Milton Gaither v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Overton
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    MILTON GAITHER
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0610-96-2               JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    JUNE 24, 1997
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG
    James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge
    Mary Katherine Martin, Senior Assistant
    Public Defender, for appellant.
    Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Milton Gaither was convicted on charges of conspiracy to
    distribute cocaine, see Code § 18.2-256, and attempted possession
    of cocaine with intent to distribute.    See Code § 18.2-248.    He
    contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
    convictions.   We agree and reverse the convictions.
    I.
    The evidence proved that Detective David E. Hamilton
    received information on November 18, 1993 about a package that
    would be arriving at the Greyhound Bus Station in the City of
    Petersburg in the name of Milton Gaither.   After the detective
    found a package at the station addressed to Gaither, a dog
    trained to detect narcotics "alerted" on the package.     The
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    detective then obtained a search warrant, searched the package,
    and found men's clothing inside the package.    Inside the pockets
    of an item of clothing, the detective found bags containing an
    off-white, chunky substance.   The substance was found to be 71
    grams of cocaine.
    The detective removed the cocaine, resealed the package, and
    returned the package to the bus station.    The detective and other
    officers waited for Gaither to arrive for the package.    That same
    day, one of the officers saw Gaither in the bus station standing
    near the counter where tickets could be purchased and packages
    could be retrieved.   Gaither walked away from the counter and
    exited the station.
    The next day, Gaither entered the bus station, signed for
    the package, and walked out of the station with the package.     As
    he was walking away from the station, Gaither gave the package to
    a man who was walking with him.   A police officer arrested
    Gaither and read him Miranda warnings.     After signing a waiver
    form, Gaither wrote the following:
    I met them when I got out of jail. They was
    in my cousin['s] room, so I ask[ed] them who
    they were. He said his name was Junie and
    Steve. We talk[ed], then one day he said he
    would [send] me a package. The first two
    times I pick[ed] it up, I thought nothing of
    it. Then I suspect[ed] it might be drug[s]
    . . . , then it was too late. I call[ed] my
    mother and she told me Sharon Booker took
    them in Blandford somewhere. He called his
    girlfriend Malisa and she told him that the
    package were there. Then he told me to go
    and pick it up.
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    At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Gaither made a
    motion to strike and argued that (1) the evidence was
    insufficient to prove possession of cocaine because the cocaine
    had been removed before Gaither obtained the box, (2) the
    evidence was insufficient to prove Gaither knew drugs were inside
    the box, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to show a
    conspiracy because the Commonwealth failed to prove an agreement
    between Gaither and another individual.   The trial judge
    sustained, in part, the motion on the possession charge and ruled
    that the evidence did not prove an offense greater than an
    attempt to possess cocaine with an intent to distribute.    The
    judge overruled the other grounds for the motion.   When Gaither
    did not present evidence on his own behalf, the trial judge
    convicted Gaither of attempted possession of cocaine with intent
    to distribute and conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
    II.
    To prove a conspiracy, the Commonwealth was required to
    prove that an agreement existed and that the parties shared an
    intent to achieve a certain objective.    See Fortune v.
    Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 643
    , 647, 
    406 S.E.2d 47
    , 48 (1991).
    Although the Commonwealth may prove an agreement through
    circumstantial evidence, the principle is well established that
    when evidence as to an element of an offense is wholly
    circumstantial, "all necessary circumstances proved must be
    consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and exclude
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    every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."   Inge v. Commonwealth,
    
    217 Va. 360
    , 366, 
    228 S.E.2d 563
    , 567 (1976).
    The Commonwealth's evidence merely showed that Gaither
    agreed to pick up the package at the bus station, that he picked
    up the package, that he suspected drugs, and that the package
    contained a large quantity of cocaine.   No evidence proved that
    Gaither agreed to distribute cocaine or that Gaither was aware of
    the nature of the contents of the package.   No evidence proved
    that Gaither had opened that package or any other package.
    "In order to convict [Gaither] of conspiring . . . to
    distribute a controlled drug, the Commonwealth had to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that an agreement existed . . . between
    [Gaither and another] by some concerted action to distribute the
    drugs."   Reed v. Commonwealth, 
    213 Va. 593
    , 594, 
    194 S.E.2d 746
    ,
    747 (1973).   This evidence fails to meet that standard.   An
    agreement between parties is not shown by merely proving that one
    person assists another.   Cf. Poole v. Commonwealth, 
    7 Va. App. 510
    , 513, 
    375 S.E.2d 371
    , 372-73 (1988).   Indeed, a person may
    unwittingly aid a criminal act.   At most, this evidence creates
    merely a suspicion of guilt.   However, suspicion, alone, is not
    enough to sustain a conviction.   See Stover v. Commonwealth, 
    222 Va. 618
    , 624, 
    283 S.E.2d 194
    , 197 (1981) ("Suspicion, . . . no
    matter how strong, is insufficient to sustain a criminal
    conviction."); see also Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 523
    , 528, 
    351 S.E.2d 598
    , 601-02 (1986).   Accordingly, we hold
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    that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine.
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    III.
    The only evidence that tended to show that Gaither knew
    cocaine was in the package was Gaither's statement that he
    "suspected" drugs.   However, to prove possession the Commonwealth
    must prove that Gaither was "aware of the presence and character
    of the [cocaine] and was intentionally and consciously"
    possessing it.   Wright v. Commonwealth, 
    217 Va. 669
    , 670, 
    232 S.E.2d 733
    , 734 (1977); see also Buono v. Commonwealth, 
    213 Va. 475
    , 
    193 S.E.2d 798
     (1973).   "[C]ircumstances of suspicion, no
    matter how grave or strong, are not proof of guilt sufficient to
    support a verdict of guilty."    Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 619
    , 623, 
    238 S.E.2d 820
    , 822 (1977); see also Burton v.
    Commonwealth, 
    215 Va. 711
    , 
    213 S.E.2d 757
     (1975).    Evidence that
    Gaither "suspected" that drugs may have been inside the package
    fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gaither
    intentionally and consciously possessed the drugs.   Thus, the
    evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted
    possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
    Accordingly, the convictions are reversed.
    Reversed.
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