Buchanan Co. Pub. Serv. Authority v. Cecil Robbins ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    BUCHANAN COUNTY PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY
    and CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.      Record No. 2809-95-3          JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
    OCTOBER 15, 1996
    CECIL D. ROBBINS
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Jim H. Guynn, Jr. (Guynn & Britt, P.C., on
    briefs), for appellants.
    Gerald F. Sharp (Browning, Lamie & Sharp,
    P.C., on brief), for appellee.
    In this workers' compensation case, Buchanan County Public
    Service Authority (Buchanan County) contends that the commission
    erred in awarding Cecil D. Robbins (claimant) temporary total
    disability benefits.   Specifically, Buchanan County argues that
    the commission erred in rejecting the deputy commissioner's
    witness credibility findings and in concluding that credible
    evidence supported the claimant's award.   We find no error and
    affirm the commission's award.
    The claimant worked as a maintenance superintendent at
    Buchanan County's water and sewer systems.   On March 13, 1995,
    the claimant and two other employees, Bradley Vandyke and Jeff
    Stiltner, were attempting to pry open the door to a pump station
    using a chisel, screw driver, and slate bar when claimant alleged
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    that he fell backwards, struck his head, and injured his neck.
    At the hearing before the deputy commissioner, the claimant
    testified that "we started prying stuff on the door, trying to
    jerk and pull on the door at the same time and that's when I
    jerked back on -- on one occasion I jerked back . . . and I kind
    of felt like I . . . pulled something in my neck or shoulder but
    I . . . shrugged it off a little bit."   He further testified that
    the screwdriver "jerked" and he "fell backward and hit [his]
    head."   The two employees that were working with the claimant,
    Vandyke and Stiltner, testified and denied having seen the
    claimant fall and denied any knowledge of an accident.
    Dr. Jim C. Brasfield, who had previously treated the
    claimant for cervical spine problems resulting from a 1989 work-
    related injury, examined the claimant on March 16, 1995.    Dr.
    Brasfield noted that the results of the exam did not appear to be
    consistent with several of the claimant's complaints.    Dr.
    Brasfield was skeptical of the claimant's complaint that he had
    received a neck injury and suggested that other motives might be
    in play.   Dr. Brasfield reported that the claimant had previously
    requested of him that he "disable" the claimant.   Accordingly,
    Dr. Brasfield arranged for the claimant to have a cervical and
    lumbar myelogram in order to more accurately evaluate his
    condition.
    The myelogram revealed a "significant change in the 3rd
    cervical disc."   Therefore, Dr. Brasfield confirmed that by
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    history the claimant had a neck injury, and as to its cause, he
    reported:
    [c]omparing today's myelogram/CT with that of
    9-30-92, the third disk does look to be worse
    and therefore I think is symptomatic. Given
    the fact that his neck pain seemed to worsen
    rather acutely with his injury of 3-13-95,
    then I think that the 3-13-95 injury has to
    be considered a new injury with the resultant
    cervical 3 disk rupture being related to
    that. To summarize, the patient has a
    cervical 3 disk rupture, which I think is
    related to his new injury of 3-13-95.
    All records prepared by Dr. Brasfield after the myelogram
    reflected his diagnosis that the ruptured disk was related to the
    claimant's workplace injury.
    The deputy commissioner found that the claimant failed to
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered an
    injury by accident arising out of and during the course of his
    employment.   Specifically, the deputy commissioner found,
    "[a]fter personally observing the witnesses and their demeanor,"
    that Stiltner and Vandyke were "credible witnesses," and that the
    claimant's testimony was not "of such weight to override the
    unequivocal testimony of [Stiltner] and [Vandyke]."   Furthermore,
    the deputy commissioner noted that the emergency room physician
    inexplicably "did not record any circumstances concerning the
    March 13, 1995 incident but did make reference to claimant's
    previous injury and surgeries," and that the claimant's
    statements to the insurance carrier were inconsistent with his
    testimony in that in his interview with the carrier he could only
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    surmise that when he fell backward he had actually struck the
    ground.
    On review, the full commission reversed the deputy
    commissioner and awarded the claimant temporary total disability
    benefits.   The commission held that "[a]lthough the Deputy
    Commissioner found the employer's witnesses credible, their
    testimony that they were unaware of the accident at the time does
    not in itself disprove the employee's claim."   Thus, the
    commission found that the deputy commissioner's denial of
    benefits and credibility determinations were based on weighing
    the facts and testimony in the record.    According to the
    commission, the claimant's description of the March 13th accident
    was generally consistent, and that "the minor inconsistency
    relating to whether the claimant found dirt in his hair or bumped
    his head [was] not fatal to the claim."   More important, however,
    the commission found that "Dr. Brasfield stated unequivocally
    that the C3 disk herniation was not present before the accident
    and was causally linked to the accident."
