2-108.01(A). App. at 5. The case proceeded to a bench
trial. After hearing the evidence, the court found Bryant guilty of “sell[ing] or distribut[ing]
stolen property” under subsection B of Code § 18.2-108.01, which the court deemed “a lesser
included offense, as charged in the indictment.” Trial Order at 1-2 (Aug. 12, 2010)
(capitalization and emphasis omitted).
Before sentencing, Bryant filed a motion in the trial court seeking to set aside the
conviction and to award a new trial because the convicted offense (selling or distributing stolen
property under subsection B) was not a lesser-included offense of the charged offense (grand
larceny with intent to sell or distribute under subsection A). The court denied the motion, heard
evidence at a sentencing hearing, and entered a final order. Inexplicably, however, the final
order stated that the court had earlier found Bryant guilty of “larceny with intent to sell or
distribute” in violation of Code § 18.2-108.01(A). Sentencing Order at 1 (Dec. 17, 2010)
(capitalization and emphasis omitted).
Bryant appealed, claiming the trial court erred by finding him guilty of an offense not
charged in the indictment and not properly deemed a lesser-included offense. With the parties’
consent, we remanded the case to the trial court to address whether clerical errors existed in the
trial or sentencing orders. The remand order specifically directed the trial court to consider
whether “the conviction and sentencing orders contain clerical mistakes in their (i) narrative
description of the offense for which appellant was convicted, or in their (ii) citation to the
applicable Code section and subsection for the offense.” Remand Order at 2 (Apr. 12, 2012).
On remand, the trial order held its conviction order — finding Bryant guilty of selling or
distributing stolen property in violation of Code § 18.2-108.01(B) — contained no clerical errors.
The court, however, held its final order mistakenly stated Bryant was convicted of grand larceny
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with intent to sell or distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-108.01(A). The trial court exercised
its authority under Code § 8.01-428(B) to correct the clerical mistake and reissued the final order
clarifying that Bryant had been found guilty of “Sell[ing] or Distribut[ing] Stolen Property
Aggregate Value $200 or more (felony) (§ 18.2-108.01(B)).” Corrected Final Order at 1 (May
16, 2012) (capitalization and emphasis omitted).
II.
Under settled principles, “an accused cannot be convicted of a crime that has not been
charged, unless the crime is a lesser-included offense of the crime charged.” Bowden v.
Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 673, 675-76, 667 S.E.2d 27, 28 (2008) (quoting Dalton v.
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 249, 253, 524 S.E.2d 860, 862 (2000)). “A lesser-included offense is
an offense which is composed entirely of elements that are also elements of the greater offense.”
Dezfuli v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 1, 7, 707 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2011) (quoting Kauffmann v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 400, 409, 382 S.E.2d 279, 283 (1989)).1
Consequently, “for one crime to be a lesser included offense of another crime, every
commission of the greater offense must also be a commission of the lesser offense.” Id. (quoting
Kauffmann, 8 Va. App. at 7, 707 S.E.2d at 4). When this is true, “proof of the greater offense
necessarily proves the lesser.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 37, 39, 434 S.E.2d 914,
915 (1993). An offense cannot be “a lesser-included offense if it contains an element that the
charged offense does not contain.” Dalton, 259 Va. at 253, 524 S.E.2d at 862.
1
See also Edenton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 413, 416, 316 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1984);
Howard v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 904, 908, 275 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1981); Martin v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 720, 723, 272 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1981); Simon v. Commonwealth, 58
Va. App. 194, 202-03, 708 S.E.2d 245, 249 (2011); Chibikom v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App.
422, 425, 680 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2009); Wright v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 312, 319, 641
S.E.2d 119, 123 (2007).
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“Put another way, if the candidate offense contains an element not present in the asserted
major offense, the relationship of greater and lesser included cannot exist.” John L. Costello,
Virginia Law & Criminal Procedure § 30.2, at 443 (4th ed. 2008). “The elements of the greater
offense as charged must be examined in relation to the purported lesser offense, and where every
commission of the greater offense is also a commission of the lesser offense, a lesser offense
may be deemed to exist.” Sanchez v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 238, 241, 527 S.E.2d 461,
463 (2000). “The required examination of the two charges focuses not on the facts of the
particular case under review, but on the offenses in the abstract.” Id.; see also Seibert v.
Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 40, 45, 467 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1996).
