Dawn L. Hoyle v. VEC, Marvin Runyon ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
DAWN L. HOYLE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1799-96-4 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
APRIL 15, 1997
VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION,
MARVIN RUNYON, POSTMASTER GENERAL,
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Barnard F. Jennings, Judge Designate
Karl F. Weickhardt for appellant.
Paul S. Stahl, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General;
Lisa J. Rowley, Assistant Attorney General;
William B. Neel, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, on brief), for appellees.
The Virginia Employment Commission ruled that Dawn L. Hoyle
was qualified for unemployment benefits following her discharge
from employment by the United States Postal Service. Upon a
petition for judicial review of that decision, the circuit judge
remanded the case to the commission for the taking of additional
evidence and reconsideration of its decision. Hoyle contends on
this appeal (1) that the circuit judge lacked jurisdiction to
remand the case to the commission, and (2) that the evidence in
the record supports the commission's finding that she was not
discharged for misconduct connected with her work. For the
reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal.
I.
Hoyle was a letter carrier for the Postal Service in the
Northern Virginia area between 1986 and 1994. She filed for
unemployment compensation following her termination from her
position. After a deputy of the commission awarded Hoyle
unemployment benefits, the Postal Service appealed.
At an evidentiary hearing before an appeals examiner, the
evidence indicated that in 1987 Hoyle incurred an injury while
working with the Postal Service and filed a claim for workers'
compensation. The Federal Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs (OWCP) accepted Hoyle's claim. Hoyle was required to
notify OWCP in the event she returned to her former job or
obtained other employment. She was also required to report any
wages earned while she received workers' compensation benefits,
including "wages in kind."
Hoyle returned to her employment with the Postal Service in
November, 1993. Although Hoyle informed OWCP of her return to
work, she did not report that she had received income during the
time she received workers' compensation benefits. After
receiving information from an informant that Hoyle worked when
she was receiving workers' compensation benefits, the Postal
Service began an investigation.
Postal inspectors discovered that indeed Hoyle had earned
money cleaning houses and caring for pets. The postal inspectors
also learned that Hoyle had filed an application for a mortgage
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loan. Copies of her tax returns for 1988 and 1989, which were
attached to the loan application, indicated that Hoyle was
self-employed as a dog groomer and earned approximately $2,000
per month. A Postal Service representative testified that Hoyle
was the subject of a criminal complaint for filing false loan
documents and that he was unable to answer certain questions
because doing so would jeopardize the criminal investigation.
The notice of Hoyle's termination from the Postal Service
stated that she had been terminated for "improper
conduct/misrepresentation of facts and intentionally failing to
report employment and earnings in a compensation claim as
required." Hoyle testified, however, that she had not been
employed as a dog groomer. She also testified that her true tax
returns reflected income only from the rental of rooms in her
home in 1988 and 1989.
After the evidentiary hearing, the appeals examiner found
that Hoyle was disqualified for benefits because she was
discharged for misconduct connected with work. The appeals
examiner reversed the deputy's decision. Hoyle appealed to the
commission from the appeals examiner's decision.
The commission ruled that Hoyle was qualified for
unemployment compensation. In its decision, the commission found
that Hoyle had only earned $1,000 for cleaning houses and that
although she "received a small amount of remuneration" for
keeping pets, she "actually netted nothing." The commission also
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found that Hoyle's true tax returns for 1988 and 1989 showed she
had not received $2,000 a month for grooming dogs. The
commission further found that no criminal investigation was
ongoing.
The Postal Service filed a petition for review in the
circuit court. In its petition, the Postal Service alleged, in
part, that the commission's decision was contrary to the law and
the facts and that Hoyle had pleaded guilty in the criminal
prosecution that resulted from the postal inspector's
investigation. In an affidavit attached to the petition, a
postal inspector averred that a criminal investigation had
occurred, that Hoyle pleaded guilty to filing false statements in
violation of federal law, and that Hoyle had signed a plea
agreement acknowledging that she made false statements. Based
upon the pleadings, the record of the commission, and the
argument of counsel, the trial judge remanded the proceeding to
the commission and directed the commission to conduct a complete
hearing, receive additional evidence, and render a further
decision. Hoyle appealed from that order.
II.
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over "[a]ny final
decision of a circuit court on appeal from a decision of an
administrative agency." Code § 17-116.05(1). A final decision
is one "'which disposes of the whole subject, gives all the
relief that is contemplated and leaves nothing to be done by the
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court.'" Southwest Va. Hosps. v. Lipps, 193 Va. 191, 193, 68
S.E.2d 82, 83 (1951) (citation omitted).
When the trial judge remanded the case to the commission,
the trial judge "did not resolve any factual or legal issues
concerning the merits of the case[]." Canova Elec. Contracting
Inc. v. LMI Ins. Co., 22 Va. App. 595, 600, 471 S.E.2d 827, 830
(1996). The remand order was an interlocutory ruling that
required further action. "The mere possibility that [the remand
order] . . . may affect the final decision in the trial does not
necessitate an immediate appeal." Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va.
App. 848, 853, 407 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1991), see also Webb v. Webb,
13 Va. App. 681, 414 S.E.2d 612 (1992).
Furthermore, even if the trial judge's remand was an
appealable order, we find no merit to Hoyle's argument that the
trial judge lacked jurisdiction to remand the case to the
commission for further proceedings.
Code § [60.2-625] does not expressly
empower a reviewing court to remand a cause
to the Commission. But, absent a specific
mandate to the contrary, a statutory grant of
appellate jurisdiction necessarily implies
such a power. "It is familiar appellate
practice to remand causes for further
proceedings without deciding the merits,
where justice demands that course in order
that some defect in the record may be
supplied. Such a remand may be made to
permit further evidence to be taken or
additional findings to be made upon essential
points."
Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602, 606-07, 299 S.E.2d 504, 507-08
(1983) (citation omitted).
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Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
Dismissed.
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