Vincent DePaul Medley a/k/a v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Bumgardner and Clements
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
VINCENT DEPAUL MEDLEY, A/K/A
DEPAUL VINCENT MEDLEY, A/K/A
JOHN DEPAUL MEDLEY, A/K/A
LEE MEDLEY, A/K/A MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
JOHNNY MEDLEY JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
APRIL 9, 2002
v. Record No. 1317-01-1
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG
AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY
Samuel Taylor Powell, III, Judge
Sheree Twine Konstantinou (Williamsburg Law
Group, PLC, on brief), for appellant.
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General
(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Vincent DePaul Medley (defendant) was convicted by a jury of
arson in violation of Code § 18.2-81. On appeal, he challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.
Finding no error, we affirm.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting
to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See
Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721
(1988). The jury's verdict will not be disturbed unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it. See id. The credibility
of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters solely for
the fact finder's determination. See Long v. Commonwealth, 8
Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989).
I.
In October 2000, Tracy Bassett was residing with her
brother, Bruce Bassett, at his home in James City County. Ms.
Bassett and defendant were romantically involved, and he was
"staying" in the home "off and on." Ms. Bassett regularly
borrowed her brother's automobile, a 1989 Pontiac Firebird, for
her purposes and "to carry [defendant] to work in the
morning[s]."
On October 27, 2000, Ms. Bassett and defendant argued, he
assaulted her, and Bruce Bassett (Bassett) ordered him from the
house. Bassett then drove defendant to a nearby store, "dropped
him off," and advised he could no longer reside in the home.
The following day, defendant visited Ms. Bassett at her
employment, noted she "didn't drive [the] car this morning," and
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commented, "don't worry about it because you'll never drive it
again."
At approximately 7:30-8:00 p.m. that evening, defendant
returned to the Bassett home in an automobile driven by Melvin
Hendrick. An argument ensued between defendant and Ms. Bassett,
and he was ordered "to leave." Defendant, a smoker in the
"habit" of carrying a "lighter, matches, whatever," asked for a
cigarette before exiting the house. Once outside, he returned
to Hendrick's car, explained "he was getting kicked out" and
requested "a ride some place else." However, Hendrick, aware
"something [wasn't] right," declined and drove away, with
defendant then alone in the yard.
"About five, ten minutes" later, a neighbor "knocked on the
[Bassett] door" and reported Bassett's car was "on fire."
Bassett "ran out" and observed "flames coming out the driver's
side window of the Firebird," the "front seat on fire." He had
seen the vehicle minutes before, parked in the "front . . .
lawn," unlocked and with the "driver's window down," and in
"perfect condition."
Assistant Fire Marshal John T. Black, Jr., an expert in
"the field of arson" assigned to investigate the incident,
examined the burned car "in an effort to locate an accidental
source of ignition." Black's investigation determined that the
fire had originated in the "front seat area of the passenger
compartment" and disclosed "no accidental sources." When asked
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by defendant's counsel, "Based on your scientific training, do
you have a reasonable idea of how the fire started?," Black
opined that "ordinary combustible materials, paper . . . was
[sic] ignited and probably dropped into the front seat of the
car."
II.
At trial and, again, on appeal, defendant contends the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We
disagree.
To convict for a violation of Code § 18.2-81, "the
Commonwealth must prove the fire was of incendiary origin and
that the [accused] was a guilty agent in the burning."
Augustine v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 123, 306 S.E.2d 886, 888
(1983). An incendiary fire is one that involves a deliberate or
intentional burning of property. See Callahan v. Commonwealth,
8 Va. App. 135, 138, 379 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1989). "Arson is a
crime of stealth. The perpetrator is seldom observed, seldom
confesses and, if skillful, leaves few traces of his presence."
Cook v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 427, 431-32, 309 S.E.2d 325, 329
(1983). Thus, circumstantial evidence is oftentimes the only
proof of the offense.
"Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to
as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently
convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of
guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d
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864, 876 (1983). "The Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable
hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not those
that spring from the imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433 S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993)
(citations omitted). Whether a hypothesis of innocence is
reasonable is a question of fact. Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7
Va. App. 269, 290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988).
A. INCENDIARY ORIGIN
Defendant insists the Commonwealth failed to prove the fire
had an incendiary origin, arguing that Black, while "rul[ing]
out various accidental causes of [the fire]," was unable to "say
for sure just how it started." Defendant's argument, however,
is belied by the record.
The investigation and related evidence of Assistant Fire
Marshal Black disclosed "no accidental sources of ignition for
the fire." Further, Black opined, without objection, that paper
or like "ordinary combustible material[]" had been ignited and
probably dropped in the front seat of the car." "When a
fact-finder has accepted the testimony of a qualified expert
witness, which negates every reasonable possibility that a fire
was of accidental origin, we cannot hold the evidence
insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a finding that the
fire was of incendiary origin." Cook, 226 Va. at 432, 309
S.E.2d at 328.
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B. CRIMINAL AGENCY
Defendant next maintains the Commonwealth's evidence failed
to prove the requisite criminal agency, contending the
circumstantial evidence did "nothing more than put [defendant]
in the yard of the Bassett home prior to the fire." Again, we
disagree.
The evidence clearly established ill will between defendant
and Ms. Bassett and her brother. On the morning of the fire,
defendant threatened that Ms. Bassett would "never drive [the
car] again." Later, the same day, despite prior warnings to
stay away, defendant returned to the Bassett home, was again
ousted, and last seen alone in the darkened yard near the
unlocked vehicle, its front window lowered. Moments later, the
car was found ablaze from an incendiary fire that began in the
front seat. Defendant was an habitual smoker, regularly in
possession of a lighter or matches. Such evidence established
motive, time, means and opportunity, proof clearly sufficient to
support conviction of defendant as the perpetrator.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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