Stepforn Dailey v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
STEPFORN DAILEY
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0555-97-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
DECEMBER 9, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHARLOTTE COUNTY
Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge
S. Anderson Nelson (Watson & Nelson, P.C., on
brief), for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General,
(Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Stepforn Dailey (appellant) appeals his conviction for
breaking and entering in the nighttime with the intent to commit
murder, rape, or robbery on the basis that the evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. We disagree and affirm.
On June 30, 1996, Christine Rutledge arrived home after
shopping for groceries at 8:45 or 8:50 p.m.; at that time, it was
not fully dark, and she did not turn on the lights. After she
had put away her groceries, Rutledge sat down to watch a movie
and her lights were on. She then heard a scratching sound, and
turned to see appellant standing near her. When asked what he
was doing there, appellant responded that, "I come in here to rob
you and kill you if you ain't got no money." After Rutledge
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
responded that she only had a little money, appellant beat and
raped her. Appellant put a knife to her throat. Appellant told
Rutledge, "if you holler I'm go cut your throat." Rutledge
identified appellant as the attacker.
After the attack, Rutledge discovered that a number of
items, including her car, were missing. A pair of brass knuckles
was found in the car following the incident. An investigating
officer discovered that a window screen had been removed from a
window at Rutledge's trailer and that the window had been raised.
The investigator testified that the window appeared to be the
attacker's point of entry.
On appeal, this Court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Martin v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). The verdict of
the judge, sitting without a jury, "shall not be set aside unless
it appears from the evidence that such judgment is plainly wrong
or without evidence to support it." Code § 8.01-680. The
credibility of witnesses, the weight accorded the testimony of
witnesses, and the inferences to be drawn from proven facts are
questions within the province of the trier of fact. Spivey v.
Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 715, 724, 479 S.E.2d 543, 548 (1997)
(citing Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 199, 379 S.E.2d
473, 476 (1989)).
A defendant may be convicted under Code § 18.2-90 if he or
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she "in the nighttime enters without breaking or at any time
breaks and enters . . . any . . . manufactured home." Contrary
to appellant's argument that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that a breaking took place, or that the entry into Rutledge's
home took place at night, the evidence at trial, viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant entered Rutledge's home
after sunset. Although Rutledge returned home when it was not
"fully dark," she put away her groceries, sat to watch
television, and heard him enter after she turned the lights on.
Furthermore, the evidence is sufficient to establish a breaking,
regardless of the time of entry. The evidence also establishes
that a screen from a window had been removed. Thus, that
evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant entered Rutledge's trailer by breaking. See Phoung v.
Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 457, 460-61, 424 S.E.2d 712, 713-14
(1992) (holding that application of any slight physical force
constitutes a "breaking").
Appellant further contends that the Commonwealth did not
prove that he had the requisite intent to rape, rob, or murder at
the time he entered Rutledge's home and that the evidence only
supports the theory that appellant entered the home with the
intent to commit larceny. This contention is without merit.
Appellant told Rutledge that he had come into the house to
rob her and kill her if she didn't have any money. In addition,
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appellant beat and raped Rutledge. During the rape, appellant
stated, "if you holler I'm go cut your throat." Appellant's
statements and action support the conclusion that he entered
Rutledge's house with the intent to rob, murder, or rape her.
See, e.g., Hancock v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 774, 782, 407
S.E.2d 301, 306 (1991) ("Specific intent may be shown by
circumstances, including by a person's conduct or by his
statements." (citing Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 662,
180 S.E. 395, 399 (1935))).
We accordingly find the evidence supports the appellant's
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm.
Affirmed.
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