David Allen Artrip v. Kerns Bakeries, Inc. ( 1996 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
    DAVID ALLEN ARTRIP
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1370-96-3                          PER CURIAM
    DECEMBER 10, 1996
    KERNS BAKERIES, INC.
    AND
    THE HOME INDEMNITY COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Gerald F. Sharp; Browning, Lamie & Sharp, on
    brief), for appellant.
    (L. Johnson Sarber, III; Johnson, Ayers &
    Matthews, on brief), for appellees.
    David Allen Artrip ("claimant") contends that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) his September
    18, 1992 automobile accident caused a significant exacerbation of
    his compensable July 13, 1992 back injury; and (2) his settlement
    of the third-party action related to the automobile accident
    without the knowledge of Kerns Bakeries, Inc. ("employer")
    adversely affected employer's subrogation rights, thereby barring
    claimant from receiving further compensation benefits.     Upon
    reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude
    that this appeal is without merit.    Accordingly, we summarily
    affirm the commission's decision.    Rule 5A:27.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    I.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.     R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).
    Factual findings made by the commission will be upheld on appeal
    if supported by credible evidence.      James v. Capitol Steel
    Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).
    So viewed, the evidence established that on July 13, 1992,
    claimant sustained a compensable back injury as the result of a
    fall at work.    On August 19, 1992, Dr. Timothy G. McGarry, an
    orthopedist, diagnosed claimant as suffering from lumbosacral
    pain.    A CT myelogram ordered by Dr. McGarry showed evidence of a
    right-sided L5-S1 disc herniation.     On August 28, 1992, after
    discussing treatment options with Dr. McGarry, claimant chose to
    continue with conservative treatment rather than undergo surgery.
    On September 18, 1992, claimant was involved in a
    non-work-related automobile accident.     On September 25, 1992,
    Dr. McGarry examined claimant and noted that claimant "was doing
    better, but was then involved in a motor vehicle accident last
    Friday when he had acute exacerbation of his pain again."        On
    September 25, 1992, claimant began complaining of left leg pain
    and cramping in both legs.    He had not exhibited these symptoms
    prior to the automobile accident.      In a letter dated September
    25, 1992 from Dr. McGarry to Dr. Galen Smith, Dr. McGarry wrote
    that claimant had suffered from increased back pain since the
    2
    automobile accident.    On October 16, 1992, Dr. McGarry again
    noted that claimant "now has problems on his left side.    He
    reports pain in his left side with radiating pain down to his
    knee."
    On December 3, 1992, Dr. Neal A. Jewell, an orthopedic
    surgeon, examined claimant and diagnosed a moderately large
    central-to-right L5-S1 herniated disc.   Claimant's condition
    continued to worsen and, on June 7, 1993, Dr. Jewell performed
    surgery on claimant's back.   On December 15, 1995, in response to
    questions posed by claimant's counsel, Dr. McGarry opined that
    the automobile accident had not adversely effected claimant's
    physical condition nor impeded his natural recovery from the
    work-related injury.
    The commission ruled that the August 18, 1992 automobile
    accident caused a significant exacerbation of claimant's
    compensable back injury.   In so ruling, the commission relied
    primarily upon the findings of Drs. McGarry and Jewell.    The
    notations made by these physicians contemporaneous with their
    examinations provide credible evidence to support the
    commission's finding.   Moreover, the commission, in its role as
    fact finder, was entitled to give more weight to Dr. McGarry's
    earlier notes than to his December 1995 response to claimant's
    counsel's question.    "Medical evidence is not necessarily
    conclusive, but is subject to the commission's consideration and
    weighing."   Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 
    11 Va. App. 3
    675, 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 215 (1991).      Because credible evidence
    supports the commission's finding that the August 18, 1992
    automobile accident caused a significant exacerbation of
    claimant's compensable July 13, 1992 back injury, it is binding
    upon this Court.
    II.
    Code § 65.2-309(A) provides that "[a] claim against an
    employer . . . shall operate as an assignment to the employer of
    any right to recover damages which the injured employee . . . may
    have against any other party . . . , and such employer shall be
    subrogated to any such right . . . ."      In applying this statute,
    we held that "the employee may not pursue his common law remedy
    in such a manner or settle his claim to the prejudice of the
    employer's subrogation right and thereafter continue to receive
    workers' compensation benefits."       Wood v. Caudle-Hyatt, Inc., 
    18 Va. App. 391
    , 397, 
    444 S.E.2d 3
    , 7 (1994).      Furthermore, we
    stated:
    An employee necessarily prejudices his
    employer's subrogation rights and, thus, is
    barred from obtaining or continuing to
    receive benefits under a Workers'
    Compensation Award when an employee settles a
    third-party tort claim without notice, or
    without making a claim for workers'
    compensation benefits, or without obtaining
    the consent of the employer.
    
    Id. (citing Stone
    v. George W. Helme Co., 
    184 Va. 1051
    , 1060, 
    37 S.E.2d 70
    , 75 (1946)).   This rule applies whether the third party
    tort feasor causes the original compensable injury or a later
    4
    aggravation of that injury.   Barnes v. Wise Fashions, 
    16 Va. App. 108
    , 111, 
    428 S.E.2d 301
    , 302 (1993). 1
    Claimant admitted that, after receiving compensation
    payments for nine and one-half weeks out of a possible 500 weeks,
    he settled the third-party claim related to the injuries he
    sustained in the automobile accident without employer's knowledge
    and consent.   This evidence supports the commission's finding
    that claimant's actions clearly prejudiced employer.
    Accordingly, the commission did not err in terminating claimant's
    benefits under the Act.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    1
    In City of Newport News v. Blankenship, 
    10 Va. App. 704
    ,
    707, 
    396 S.E.2d 145
    , 146-47 (1990), we held that compensation
    benefits would not be terminated where the exacerbation of the
    compensable injury was so minor that the settlement of a
    third-party claim related to the exacerbation did not prejudice
    the employer. Because we find that credible evidence supports
    the commission's finding that the August 18, 1992 automobile
    accident caused a significant exacerbation of claimant's
    compensable back injury, the rule enunciated in Blankenship does
    not apply to this case.
    5