Virginia Power v. Tim B. Brueser ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Baker and Elder
    VIRGINIA POWER
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1667-97-4                        PER CURIAM
    DECEMBER 16, 1997
    TIM B. BRUESER
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Glenn S. Phelps; Midkiff & Hiner, on brief),
    for appellant.
    (Craig A. Brown; Ashcraft & Gerel, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Virginia Power (employer) contends that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission erred in awarding temporary partial
    disability benefits to Tim B. Brueser (claimant) based upon pay
    for overtime hours that claimant was not offered when he returned
    to light duty work with employer.   Upon reviewing the record and
    the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
    without merit.   Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
    decision.    See Rule 5A:27.
    Two recent decisions control the issue of whether the
    partially disabled claimant is entitled to benefits because his
    light duty job has not included overtime wages as did his
    pre-injury work.   In Carr v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 
    25 Va. App. 306
    , 
    487 S.E.2d 878
     (1997), and Consolidated Stores
    Corp. v. Graham, 
    25 Va. App. 133
    , 
    486 S.E.2d 576
     (1997), we held
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    that when a claimant who has not been released to his pre-injury
    duties is offered and accepts light duty work from the employer
    which does not include overtime that was previously part of the
    pre-injury job, "the availability of alternative [overtime] work
    [does] not affect the claimant's right to compensation due to an
    impaired capacity to perform his pre-injury duties."
    Consolidated Stores, 
    25 Va. App. at 137
    , 
    486 S.E.2d at 578
    .        The
    underlying theory is that the partial incapacity has caused the
    employee to earn a lesser post-injury wage than his pre-injury
    wage.    Thus, if a claimant who has not recovered his "pre-injury
    capacity" suffers a wage loss in the light duty position by
    virtue of the fact that overtime work, which was previously
    available, enabled the employee to earn a particular wage and the
    employee is not able to earn that same wage because overtime is
    unavailable in the light duty position, he is entitled to
    temporary partial disability benefits to compensate for the wage
    loss incurred.     See Carr, 
    25 Va. App. at 312
    , 487 S.E.2d at 881;
    Consolidated Stores, 
    25 Va. App. at 136-37
    , 
    486 S.E.2d at 578
    .
    The uncontradicted evidence in this case proves that the
    claimant has not been released to his pre-injury capacity as an
    electric serviceman - first class.       The evidence also proves that
    claimant consistently accepted overtime hours that were offered
    to him in his pre-injury employment.      However, in his light duty
    employment, he was not offered overtime hours, whereas other
    employees in claimant's pre-injury job classification continued
    - 2 -
    to receive overtime.   Claimant's average weekly wage earned prior
    to his injury was greater than the average weekly wage earned in
    the light duty work because of the lack of available overtime in
    the light duty work.   Thus, he suffered a post-injury wage loss.
    "[E]mployer's inability to predict the available overtime to the
    [electric servicemen] during the period in question does not
    diminish claimant's right to compensation, as his work-related
    injury prevents him from performing [electric serviceman] duties,
    and employer remains liable for the wage loss suffered by
    claimant."   Carr, 
    25 Va. App. at 312
    , 487 S.E.2d at 881.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1667974

Filed Date: 12/16/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014