Jeffrey Scott Wright v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1997 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Moon *
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    JEFFREY SCOTT WRIGHT
    MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY
    v.   Record No. 2528-96-3                JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
    DECEMBER 9, 1997
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY
    J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge
    Robert R. Feagans, Jr., for appellant.
    Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Jeffrey Scott Wright was convicted in a bench trial for
    possession of LSD, a Schedule I controlled substance, in
    violation of Code § 18.2-250.   On appeal, he contends that the
    trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the LSD that
    was seized when he was arrested.   Specifically, Wright alleges
    that because the arresting officer was beyond his territorial
    jurisdiction the arrest was unlawful, and, therefore, the
    evidence was illegally seized in the search incident to an
    unlawful arrest.   We disagree and affirm the conviction.
    *
    When the case was argued Judge Moon presided. Judge
    Fitzpatrick was elected Chief Judge effective November 19, 1997.
    Judge Moon participated in the hearing and decision of this case
    prior to his retirement on November 25, 1997.
    **
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    During roll call, Investigator Danny Viar of the Lynchburg
    Police Department learned of an outstanding capias for the arrest
    of Jeffrey Scott Wright for his having failed to appear in court.
    Viar testified that he did not know from which jurisdiction the
    capias had been issued or that the charge for failure to appear
    was for a misdemeanor offense.
    Viar, who was familiar with Wright and his vehicle, spotted
    Wright while driving through Campbell County.    Viar radioed the
    Campbell County dispatcher to send an officer to serve the
    capias.    In the meantime, Viar stopped the appellant's vehicle in
    Campbell County, which was beyond Viar's jurisdictional limit in
    the City of Lynchburg.
    Viar approached the appellant's vehicle, showed appellant
    his badge and told the appellant that a Campbell County officer
    was en route to arrest appellant on the capias.    Although Viar
    did not physically restrain Wright, Viar told him to stay until
    the Campbell County deputy arrived and that Wright was "not going
    to leave."    Ten minutes after Viar stopped Wright, a Campbell
    County officer arrived and arrested Wright.    In a search incident
    to the arrest, the Campbell County officer found LSD in Wright's
    pocket.
    At trial, Wright filed a motion to suppress the LSD
    contending it was obtained in a search incident to an illegal
    arrest.    The trial court found that although Investigator Viar
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    had exceeded the scope of his jurisdiction as a Lynchburg police
    officer by arresting Wright, Viar had legally arrested him as a
    private citizen.    Accordingly, the trial court denied the motion
    to suppress.    The correctness of that ruling is the issue before
    us on appeal.
    II.   ANALYSIS
    Investigator Viar's detention of the appellant was an arrest
    and was not, as the Commonwealth argues, merely an investigative
    stop. 1   Viar was not briefly detaining the appellant for the
    purpose of conducting an investigation of suspected criminal
    activity.    Rather, Viar had restricted Wright from leaving the
    roadside, he had told Wright that he was not free to leave, and
    that Wright had to remain there until the Campbell County deputy
    arrived to formally take him into custody.      Under the
    circumstances, a person of ordinary intelligence and
    understanding would believe that he was not free to leave and
    was, therefore, under "arrest."      See United States v. Mendenhall,
    
    446 U.S. 544
    , 553-54 (1980); Castell v. Commonwealth, 
    21 Va. App. 78
    , 81-82, 
    461 S.E.2d 438
    , 439 (1995).       Accordingly, the trial
    court did not err in holding that Viar had arrested Wright
    without a warrant.    Thus, we must next determine whether Viar's
    1
    Because Viar's detention of Wright was an arrest, and not
    an investigative stop, the decision in Layne v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 23
    , 
    421 S.E.2d 215
     (1992), does not apply to the case at
    bar. See Layne, 15 Va. App. at 27, 
    421 S.E.2d at 217
     ("An
    officer need not possess the statutory authority to effect an
    arrest . . . in order to effect a Terry-type detention to
    investigate incipient criminal activity.").
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    extraterritorial arrest of Wright would require the exclusion of
    the evidence seized in the search incidental to such an arrest.
