Karl J. Ottosen v. Carla L. Saunders ( 2005 )


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  •                                  COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judge McClanahan, Senior Judges Coleman and Annunziata
    KARL J. OTTOSEN
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.      Record No. 0953-05-4                                          PER CURIAM
    DECEMBER 6, 2005
    CARLA L. SAUNDERS
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge
    (Michael A. Ward, on briefs), for appellant.
    (Lisa C. Fried, on brief), for appellee.
    Karl J. Ottosen (father) appeals from the circuit court’s March 18, 2005 order finding he
    violated Code § 8.01-271.1 and ordering him to pay costs and attorney’s fees to Carla L. Saunders
    (mother). On appeal, father contends the trial court erred (1) in finding mother is entitled to relief
    under Code § 8.01-271.1 and (2) in determining the amount of the award. Both parties seek
    attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal. Upon reviewing the record and
    briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily
    affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
    BACKGROUND
    On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
    to appellee as the party prevailing below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 
    10 Va. App. 248
    , 250, 
    391 S.E.2d 344
    , 346 (1990).
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    The parties’ children were born on November 1, 1991. The parties, never married, entered
    into an “Agreed Order” on November 8, 2000. In that order, they agreed the parties would have
    joint legal custody of the twins, with mother having primary physical custody, subject to visitation
    as outlined in the order. The order further provided that either party could recover attorney’s fees
    expended in successfully enforcing the order.
    On May 30, 2003, father petitioned the juvenile and domestic relations district court for a
    change in custody for the two children. The first trial date of January 26, 2004 was cancelled due to
    weather, but mother and the children had already traveled to Virginia from Florida for the event.
    Mother again traveled to Virginia for the second trial date of May 24, 2004. The following day, the
    juvenile court dismissed father’s petition, on mother’s motion, concluding father had failed to
    demonstrate a material change in circumstances since the entry of the consent order. The juvenile
    court denied mother’s motion for attorney’s fees and also denied her motion to reconsider the denial
    of attorney’s fees, concluding that responding to father’s petitions was not a “successful
    enforcement of any of the provisions” of the parties’ consent order.
    On June 2, 2004, father appealed the juvenile court decision to the circuit court. Father’s
    counsel sought to non-suit the appeal just days before the scheduled November 17, 2004 trial date.
    Mother objected to the non-suit. The circuit court allowed father to withdraw his appeal with
    prejudice but rejected the non-suit attempt. The court also allowed mother to file a renewed motion
    for attorney’s fees and after reviewing the record and evidence presented determined father violated
    Code § 8.01-271.1 and awarded sanctions to mother in the amount of her attorney’s fees and costs
    associated with defending the action father initiated against her.
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    ANALYSIS
    I.
    Under Code § 8.01-271.1, every motion signed or made orally by an attorney constitutes
    a representation that “to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after
    reasonable inquiry,” the argument or legal position is “well grounded in fact,” and is well
    grounded in current law or is made in good faith application of law that should be extended,
    modified, or reversed. If this statute is violated, then the trial court shall impose upon the
    attorney and/or the represented party “an appropriate sanction.” The trial court found father
    vindictively “pursu[ed] his fruitless litigation” causing unnecessary expense and stress to mother
    and the children. Father argues this ruling was in error.
    This Court reviews an award of sanctions for abuse of discretion by the trial court.
    Oxenham v. Johnson, 
    241 Va. 281
    , 287, 
    402 S.E.2d 1
    , 4 (1991).
    In applying that standard, we use an objective standard of
    reasonableness in determining whether a litigant and his attorney,
    after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that
    the pleading was well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law
    or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
    reversal of existing law, and not interposed for an improper
    purpose.
    Flippo v. CSC Assocs. III, L.L.C., 
    262 Va. 48
    , 65-66, 
    547 S.E.2d 216
    , 227 (2001). See also
    Gilmore v. Finn, 
    259 Va. 448
    , 466, 
    527 S.E.2d 426
    , 435 (2000). In this context, we review the
    trial court’s determination that father did not reasonably believe that his representations to the
    court, both orally and in his pleadings, were well grounded or made in good faith.
    We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that father filed his
    motions for the improper purpose of harassing mother or to cause her unnecessary expense. The
    record reveals the juvenile court determined father failed to demonstrate any material changes in
    circumstances. After initiating an appeal to the circuit court, father attempted to non-suit the
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    case just days before the scheduled trial. The court permissibly inferred from the record that
    father “use[d] his pending appeal as leverage, [in] offer[ing] a settlement to [m]other . . . .”
    Based in part on the parties’ “disparate financial positions,” the court concluded “[t]he financial
    burden of the instant litigation is far more burdensome on the mother than the father, and the
    father was aware of the impact his litigation had on her.”
    Given the facts in this case, father was not reasonable in his pursuit of the cause he
    initiated. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions pursuant to Code
    § 8.01-271.1.
    II.
    Father argues the trial court erred in its determination of the amount of sanctions.
    Specifically, he contends mother’s evidence “support[ing] her claim for an award of sanctions
    . . . was unverified and unsubstantiated.” He does not, on appeal, challenge the admissibility of
    the evidence mother presented. The validity of the court’s ruling on the admissibility of the
    evidence is not part of the question presented and thus is not cognizable on appeal. See Hillcrest
    Manor Nursing Home v. Underwood, 
    35 Va. App. 31
    , 39 n.4, 
    542 S.E.2d 785
    , 789 n.4 (2001)
    (finding “an issue [was] not expressly stated among the ‘questions presented,’ . . . we, therefore,
    decline to consider [it] on appeal”); see also Rule 5A:20(c). The only issue before us is whether
    the evidence presented to the trial court supports its determination of the amount of the sanctions
    awarded.
    Mother presented attorney’s fees statements, airline receipts, and various other
    documentation regarding the costs she incurred as a result of father’s lawsuit. “The credibility of
    the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has
    the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Thomas v. Thomas, 40
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    Va. App. 639, 644, 
    580 S.E.2d 503
    , 505 (2003). Mother fully documented her expenses. The
    trial court accepted mother’s evidence. We find no error in the court’s determination.
    III.
    Both parties request costs and attorneys’ fees for matters relating to this appeal.
    The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to
    determine the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees for efforts
    expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the
    opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine
    whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for
    requiring additional payment.
    O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 
    23 Va. App. 690
    , 695, 
    479 S.E.2d 98
    , 100 (1996). In this context,
    and upon consideration of the entire record in this case, we hold that husband is not entitled to
    costs or attorney’s fees in the matter.
    Upon a review of this appeal, we find that husband’s case presented numerous questions
    that were not supported by law or evidence. See Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 
    19 Va. App. 77
    , 95, 
    448 S.E.2d 666
    , 677 (1994). Therefore, we award attorney’s fees to wife and remand this case to the
    trial court for determination of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in responding to this appeal,
    and for any costs incurred at the hearing on remand, including any attorney’s fees and costs
    incurred at the remand hearing, and any reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of collection, if
    necessary.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
    Affirmed.
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