David Smith, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2004 )


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  •                                COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, Felton and Senior Judge Willis
    DAVID SMITH, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.     Record No. 1947-03-1                                   JUDGE JERE M.H. WILLIS, JR.
    MAY 25, 2004
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY
    Glen A. Tyler, Judge
    (A. Theresa Bliss, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on
    brief.
    (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Alice T. Armstrong, Assistant
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
    brief.
    The trial court convicted David Smith, Jr. of possession of
    methylenedioxymethamphetamine, a Schedule I drug, in violation of Code § 18.2-250, and
    possession of marijuana, in violation of Code § 18.2-250.1. On appeal, he contends the trial
    court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
    seizure and subsequent search of his person. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, ‘[t]he burden is upon [the
    defendant] to show that th[e] ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the
    Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.’” McGee v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 193
    ,
    197, 
    487 S.E.2d 259
    , 261 (1997) (en banc) (citation omitted). While we are bound to review de
    novo the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we “review findings of
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    historical fact only for clear error1 and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts
    by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    ,
    699 (1996) (footnote added).
    The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches and
    seizures. “Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a
    reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the need of
    split-second decisions and without regard to the officer’s intent or
    motivation.” An officer is entitled to view the circumstances
    confronting him in light of his training and experience, and he may
    consider any suspicious conduct of the suspected person.
    James v. Commonwealth, 
    22 Va. App. 740
    , 745, 
    473 S.E.2d 90
    , 92 (1996) (citations omitted).
    On November 1, 2002, Smith was riding in the backseat of a car stopped for a traffic
    infraction. Police discovered that the driver possessed marijuana, packaged in ten smaller units.
    The driver and the front seat passenger, who was the owner, were then outside the car. Smith
    and Ronald Paschal remained in the backseat. The owner gave permission for a search of the
    car.
    Officer Hickman, who made the stop, began talking with Paschal and noticed him trying
    to hide several white pills in his hand. Hickman tried to take the pills, and Paschal tried to give
    them to Smith. Hickman struggled with Paschal and ultimately sprayed Paschal with pepper
    spray. Hickman called for Officer Kinney to help. Kinney opened the left rear car door just after
    Hickman used the pepper spray. Kinney saw Hickman struggling with Paschal. He told Smith
    three times to show his hands. Smith failed to comply. Kinney grabbed Smith’s left wrist and
    put him in a wristlock. He forcibly removed Smith from the car, put him on the ground, and
    handcuffed him. Kinney later recovered a baggie containing drugs from the area where Smith
    had lain. The ground had been clear before Kinney placed Smith there.
    1
    “In Virginia, questions of fact are binding on appeal unless ‘plainly wrong.’” McGee, 25
    Va. App. at 198 n.1, 487 S.E.2d at 261 n.1 (citations omitted).
    -2-
    “The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all seizures, only those that are
    unreasonable. Whether a seizure is unreasonable is determined by balancing the individual’s
    right to be free from arbitrary government intrusions against society’s countervailing interest in
    preventing or detecting crime and in protecting its law enforcement officers.” Welshman v.
    Commonwealth, 
    28 Va. App. 20
    , 30, 
    502 S.E.2d 122
    , 126-27 (1998) (emphasis added). See also
    Harrell v. Commonwealth, 
    30 Va. App. 398
    , 403, 
    517 S.E.2d 256
    , 258 (1999) (citing Sattler v.
    Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 366
    , 368, 
    457 S.E.2d 398
    , 399-400 (1995)). “The validity of a
    seizure ‘turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and
    circumstances confronting him at the time.’” Hamlin v. Commonwealth, 
    33 Va. App. 494
    , 499,
    
    534 S.E.2d 363
    , 365 (2000) (quoting Maryland v. Macon, 
    472 U.S. 463
    , 470-71 (1985))
    (emphasis added).
    “[A]n officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending
    completion of the stop.” Maryland v. Wilson, 
    519 U.S. 408
    , 415 (1997). See also Alston v.
    Commonwealth, 
    40 Va. App. 728
    , 742, 
    581 S.E.2d 245
    , 252 (2003). Simply put, “[t]he law does
    not expect that a police officer must gamble on turning away from a possible danger and chance
    taking a bullet in the back merely because of the status of a vehicle’s occupants.” Peguese v.
    Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 349
    , 352, 
    451 S.E.2d 412
    , 413-14 (1994) (citations omitted). See
    also Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413 (“the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of
    whether the occupant of the car stopped is a driver or passenger”); United States v. Sakyi,
    
    160 F.3d 164
    , 169 (4th Cir. 1998) (after a lawful traffic stop, in the absence of factors allaying
    officer’s safety concerns he may order occupants out of vehicle and conduct a pat-down search
    for weapons). Moreover, “an officer is entitled to rely upon the totality of the circumstances –
    the whole picture.” Peguese, 19 Va. App. at 351, 451 S.E.2d at 413.
    -3-
    Kinney faced a situation in which drugs had been discovered, and in which the other
    backseat passenger was struggling with Hickman. When Smith refused to show his hands,
    Kinney reasonably concluded that Smith was a risk to his and Hickman’s safety. He acted
    appropriately in removing Smith from the car and restraining him. The discovery of the
    contraband on Smith’s person resulted from that removal and restraint. Accordingly, the trial
    court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    -4-