Piedmont Manufacturing Co. v. Lois P. East ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Overton
Argued at Salem, Virginia
PIEDMONT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1546-96-3 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
FEBRUARY 25, 1997
LOIS P. EAST
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
S. Vernon Priddy, III (Mark M. Caldwell, III;
Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, on briefs),
for appellants.
P. Scott De Bruin (Joseph R. Johnson, Jr. &
Associates, on brief), for appellee.
This appeal stems from a 1992 award of benefits by the
Workers' Compensation Commission to Lois P. East for DeQuervain’s
tenosynovitis, affirmed by this Court in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v.
East, 17 Va. App. 499, 438 S.E.2d 769 (1993). After the Supreme
Court's decision in The Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186,
467 S.E.2d 795 (1996), Piedmont moved the commission to vacate
the award, arguing that the commission had no subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim. The commission refused, and
Piedmont appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
In the case at bar we are constrained to observe the
doctrine of res judicata, in which "a point once adjudicated by a
court of competent jurisdiction may be relied upon as conclusive
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
upon the same matter as between the parties or their privies, in
any subsequent suit, in the same court or any other court, at law
or in chancery." Patterson v. Saunders, 194 Va. 607, 611, 74
S.E.2d 204, 207 (1953). "A plea of res judicata will be
sustained if the prior adjudication was between the same parties
or their privies and a valid final judgment was entered which
resolved the claim on its merits." Waterfront Marine Constr.,
Inc. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417, 430, 468 S.E.2d 894, 902
(1996); see Bates v. Devers, 214 Va. 667, 670-71, 202 S.E.2d 917,
920-21 (1974).
Piedmont argues that res judicata does not apply because the
commission never had subject matter jurisdiction and that the
award was therefore void ab initio. This argument is
disingenuous. When East brought her claim, the commission found
that it had jurisdiction to award benefits. This Court, which
Piedmont does not contend lacks competent jurisdiction, then
affirmed the finding of the commission. Because Piedmont chose
not to appeal further, our decision became a point "adjudicated
by a court of competent jurisdiction [to be] relied upon as
conclusive upon the same matter as between the parties." The
case before us today is the same matter between the same parties,
1
and our past ruling continues to bind the parties.
1
We note that, were we to revisit East’s claim, we would not
retroactively apply Jemmott to vacate her award. As Jemmott
overruled the past consistent decisions of both the commission
2
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commission.
Affirmed.
and this Court, and as a retrospective application would result
in substantial inequity to claimants whose claims in tort are now
barred by the statute of limitations, Jemmott should be applied
only prospectively. See City of Richmond v. Blaylock, 247 Va.
250, 252, 440 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1994); Harper v. Virginia Dep't of
Taxation, 241 Va. 232, 237-40, 401 S.E.2d 868, 871-73 (1991).
3