Barry Samuel Camden v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Overton
Argued at Salem, Virginia
BARRY SAMUEL CAMDEN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2951-96-3 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
DECEMBER 16, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY
George E. Honts, III, Judge
William E. Bobbitt, Jr., Public Defender, for
appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General;
Margaret Ann B. Walker, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Barry S. Camden (appellant) appeals from his bench trial
conviction by the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County (trial
court) for grand larceny of a dog-tracking collar and a
dog-shocking collar, in violation of Code § 18.2-95. He contends
the evidence was insufficient to prove that (1) he intended to
steal the collars and (2) the value of the collars was at least
$200. He seeks to have his conviction reversed or,
alternatively, reduced to petit larceny.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358
S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The judgment of a trial court, sitting
without a jury, is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict
and will be disturbed only if plainly wrong or without evidence
to support it. See id.Intent
Larceny requires proof of "the wrongful or fraudulent taking
of personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another,
without his assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner
thereof permanently. The [intent] must accompany the taking, but
the wrongful taking . . . in itself imports the [necessary
intent]." Skeeter v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 722, 725, 232 S.E.2d
756, 758 (1977) (quoting Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521,
524, 35 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1945)). In determining intent, "the
fact finder may consider the conduct of the person involved and
all the circumstances revealed by the evidence." Welch v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 524, 425 S.E.2d 101, 105 (1992)
(quoting Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d
193, 198 (1987)). "Indeed, '[t]he specific intent in the
person's mind may, and often must, be inferred from that person's
conduct and statements.'" Id. (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth,
13 Va. App. 524, 527, 414 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1992)).
Here, the only reasonable hypothesis flowing from the
- 2 -
evidence was that appellant took the collars with the intent to
permanently deprive the owner of them. Appellant picked up
Gerald Looney's dog and its tracking and shocking collars and
transported them twenty miles, despite the identification collar
also around the dog's neck. On the way home, appellant stopped
at the home of a friend, a hunter, to inquire about the collars,
but made no attempt to contact the owner listed on the dog's
identification collar. Instead, he opined that the dog itself
was worth no "more than a dollar." In addition, he removed the
shocking and tracking collars, not the identification collar, and
kept them in his truck, while he permitted the dog to run free.
Finally, about twenty-four hours after picking up the dog and
collars, appellant still had not attempted to contact the owner.
The credibility of a witness, the weight accorded the testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are matters
solely for the fact finder's determination. See Long v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1989).
Although appellant claimed that he intended to return the
collars, the trial court was entitled to conclude that he was
lying to conceal his guilt, and the remaining evidence was
sufficient to prove that he acted with the requisite intent.
Value
In a grand larceny conviction, "the burden is upon the
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of
the goods stolen equals at least [$200,] the amount fixed by
- 3 -
statute in definition of the offense." Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222
Va. 704, 705, 284 S.E.2d 792, 792 (1981); see Code § 18.2-95.
Appellant contends that the Commonwealth's evidence was
insufficient to prove that the combined value of the collars
taken was $200 or more. We agree. In Parker v. Commonwealth,
254 Va. 118, 489 S.E.2d 482 (1997), the Court held that the
"monetary element of [Code § 18.2-95] is measured by the value of
the item actually stolen, not by the value of the entire property
of which it is a part." Id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 484 (emphasis
added). In the case before us, we are bound by the Parker
decision.
In a trial on an indictment charging grand larceny in which
the evidence, as here, fails to support a grand larceny
conviction but is sufficient to support a conviction for petit
larceny, an appeal does not require a complete reversal and new
trial. Although the record shows that the value of the shocking
collar was not the same as the value of that collar and the
transmitter set, the evidence discloses that the tracking collar
was valued at $135, a sum sufficient to support appellant's
conviction for petit larceny.
Accordingly, we grant appellant's request to set aside his
conviction for grand larceny and remand this case to the trial
court for sentencing on the lesser-included offense of petit
larceny.
Reversed and remanded.
- 4 -