Faye L. Price v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
FAYE L. PRICE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1271-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
APRIL 1, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Robert W. Duling, Judge
Matthew T. Paulk, Assistant Public Defender
(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on
brief), for appellant.
John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Faye L. Price (appellant) appeals her conviction of
possessing heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250. She contends
that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress
evidence obtained during a search incident to her arrest at a
roadblock. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
FACTS
During the evening of September 19, 1995, appellant rode as
a passenger in a car driven by James E. Walker, Jr. that
encountered a roadblock in the City of Richmond. The roadblock
was operated by Sergeant Hicks and Officer Tovar. At the
roadblock, Officer Tovar checked Mr. Walker's driving record with
a police dispatcher and discovered that his driver's license had
been suspended with notice. Officer Tovar informed Mr. Walker
that he could not drive his car from the roadblock and that Mr.
Walker's only options were to arrange to have the vehicle towed
or to find a licensed driver to drive the car away for him.
Appellant then stated that she was willing to drive Mr.
Walker's car. Sergeant Hicks asked appellant for some
identification so that he could verify with the dispatcher that
appellant possessed a valid driver's license. Appellant gave her
Social Security number to Sergeant Hicks. Sergeant Hicks
contacted a dispatcher, who accessed appellant's DMV record from
a computer.
While checking appellant's driving record, the police
computer automatically searched its data base of outstanding
warrants. This search disclosed an outstanding warrant for
appellant's arrest. Officer Tovar then executed the warrant by
arresting appellant. During a search of appellant incident to
her arrest, Officer Tovar found heroin in her purse. Appellant
then waived her Fifth Amendment rights and admitted that the
heroin was hers.
Appellant was charged with the unlawful possession of heroin
in violation of Code § 18.2-250. Appellant filed a motion to
suppress both the heroin and her statement, which the trial court
denied. The trial court also denied appellant's motion to
reconsider and convicted her of possessing heroin.
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II.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT ROADBLOCK
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied
her motion to suppress. She argues that she was unlawfully
seized when Sergeant Hicks asked to check her driving record, or
in the alternative, that Sergeant Hicks arbitrarily exceeded the
parameters of the roadblock plan when he checked the police data
base for outstanding arrest warrants. She asserts that the trial
court should have excluded the heroin and her statement because
this evidence was a fruit of the officers' unconstitutional
conduct. We disagree.
"On appeal, the burden is on appellant to show, considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
that the denial of his [or her] motion to suppress constituted
reversible error. This Court will not disturb the trial court's
ruling unless it is plainly wrong." Richmond v. Commonwealth, 22
Va. App. 257, 260, 468 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1996) (citations
omitted).
We hold that the detention of appellant at the roadblock
while Sergeant Hicks verified the validity of her driver's
license did not violate appellant's Fourth Amendment rights.
First, we agree that appellant was seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes when she agreed to drive Mr. Walker's car and Sergeant
Hicks took measures to check her driver's license before allowing
her to leave the roadblock. "[D]etaining the operator [of a
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motor vehicle at a roadblock] constitute[s] a 'seizure' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of
the stop is limited and the resulting detention is quite brief."
Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 349, 337 S.E.2d 273, 275
(1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084, 106 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2d
720 (1986). But, appellant's seizure was lawful because the
record indicates that the officers detained appellant in
accordance with an explicit and neutral roadblock plan. A
seizure of the driver of an automobile at a roadblock does not
violate his or her Fourth Amendment rights if the roadblock is
"'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers.'" Id. at 350,
337 S.E.2d at 276 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99
S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979)).
The record establishes that the police department issued a
plan authorizing the roadblock carried out by the officers. The
plan restricted the officers' activities during each stop at the
roadblock to inspecting the stopped vehicle for defects,
examining the physical condition of the driver, and verifying the
status of the driver's operator's license. The record indicates
that the officers performed these activities on every vehicle
that passed through the roadblock. After the officers informed
Mr. Walker that he could not drive his vehicle from the roadblock
and appellant agreed to drive it for him, she became the next
"driver" through the roadblock. Pursuant to the roadblock plan,
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the police were permitted to examine her physical condition and
to verify the status of her driver's license.
Appellant also challenges the constitutionality of the
officers' actions after she was seized at the roadblock.
Specifically, she argues that Sergeant Hicks exceeded the
restrictions set forth in the roadblock plan when he conducted a
warrant check of appellant in conjunction with the review of her
driving record. We disagree.
When police officers stop vehicles at a roadblock pursuant
to a pre-approved plan, the Fourth Amendment requires the
officers to act in accordance with the rules set forth in the
roadblock plan. Brown v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 21, 25-26,
454 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1995).
"To allow the [police] to do anything short
of complying in full with [their] own
guidelines would inject an element of
discretion into the [checkpoint] procedures
and thus undercut the very foundation upon
which the [checkpoint] seizure is
constitutionally justified."
Id. at 25, 454 S.E.2d at 759 (quoting Commonwealth v. Anderson,
406 Mass. 343, 547 N.E.2d 1134, 1137-38 (1989)).
We hold that the warrant check of appellant was not a
deviation from the procedures set forth in the roadblock plan.
The roadblock plan authorized the review of an individual's
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driving record, and the warrant check was one component of the
neutral police procedure for such a review. The officers
testified that confirming the validity of a driver's license
involved requesting a police dispatcher to access by computer the
individual's DMV record. The evidence established that police
procedures mandate the performance of a warrant check whenever an
officer in the field makes such a request. Specifically,
Sergeant Hicks testified that the police computer is programmed
so that any time the dispatcher accesses an individual's driving
record, the computer automatically performs a simultaneous
warrant check on the individual.
Thus, the warrant check of appellant was performed in
accordance with the roadblock plan. Pursuant to the roadblock
plan, Sergeant Hicks was authorized to verify the status of
appellant's license after she volunteered to drive Mr. Walker's
car. He did so by requesting the dispatcher to review her
driving record. After Sergeant Hicks made this request, the
computer search of appellant's driving record automatically
triggered the warrant check that revealed the outstanding warrant
for her arrest. Sergeant Hicks did not arbitrarily request the
warrant check of appellant. The check was performed
automatically, regardless of the requesting officer's desire for
this information.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction of
possessing heroin in violation of Code § 18.2-250.
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Affirmed.
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