Commonwealth v. Yulaleya Joyner ( 1997 )


Menu:
  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2292-96-4               JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    FEBRUARY 11, 1997
    YULALEYA JOYNER
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
    Alfred D. Swersky, Judge
    John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney
    General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
    General, on briefs), for appellant.
    Jeffrey T. Barbour, Assistant Public
    Defender, for appellee.
    After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the
    trial judge ruled that the police unlawfully seized Yulaleya
    Joyner and sustained Joyner's motion to suppress evidence
    obtained as a result of that seizure.   The Commonwealth appeals
    from that ruling, see Code § 19.2-398(2), and contends that the
    seizure was not unlawful and that Joyner's statements were not
    the product of an illegal search and seizure.      We affirm the
    ruling.
    Under the usual standards of review, "[w]e view the evidence
    in the light most favorable to [Joyner], the prevailing party
    below, and we grant all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
    from that evidence."   Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1066, 1067, 
    407 S.E.2d 47
    , 48 (1991).   So viewed, the evidence,
    in pertinent part, proved that eighteen Alexandria police
    officers and United States postal inspectors were watching an
    apartment building and monitoring a controlled delivery of
    marijuana to apartment 102, one of twelve apartments in the
    building.   The officers had intercepted a parcel containing
    marijuana that had been mailed to that apartment, equipped the
    parcel with an electronic monitor, and obtained a warrant to
    search apartment 102.
    While the package was being delivered, the officers observed
    a man watching the delivery from an automobile.   After the
    delivery, the man went into the building and exited a few minutes
    later carrying the package of marijuana that was delivered to
    apartment 102.   The officers, some of whom were in uniform,
    arrested the man as he left the building.   Approximately five
    minutes after the man was arrested, numerous officers, openly
    displaying their badges, rushed to the building with guns drawn.
    As the officers rushed to the building, Joyner and another
    woman were walking out of the building.   Joyner testified that
    one of the officers grabbed her arm and told her and the other
    woman that they had to remain in place until the officers "found
    out what was going on, who they needed to . . . hold, or arrest."
    Detective Erwin then approached Joyner, who was twelve feet away
    from the front door of the building, and asked her for her name
    and other identification.
    - 2 -
    The trial judge ruled that the officers had seized Joyner
    and that they lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to do
    so.   We agree.
    "A 'stop' or 'detention' occurs when the 'circumstances
    . . . amount to a show of official authority such that "a
    reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
    leave."'"    Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 363
    , 365, 
    398 S.E.2d 690
    , 691 (1990) (citations omitted).    "[W]henever a police
    officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
    away, he has 'seized' that person."     Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    ,
    16 (1968).
    When one officer grabbed Joyner's arm and told her to remain
    where she was and the other officer began to question Joyner
    about her identity, Joyner was seized.    Furthermore, when the
    officers seized Joyner, the officers had no objective basis to
    conclude that Joyner was involved in criminal activity.      See
    Brown v. Texas, 
    443 U.S. 47
    , 51 (1979).
    The evidence, thus, supports the trial judge's ruling that
    Joyner was unlawfully seized.   Because the cocaine in her
    possession and the statements she subsequently made were obtained
    as a result of the unlawful seizure, the trial judge did not err
    in sustaining the motion to suppress.     See Commonwealth v. Ealy,
    
    12 Va. App. 744
    , 754, 
    407 S.E.2d 681
    , 687 (1991).    Accordingly,
    we affirm the ruling.
    Affirmed.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2292964

Filed Date: 2/11/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014