Eugene Blair v. Hampton Department of Social Services ( 2005 )


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  •                                COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Frank, Clements and Haley
    EUGENE BLAIR
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.     Record No. 2841-04-1                                         PER CURIAM
    MAY 10, 2005
    HAMPTON DEPARTMENT OF
    SOCIAL SERVICES
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
    Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge
    (Lawrence A. Martin; Coyle, Martin & Blackwell, on brief), for
    appellant.
    (Lesa J. Yeatts, Deputy City Attorney; Michael King, Guardian ad
    litem for the minor children; Hampton York Law Center, P.C., on
    brief), for appellee.
    On October 4 and 5, 2004, the trial court entered orders terminating the parental rights of
    Eugene Blair to his daughters, A.B. and D.B., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). On appeal,
    Blair contends the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. Upon reviewing the
    record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
    summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
    BACKGROUND
    We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant
    to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
    Human Dev., 
    13 Va. App. 123
    , 128, 
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence
    proved A.B. was born on November 6, 2001, and D.B. was born on October 11, 2002. In 2002,
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    Blair lived with Tina Townsend, the mother of A.B. and D.B. On October 17, 2002, the
    Hampton Department of Social Services (HDSS) took custody of D.B. when she tested
    positively for cocaine following birth. HDSS removed A.B. from the home on November 12,
    2002. In addition to the concerns regarding substance abuse in the home, there were allegations
    of domestic violence between Blair and Townsend, who appeared incapable of maintaining
    employment and providing safe and stable housing for the children. Both A.B. and D.B. were
    adjudged as having been abused and neglected. The two girls were placed together in a foster
    home.
    Initially, the goal of HDSS was to return A.B. and D.B. to their parents. The defined
    responsibilities for Blair were that he maintain safe and stable housing and employment for at
    least six months, participate and complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow all
    recommendations, successfully complete parenting classes, obtain a parenting capacity
    evaluation, and obtain and follow the recommendations of a psychiatric evaluation.
    In April of 2004, HDSS changed its goal concerning A.B. and D.B. to adoption. The
    change was based upon Blair’s and Townsend’s failure to comply with the responsibilities
    defined for them. Blair had obtained substance abuse and parenting capacity evaluations. He
    also had attended ten of eighteen parenting classes regarding nurturing children of his daughters’
    ages, as well as six of twelve classes in the “Dynamic Dads” program. However, Blair
    successfully completed neither program. Blair did not obtain a psychiatric evaluation. Blair had
    worked part-time for Allied Trucking for about a month, but had otherwise failed to maintain
    steady employment. Blair indicated he was trying to get his flooring business back on its feet.
    Blair also had not obtained stable housing. At the time, HDSS had a mailing address for Blair,
    but did not know where he actually was living.
    -2-
    At the termination hearing on September 9, 2004, Colandra Cooke, a social worker with
    HDSS, testified that both A.B. and D.B. were thriving in their foster home. The girls had bonded
    with the foster parents’ biological children and the other foster child in the home.
    Blair testified at the termination hearing he had been employed at Southeastern Tile and
    Rug for one and one-half months. He was living in a three bedroom apartment with a female
    relative. Blair stated he had completed a psychological examination and signed a release for
    HDSS to receive a report of the results. Blair stated he had maintained stable housing for a
    period of eight months since the children were taken into custody. Blair asked the trial court to
    give him more time to satisfy his responsibilities regarding continued employment and stable
    housing.
    The trial court approved the foster care plan with the goal of adoption and terminated the
    residual parental rights of Blair and Townsend pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
    DISCUSSION
    When considering termination of a parent’s residual rights to a child, “the paramount
    consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
    at 463. On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence,
    considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best
    interests.” Farley v. Farley, 
    9 Va. App. 326
    , 329, 
    387 S.E.2d 794
    , 796 (1990). “The trial court’s
    judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463
    (citation omitted).
    Termination pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof, by clear and convincing
    evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interests and the parent, “without good cause,
    ha[s] been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months
    -3-
    from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditions which led
    to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” notwithstanding reasonable and
    appropriate efforts of services agencies.
    The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to HDSS, was clear and convincing that
    Blair, without good cause, failed “to substantially remedy” the conditions which led to or
    required continuation of the children’s foster care placement within a reasonable period of time.
    One reason A.B. and D.B. were removed by HDSS was the concern that Blair could not provide
    financial stability or maintain a safe residence for the girls. Blair failed to satisfy responsibilities
    defined for him by HDSS with regard to employment and housing. At the time of the
    termination hearing, both A.B. and D.B. had been in foster care for almost twenty-two months.
    During this period of time, Blair had maintained steady employment for only about a month at a
    time. Nor had Blair maintained stable housing. In fact, Cooke had only a mailing address for
    Blair and was uncertain where he was living at the time of the termination hearing. Although
    Blair had participated in parenting classes, he completed neither of the programs he attended. “It
    is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out
    when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halifax
    County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    10 Va. App. 535
    , 540, 
    394 S.E.2d 492
    , 495 (1990).
    The record thus supports the trial court’s approval of the foster care plan with the goal of
    adoption and the court’s finding the best interests of the children would be served by terminating
    Blair’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
    judgment. See Rule 5A:27
    Affirmed.
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2841041

Filed Date: 5/10/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014