Bryant Heating, etc. v. John C. Powers ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Senior Judge Cole
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    BRYANT HEATING & COOLING AND
    SHELBY INSURANCE COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0752-96-2                 JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE
    DECEMBER 10, 1996
    JOHN CHRISTOPHER POWERS
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Steven H. Theisen (Midkiff & Hiner, P.C., on
    brief), for appellants.
    William E. Glover (Glover & Dahnk, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Bryant Heating & Cooling and Shelby Insurance Company
    (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") appeal a
    decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission)
    awarding compensation benefits to John Christopher Powers
    (claimant).   Employer contends that the commission erred in
    finding that (1) claimant sustained an injury by accident arising
    out of and in the course of his employment on July 6, 1994; and
    (2) claimant's herniated disc was causally related to the July 6,
    1994 injury by accident.    Finding no error, we affirm.
    I.
    On July 6, 1994, claimant was working for employer as a
    sheet metal mechanic.   On that day, claimant and his co-workers
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    travelled from the jobsite to a local convenience store for their
    lunch break.    While travelling to the convenience store, claimant
    and his co-workers noticed a severe vibration and loud clunking
    noise coming from employer's truck.     One of them crawled
    underneath the truck and found the "drive shaft was ready to fall
    out."    Consequently, they took the truck to Blakely Automotive
    Center ("Blakely's") for repairs.      Blakely's, a service center
    which regularly repaired employer's vehicles, was located five to
    seven miles from the jobsite where claimant and his co-workers
    had been working.
    While waiting for Blakely's to complete the repair work,
    claimant sat in an office-type swivel chair located on Blakely's
    premises.    The chair had wheels on the bottom.   When claimant sat
    in the chair, it "flung back," and he "felt a sharp pain in [his]
    back."    Claimant stated that the chair "went back further and
    quicker, easier than what a normal chair would."     Claimant
    further explained that when he tried to sit back in the chair,
    the spring was evidently loose, causing him to feel as if he was
    falling backwards to the floor.    When he tried to catch himself,
    he "felt something pop in [his] back."     He also felt pain going
    down his buttock and left leg.    Claimant reported the incident to
    his supervisors on July 6, 1994.
    Based upon this record, the commission found that claimant's
    injury arose out of his employment because the chair's spring
    mechanism was not properly operating, which constituted an
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    additional risk peculiar to claimant's employment.   In addition,
    the commission found that the lack of any objection by Steve
    Bryant, owner of Bryant Heating & Cooling, to the truck repair
    established that employer approved of the procedure used by the
    employees, which benefitted employer and was incidental to
    claimant's employment.   Therefore, the commission ruled that
    claimant's injury occurred in the course of his employment.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.    R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).      A
    finding by the commission that an injury did or did not arise out
    of and in the course of employment is a mixed finding of law and
    fact and is properly reviewable on appeal.    City of Richmond v.
    Braxton, 
    230 Va. 161
    , 163-64, 
    335 S.E.2d 259
    , 261 (1985).
    "The concepts of 'arising out of' and 'in the course of'
    employment are not synonymous and both conditions must be proved
    before compensation will be awarded."    Marketing Profiles, Inc.
    v. Hill, 
    17 Va. App. 431
    , 433, 
    437 S.E.2d 727
    , 729 (1993) (en
    banc).   "The phrase arising 'out of' refers to the origin or
    cause of the injury."    Chesterfield v. Johnson, 
    237 Va. 180
    , 183,
    
    376 S.E.2d 73
    , 74 (1989).   To prevail, a claimant must "show that
    the conditions of the workplace . . . caused the injury."     Plumb
    Rite Plumbing Serv. v. Barbour, 
    8 Va. App. 482
    , 484, 
    382 S.E.2d 305
    , 306 (1989).   "An injury 'occurs in the "course of
    employment" when it takes place within the period of employment,
    3
    at a place where the employee may be reasonably expected to be,
    and while he is fulfilling the duties of his employment or is
    doing something which is reasonably incidental thereto.'"     Lucas
    v. Lucas, 
    212 Va. 561
    , 563, 
    186 S.E.2d 63
    , 64 (1972) (citation
    omitted).    "The phrase 'arising out of and in the course of the
    employment' covers those accidents which cause injury to an
    employee while he is discharging some duty he is authorized to
    perform in furtherance of his employer's business, either
    directly or indirectly."     
    Id. at 563,
    186 S.E.2d at 65.
    Claimant's testimony proved that the chair which caused his
    injury was unusual and was different from a normal office chair.
    Claimant stated that when he sat down, the chair went back
    further and quicker than he would have expected from a normal
    office chair.    This evidence established that while at Blakely's,
    claimant sustained an injury causally connected to a risk
    associated with the conditions of his employment.    The fact that
    the general public would have been exposed to the risk of injury
    from the chair is of no consequence.    The "actual risk" test
    adopted in Virginia "requires only that the employment expose the
    workman to the particular danger from which he was injured,
    notwithstanding the exposure of the public generally to like
    risks."     