    Generally, an arresting officer may search an individual as
    an incident to a lawful arrest.     DePriest v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 577
    , 583, 
    359 S.E.2d 540
    , 543 (1987).    If, however, the
    arrest is illegal in that it violates federal constitutional
    protections, any evidence seized from a search pursuant to such
    arrest is subject to the exclusionary rule, as mandated by Mapp
    v. Ohio, 
    367 U.S. 643
     (1961).     See Penn v. Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 399
    , 406, 
    412 S.E.2d 189
    , 193 (1991), aff'd per curiam, 
    244 Va. 218
    , 
    420 S.E.2d 713
     (1992).
    However, in Penn, we held that "[i]n the absence of any
    deprivation of constitutional rights, an arrest in violation of
    state statute does not require exclusion of any evidence obtained
    as a result of the arrest."   13 Va. App. at 408, 
    412 S.E.2d at 194
    .   The exclusionary rule adopted in Mapp does not operate to
    exclude evidence from an arrest that is statutorily defective,
    but otherwise constitutionally valid, id. at 406-07, 
    412 S.E.2d at 193
    , and the Virginia Supreme Court has rejected the
    invitation to adopt a state exclusionary rule for arrests that
    are constitutionally valid but which may violate a statutory
    provision.    See Horne v. Commonwealth, 
    230 Va. 512
    , 519, 
    339 S.E.2d 186
    , 191 (1986).   Therefore, in this case, even if Viar's
    arrest of Wright was "illegal" because he was a Lynchburg police
    officer who had exceeded his authority to arrest in Campbell
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    County or a private citizen who had no authority to arrest for a
    misdemeanor, the dispositive issue is whether Viar's arrest of
    Wright violated any federal constitutional guarantees which the
    exclusionary rule, as enunciated in Mapp, was designed to
    protect.
    The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the state or a police
    officer from making a warrantless arrest or seizure of a person
    provided that the state or officer has probable cause to believe
    that a crime has been or is being committed.   See Thompson v.
    Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 117
    , 121, 
    390 S.E.2d 198
    , 201 (1990)
    (citing United States v. Watson, 
    423 U.S. 411
     (1976)).     A police
    officer has probable cause to arrest if the officer "had
    knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a
    reasonable man in believing that an offense has been committed."
    DePriest, 4 Va. App. at 583, 
    359 S.E.2d at 543
    .
    Here, Investigator Viar had probable cause to arrest Wright
    because he had learned at roll call that a capias for Wright's
    arrest was outstanding, charging him with having failed to appear
    in court.   The information provided Viar with sufficient facts to
    reasonably believe that Wright had committed a criminal offense.
    Wright does not contest this.
    Wright asserts that the LSD was seized from him in a search
    pursuant to an unlawful arrest because Viar exceeded his
    jurisdictional authority under Code § 19.2-250. 2   However, that
    2
    Code § 19.2-250 provides that, in criminal cases involving
    offenses against the Commonwealth, the jurisdiction of a city or
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    claim of illegality as to the arrest does not involve a claim
    that federal constitutional protections were violated which would
    implicate the exclusionary rule.   Even if Investigator Viar
    violated Code § 19.2-250 or exceeded the common law authority of
    a private citizen in arresting Wright for a misdemeanor, he
    nonetheless constitutionally detained Wright.    Under the holding
    in Penn, the exclusionary rule does not apply.    Accordingly, the
    trial court properly denied the appellant's motion to suppress
    the evidence.
    For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.
    Affirmed.
    (..continued)
    town "shall extend within the Commonwealth one mile beyond the
    corporate limits of such town or city . . . ." See Hall v.
    Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 559
    , 563, 
    389 S.E.2d 921
    , 924 (1990)
    (wherein we held that if an officer exceeds his statutory
    authority, his arrest may nevertheless be lawful because an
    officer retains the power as a private citizen to arrest an
    accused); see also Moore v. Oliver, 
    347 F. Supp. 1313
    , 1316 (W.D.
    Va. 1972) ("If [a police officer] acts outside the one mile area
    from the city limits, his status is that of any other private
    citizen.") (citing Alexandria v. McClary, 
    167 Va. 199
    , 203, 
    188 S.E. 158
    , 160 (1936)).
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