Goodyear Tire, etc. v. Samuel R. Taylor ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Elder and Bray
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY and
    TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.         Record No. 1119-96-3          JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    DECEMBER 31, 1996
    SAMUEL R. TAYLOR
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Martha White Medley (Daniel, Vaughan, Medley &
    Smitherman, P.C., on brief), for appellants.
    No brief or argument for appellee.
    Contending that Samuel R. Taylor (claimant) failed to prove
    that a knee injury arose from his employment, Goodyear Tire &
    Rubber Company and Travelers Indemnity Company of Illinois
    (employer) appeal a decision of the Workers' Compensation
    Commission (commission) awarding claimant related medical
    benefits.   Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the
    commission.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
    memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of the appeal.   Guided by well established
    principles, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the party prevailing below, claimant in this instance.     Crisp
    v. Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, Inc., 
    1 Va. App. 503
    , 504, 339
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    S.E.2d 916, 916 (1986).    "If there is evidence, or reasonable
    inferences can be drawn from the evidence, to support the
    Commission's findings, they will not be disturbed on review, even
    though there is evidence in the record to support a contrary
    finding."    Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va.
    App. 276, 279, 
    348 S.E.2d 876
    , 877 (1986); see Code § 65.2-706.
    "In order to recover on a workers' compensation claim, a
    claimant must prove: (1) an injury by accident, (2) arising out
    of and (3) in the course of his employment."     Kane Plumbing, Inc.
    v. Small, 
    7 Va. App. 132
    , 135, 
    371 S.E.2d 828
    , 830 (1988); see
    Code § 65.2-101.    "The phrase arising 'in the course of' refers
    to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident
    occurred," while "arising 'out of' refers to the origin or cause
    of the injury."     County of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 
    237 Va. 180
    ,
    183, 
    376 S.E.2d 73
    , 74 (1989).
    "The mere happening of an accident at the workplace, not
    caused by any work related risk or significant work related
    exertion, is not compensable."     Plumb Rite Plumbing Serv. v.
    Barbour, 
    8 Va. App. 482
    , 484, 
    382 S.E.2d 305
    , 306 (1989).     A
    claimant must establish "that the conditions of the workplace
    or . . . some significant work related exertion caused the
    injury."    
    Id. Thus, "the
    arising out of test excludes 'an injury
    which comes from a hazard to which the employee would have been
    equally exposed apart from the employment.    The causative danger
    must be peculiar to the work, incidental to the character of the
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    business, and not independent of the master-servant
    relationship.'"   
    Johnson, 237 Va. at 183-84
    , 376 S.E.2d at 75
    (quoting United Parcel Service v. Fetterman, 
    230 Va. 257
    , 258-59,
    
    336 S.E.2d 892
    , 893 (1985)).
    "The actual determination of causation is a factual finding
    that will not be disturbed on appeal," if supported by credible
    evidence.   Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 
    7 Va. App. 684
    , 688, 
    376 S.E.2d 814
    , 817 (1989); see Code § 65.2-706.   However, "[w]hether
    an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is a
    mixed question of law and fact . . . , reviewable upon appeal."
    Jones v. Colonial Williamsburg Found., 
    8 Va. App. 432
    , 434, 
    382 S.E.2d 300
    , 301 (1989).
    Here, claimant's employment duties required that he change a
    "slug," which is located in the "bottom sidewall plate[]" of a
    tire mold and identifies the "cure" date of the tire.   The plate
    was accessed through a "hole in the bottom," "real low,"
    approximately five to six inches from the floor.   It was,
    therefore, necessary for claimant to assume a "fairly awkward"
    position, "squat[ting] down" in an environment that was "slick"
    and "hot," unable to kneel because the floor was "hot."    Claimant
    testified that employer had repeatedly instructed that he
    undertake the task by "bend[ing] [his] knees" rather than
    "bending at the hip and hurting the back."   In awarding benefits,
    the commission concluded that
    the claimant was required to engage in
    prolonged squatting in a hot, slick area,
    and to perform the task in a "fairly
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    awkward" position. After working in this
    manner for approximately one and a half
    hours, the claimant experienced a sudden,
    painful popping in his knee as he squatted
    down. . . . From this record we concur with
    the Deputy Commissioner that this injury
    arose out of the claimant's employment
    conditions.
    The commission's factual findings are supported by the
    record, and establish an activity arising from a work-related
    risk sufficiently distinctive to render the resulting injury
    compensable.   Compare 
    Barbour, 8 Va. App. at 484
    , 382 S.E.2d at
    306 (injury not compensable because it "resulted from merely
    bending over," and not from any "significant work related
    exertion [or condition]") with Kane 
    Plumbing, 7 Va. App. at 137-38
    , 371 S.E.2d at 831-32 (injury compensable when employee
    struck a rock, and turned unexpectedly while digging in awkward
    position), and Richard E. Brown, Inc. v. Caporaletti, 
    12 Va. App. 242
    , 245, 
    402 S.E.2d 709
    , 711 (1991) (injury compensable when
    suffered while lowering 100-pound furnace and performing related
    tasks).
    Accordingly, the commission correctly determined that
    claimant's injury arose from his employment, and we affirm the
    award.
    Affirmed.
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