    Id. at 563,
    186 S.E.2d at 64.
    With respect to the "in the course of" prong, although no
    evidence showed that employer required claimant and his
    co-workers to take the truck to Blakely's for repair, it was
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    obvious that by doing so, employer benefitted.    Having the truck
    repaired quickly allowed the employees to return to the jobsite
    and continue working.   Moreover, the commission was entitled to
    infer from the lack of objection by Bryant, who testified at the
    hearing, and from his payment of the invoice for the repair work,
    that employer approved of the repairs.     In short, when claimant
    injured his back he was at a place he was reasonably expected to
    be while engaged in an activity incidental to his employment.    He
    was not on a mission of his own wholly unconnected with his
    employment.
    Under these circumstances, claimant's injury arose out of
    and occurred in the course of his employment.    "To bar an
    employee from protection of Workmen's Compensation benefits
    because he voluntarily acted in his employer's interest would be
    to discourage constructive initiative, which is not a desirable
    result."   
    Id. at 564,
    186 S.E.2d at 65.
    II.
    "The actual determination of causation is a factual finding
    that will not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible
    evidence to support the finding."     Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick,
    
    7 Va. App. 684
    , 688, 
    376 S.E.2d 814
    , 817 (1989).
    The evidence showed that when claimant returned at the
    jobsite on July 6, 1994, his back pain was so severe that he had
    to lie down for approximately two and one-half hours.
    Thereafter, he sought medical treatment at the Mary Washington
    5
    Hospital emergency room.      The emergency room physician recorded a
    history of claimant developing lower back pain and left leg pain
    after hyperextending his back at work that day.        The emergency
    room Nursing Assessment Form reflects that claimant felt a pop in
    his back when he leaned back in a reclining chair.        The emergency
    room attending physician diagnosed acute back strain.
    On July 13, 1994, Dr. Michael B. O'Brien, an orthopedic
    surgeon, examined claimant.      Claimant gave Dr. O'Brien a history
    of straining his back when he forcefully sat down at work on July
    6, 1994.      Dr. O'Brien diagnosed lower back strain.    Claimant
    returned to Dr. O'Brien on October 27, 1994.        At that time,
    claimant reported extreme back pain.      On October 28, 1994, Dr.
    O'Brien reported that claimant's back was sore and he was
    experiencing left leg pain.      On November 9, 1994, Dr. O'Brien
    reported that a November 4, 1994 MRI revealed a moderate
    herniated disc on the left at L4-5 and a larger herniated disc at
    L5-S1.      Dr. O'Brien noted that these discs had not changed since
    1
    a December 1991 MRI performed by Dr. Lucey.         Dr. O'Brien noted
    that claimant had a new moderate centrally herniated disc at
    L3-4.       Dr. O'Brien recommended that claimant undergo back
    surgery.
    1
    Claimant injured his back in 1991. However, he testified
    that he did not suffer from any leg pain related to that injury,
    and he was not suffering from any back or leg pain immediately
    before the July 6, 1994 accident. Claimant was also involved in
    a motor vehicle accident on April 22, 1994, which resulted in
    neck pain.
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    On August 3, 1995, Dr. O'Brien, responding to employer's
    attorney's written question, checked "yes" in response to whether
    it was his opinion that the July 6, 1994 incident did not cause
    claimant's herniated disc at L3-4.    Employer's attorney described
    the July 6, 1994 incident as claimant being taken by surprise as
    he leaned back in a reclining chair and then tried to catch
    himself.   On August 14, 1995, in response to written questions
    posed by claimant's attorney, Dr. O'Brien indicated that he had
    changed his opinion.   Dr. O'Brien opined to a reasonable degree
    of medical certainty that claimant's herniated disc at L3-4 was
    caused by the July 6, 1994 incident.
    In his September 5, 1995 deposition, Dr. O'Brien stated that
    claimant did not exhibit any radicular leg pain during his
    initial July 13, 1994 examination.    Therefore, Dr. O'Brien
    diagnosed a simple lumbar strain.     However, Dr. O'Brien stated
    that his findings on that date were not inconsistent with a
    central herniated disc.   He noted that claimant first reported
    left leg pain on October 27, 1994.    Dr. O'Brien's physical
    findings on that date were different from those on July 13, 1994,
    because the straight leg raising test was positive on the left
    side at sixty degrees.    Dr. O'Brien opined that if there was
    enough force involved in the July 6, 1994 incident, "it is
    possible and it is reasonably medically certain that that trauma
    could have been enough to cause a herniated disc at L3-4."     Dr.
    O'Brien opined that if enough force was placed on claimant's back
    7
    as he leaned back in the chair, this could cause the disc to
    rupture.
    While noting that Dr. O'Brien's opinions appeared somewhat
    inconsistent, the commission found that Dr. O'Brien's deposition
    testimony provided sufficient evidence to prove that claimant's
    herniated disc at L3-4 was caused by the July 6, 1994 accident.
    The commission, in its role as fact finder, was entitled to weigh
    the medical evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and to
    accept Dr. O'Brien's opinion.   "In determining whether credible
    evidence exists, the appellate court does not retry the facts,
    reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own
    determination of the credibility of the witnesses."    Wagner
    Enters., Inc. v.   Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35
    (1991).    Dr. O'Brien's opinion is not inherently incredible and
    it provides credible evidence to support the commission's
    finding.   Therefore, we will not disturb this finding on appeal.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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