Gilbert J Perkey, t/a, etc v. Randall Wayne Fridley ( 2003 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Clements
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    GILBERT J. PERKEY, t/a
    BOTETOURT STONEMASONS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1870-02-3                JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
    JANUARY 28, 2003
    RANDALL WAYNE FRIDLEY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Monica Taylor Monday (Gentry, Locke, Rakes &
    Moore, on brief), for appellant.
    Rhonda L. Overstreet (Lumsden, Overstreet &
    Hansen, on brief), for appellee.
    Gilbert J. Perkey, t/a Botetourt Stonemasons, appeals a
    decision of the commission awarding Randall Wayne Fridley
    temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability
    benefits and medical benefits, and assessing against Perkey a fine
    of $500, pursuant to Code § 65.2-805 for failing to insure its
    liability for workers' compensation purposes.    Perkey contends the
    commission erred in finding that he had three or more employees
    regularly in service and that he was, therefore, subject to the
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication. Further, because this opinion has
    no precedential value, we recite only those facts essential to
    our holding.
    commission's jurisdiction.   For the reasons that follow, we affirm
    the decision of the commission.
    We first note that Perkey does not dispute the commission's
    determination that Fridley, the claimant, and Gilbert Perkey, his
    son, were "employees" within the meaning of Code § 65.2-101(2)(h).
    Instead, Perkey confines his argument to whether the commission
    erred in finding that Thomas Perkey, also his son, was an employee
    and that Perkey therefore had three or more employees regularly in
    service, subjecting him to the commission's jurisdiction pursuant
    to the Act.   We disagree with Perkey's contention in this regard.
    Under Code § 65.2-101, employers with fewer
    than three employees are exempt from
    coverage under the Workers' Compensation
    Act. The employer has the burden of
    producing evidence that it is exempt from
    coverage. Craddock Moving & Storage Co. v.
    Settles, 
    16 Va. App. 1
    , 2, 
    427 S.E.2d 428
    ,
    429 (1993), aff'd per curiam, 
    247 Va. 165
    ,
    
    440 S.E.2d 613
     (1994). "What constitutes an
    employee is a question of law, but whether
    the facts bring a person within the law's
    designation, is usually a question of fact."
    Baker v. Nussman, 
    152 Va. 293
    , 298, 
    147 S.E. 246
    , 247 (1929); see also Metropolitan
    Cleaning Corp., Inc. v. Crawley, 
    14 Va. App. 261
    , 264, 
    416 S.E.2d 35
    , 37 (1992) (en
    banc). We are bound by the commission's
    findings of fact if those findings are
    supported by credible evidence. Lynch v.
    Lee, 
    19 Va. App. 230
    , 234, 
    450 S.E.2d 391
    ,
    393 (1994). On appeal, we construe the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the
    employer, the party prevailing below.
    Whitlock v. Whitlock Mechanical/Check
    Services, Inc., 
    25 Va. App. 470
    , 479, 
    489 S.E.2d 687
    , 692 (1997).
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    Osborne v. Forner, 
    36 Va. App. 91
    , 95, 
    548 S.E.2d 270
    , 272
    (2001).
    Therefore, we must determine if there is evidence in the
    record that credibly supports the commission's finding that Thomas
    Perkey was Perkey's employee and not an independent contractor.
    "The elements of an employment relationship
    are: (1) selection and engagement of the
    employee, (2) payment of wages, (3) power of
    dismissal, and (4) power of control of the
    employee's action. The most important of
    these is the element of control." Behrensen
    v. Whitaker, 
    10 Va. App. 364
    , 366, 
    392 S.E.2d 508
    , 509 (1990) (citation omitted).
    The first three elements "are not the
    ultimate facts, but only those more or less
    useful in determining whose is the work and
    where is the power of control." Stover v.
    Ratliff, 
    221 Va. 509
    , 512, 
    272 S.E.2d 40
    , 42
    (1980).
    Mount Vernon Builders, Inc. v. Rotty, 
    28 Va. App. 511
    , 514, 
    507 S.E.2d 95
    , 96-97 (1998).
    [Thus,] [t]he right of control is the
    determining factor in ascertaining the
    parties' status in an analysis of an
    employment relationship. Virginia
    Employment Comm'n v. A.I.M. Corp., 
    225 Va. 338
    , 347, 
    302 S.E.2d 534
    , 539 (1983). And
    the right of control includes not only the
    power to specify the result to be attained,
    but the power to control "the means and
    methods by which the result is to be
    accomplished." [Richmond Newspapers v.
    Gill, 
    224 Va. 92
    , 98, 
    294 S.E.2d 840
    , 843
    (1982)]. An employer-employee relationship
    exists if the party for whom the work is to
    be done has the power to direct the means
    and methods by which the other does the
    work. "[I]f the latter is free to adopt
    such means and methods as he chooses to
    accomplish the result, he is not an employee
    but an independent contractor." A.I.M.
    - 3 -
    Corp., 225 Va. at 347, 
    302 S.E.2d at 540
    ;
    Craig v. Doyle, 
    179 Va. 526
    , 531, 
    19 S.E.2d 675
    , 677 (1942). The extent of the reserved
    right of control may be determined by
    examining the performance of the parties in
    the activity under scrutiny.
    Intermodal Services, Inc. v. Smith, 
    234 Va. 596
    , 601, 
    364 S.E.2d 221
    , 224 (1988).
    The evidence in the case at bar, when considered in the light
    most favorable to Fridley, established that Thomas Perkey had
    worked primarily for his father since he was a teenager. 1   The
    evidence further established that he was transported to the
    various sites in the company vehicle, that he was paid on a
    "square footage basis, that averaged out to an hourly thing" of
    approximately $8.00 per hour, and that he primarily used his
    father's equipment when performing his work.   In fact, Perkey
    testified that he was not able to work on "major" jobs, like those
    he worked on with his father, because he "didn't have the
    equipment" to allow him to do so.
    Moreover, the evidence supported the commission's
    determination that Perkey had the "power to direct the means and
    methods by which [Thomas Perkey did his] work."   Intermodal, 
    234 Va. at 601
    , 
    364 S.E.2d at 224
    .    Indeed, Thomas Perkey conceded, in
    response to questioning by the deputy commissioner, "[y]eah, he
    tells me how he wants it done, overall result.    I mean if he wants
    1
    Thomas Perkey testified that he was 21 years of age at the
    time of the hearing.
    - 4 -
    a wall, he tells me he needs a wall."   Further, Gilbert Perkey
    testified that his father established quitting time and that he
    gave the workers, including Thomas Perkey, their individual
    assignments.   He also stated that when "it came to stuff we didn't
    know about, then [Perkey] would do it."   Finally, Thomas Perkey
    himself testified that he did not bid for other large jobs, but
    only did "small" jobs for friends.
    Because credible evidence existed in the record to support
    the commission's determination that Thomas Perkey was an
    "employee," not an independent contractor, and that Perkey
    therefore, regularly employed three or more employees, we find no
    error in its finding that it possessed jurisdiction over Fridley's
    claim.
    Affirmed.
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