In this case, the grand jury indicted Bryant for grand larceny with the intent to sell or
distribute the stolen property in violation of subsection A of Code § 18.2-108.01. The trial court,
however, sua sponte convicted Bryant for “sell[ing] or distribut[ing] stolen property” under
subsection B, believing it to be “a lesser included offense, as charged in the indictment.” Trial
Order at 1-2 (Aug. 12, 2010) (capitalization and emphasis omitted); see also Corrected Final
Order at 1 (May 16, 2012). The trial court erred in doing so.
The conviction does not involve a lesser-included offense. One can commit larceny with
the intent to sell or distribute the stolen property (the charged offense) without actually selling or
distributing the stolen property (the convicted offense). The latter requires proof of a sale or
distribution whereas the former does not. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 68, 77, 636
S.E.2d 893, 897 (2006). Thus it cannot be said that “every commission of the greater offense is
also a commission of the lesser offense,” Sanchez, 32 Va. App. at 241, 527 S.E.2d at 463,
because, here, the latter is not legally a subset of the former. In other words, comparing the two
offenses objectively, we cannot conclude “proof of the greater offense necessarily proves the
lesser.” Smith, 17 Va. App. at 39, 434 S.E.2d at 915.
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Given the trial court’s narrative description of the convicted offense as selling or
distributing stolen property (both in its original conviction order and corrected final order
following our remand), we need not address whether any other method of establishing a
violation of subsection B of Code § 18.2-108.01 — such as possessing “with intent to sell or
distribute” stolen property with an aggregate value of $200 or more where the possessor knew or
should have known that the property was stolen — would constitute a lesser-included offense of
subsection A.2 Bryant acknowledges on appeal that it might indeed be so, but correctly points
out the trial court’s orders specifically chose not to rely on that basis for convicting him under
subsection B. See Oral Argument Audio at 8:04 to 8:50 (June 6, 2012).
For the same reason, we need not address whether the disjunctive nature of Code
§ 18.2-108.01(B) — allowing three alternative methods of establishing a violation — by itself
precludes a conviction under any one of the three from being deemed a lesser-included offense
under subsection A. See generally Coleman v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 196, 200, 539 S.E.2d
732, 734 (2001); Dezfuli, 58 Va. App. at 11-12, 707 S.E.2d at 6. Even if it does not have this
preclusive effect, the specific subset of subsection B upon which the trial court based Bryant’s
conviction — selling or distributing stolen property — still could not be deemed a
lesser-included offense of subsection A.
“In this case, as in all others, we seek to decide cases, ‘on the best and narrowest ground
available’ from the record.” Kirby v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 691, 698 n.2, 653 S.E.2d
600, 603 n.2 (2007) (citations omitted). This approach encourages “judicial self-restraint” by
2
In denying Bryant’s motion to set aside the verdict, the trial court relied on Bell v.
Commonwealth, No. 2605-09-1, at 3-4 (July 14, 2010) (per curiam). That order, however,
denied a petition for appeal on the ground that “possession of stolen property with the intent to
sell or distribute pursuant to Code § 18.2-108.01(B) is a lesser-included offense of larceny with
the intent to sell or distribute pursuant to Code § 18.2-108.01(A).” Id. (emphasis added).
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avoiding the resolution of broad, reasonably debatable legal issues when narrower, less debatable
legal issues fully dispose of the appeal before the court. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App.
558, 566, 680 S.E.2d 361, 365 (2009) (citation omitted). It also disciplines our reasoning to
focus narrowly “‘on what we conceive to be the determinative points,’ Justice Herbert B.
Gregory, Shorter Judicial Opinions, 34 Va. L. Rev. 362, 365 (1948).” Morris v. City of Va.
Beach, 58 Va. App. 173, 180, 707 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2011).
III.
Because the trial court convicted Bryant for an offense not charged in the indictment and
not properly viewed as a lesser-included offense, we reverse his conviction.3
Reversed.
3
Bryant conceded on appeal that our reversal, for what amounts to a fatal variance,
would not preclude reindictment given the absence of a successful appellate challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. See Purvy v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 260, 269-70, 717 S.E.2d
847, 851-52 (2011); Oral Argument Audio 8:50 to 9:12 (June 6, 2012). In this case, our initial
per curiam order denied Bryant’s sufficiency challenge. See Bryant v. Commonwealth, No.
0092-11-1, at 2-4 (July 20, 2011) (per curiam). Following Bryant’s request for reconsideration,
we declined to grant the sufficiency assignment of error. See Bryant v. Commonwealth, No.
0092-11-1, at 2 (Nov. 4, 2011) (holding the sufficiency assignment of error “remained denied for
the reason set forth in the order of this Court dated July 20, 2011”).
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