    [A] specific, recorded observation of a
    key witness' demeanor or appearance in
    relation to credibility is an aspect of the
    hearing that the commission may not
    arbitrarily disregard. When the commission
    does not follow such a finding, the record
    should indicate that the commission did not
    arbitrarily ignore the finding.
    Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 
    5 Va. App. 374
    , 382, 
    363 S.E.2d 433
    , 437 (1987), appeal after remand, 
    9 Va. App. 120
    , 127,
    
    384 S.E.2d 333
    , 335 (1989).   Here, the deputy commissioner found
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    that Stiltner and Vandyke were credible witnesses.    Buchanan
    County argues that this finding by the deputy commissioner was
    necessarily a finding that the claimant lacked credibility based
    upon his demeanor at the hearing and, therefore, was binding upon
    the commission under Pierce.    On this record, the commission
    could make its own credibility determinations by deciding which
    witnesses' accounts seemed more accurate, which accounts were
    believable, whether independent evidence corroborated various
    accounts, whether witnesses had motives or biases for testifying
    as they did, whether witnesses had an opportunity to observe, and
    such other factors that may affect credibility.
    Pierce distinguishes between credibility determinations
    based upon specific observations of appearance and demeanor and
    those based upon the substance of the testimony and other
    evidence.
    When the deputy commissioner's finding of
    credibility is based, in whole or in part,
    upon the [witness'] appearance and demeanor
    at the hearing, the commission may have
    difficulty reversing that finding without
    recalling the witness. On the other hand, if
    the deputy commissioner's determination of
    credibility is based on the substance of the
    testimony and not upon the witness' demeanor
    and appearance, such a finding is as
    determinable by the full commission as by the
    deputy.
    Pierce, 5 Va. App. at 383, 363 S.E.2d at 438.     In the latter
    situation, the commission has no duty to explain its decision
    favoring the testimony of one witness over another "absent a
    specific, recorded observation regarding the behavior, demeanor
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    or appearance of [the witnesses]."     Bullion Hollow Enters. v.
    Lane, 
    14 Va. App. 725
    , 729, 
    418 S.E.2d 904
    , 907 (1992); see also
    Kroger Co. v. Morris, 
    14 Va. App. 233
    , 236, 
    415 S.E.2d 879
    , 881
    (1992).
    Upon review of the deputy commissioner's decision, it
    contained no "specific recorded observation" of the demeanor of
    the witnesses as a basis for determining credibility that would
    have been available and observable only by the hearing officer.
    See Lane, 14 Va. App. at 729, 418 S.E.2d at 907.    "[A] deputy
    commissioner cannot render his findings of fact unreviewable
    simply by asserting that his conclusion as to a witness'
    credibility is based on the witness' appearance and demeanor."
    Williams v. Auto Brokers, 
    6 Va. App. 570
    , 574, 
    370 S.E.2d 321
    ,
    323 (1988).   The deputy's credibility determination here was
    based primarily on the substantive testimony of the witnesses as
    well as other evidence in the record, such as the claimant's
    medical records.   Although the deputy commissioner passingly
    mentioned the witnesses' demeanor, he did not describe or explain
    anything about the appearance or demeanor of the claimant that
    would indicate his testimony was incredible or that Vandyke and
    Stiltner were credible.   Therefore, the commission did not err in
    finding that the deputy commissioner's credibility determinations
    were not binding and did not err in making its own credibility
    determinations, as the fact finder is required to do.
    In reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to prove an
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    accident or to prove causation, we do not reweigh the evidence or
    redetermine the credibility of the witnesses.      Wagner Enters.,
    Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).
    We do not redetermine the preponderance of the evidence or
    substitute our judgment for that of the commission.      Id.   We
    review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
    prevailing before the commission.      R. G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).      "The
    burden [of proof] is upon a claimant to prove by a preponderance
    of the evidence that he sustained a compensable injury" which
    requires proof of an accident and an injury caused by that
    accident.   Virginia Dep't of Transp. v. Mosebrook, 
    13 Va. App. 536
    , 537, 
    413 S.E.2d 350
    , 351 (1992); see Morris v. Morris, 
    238 Va. 578
    , 589, 
    385 S.E.2d 858
    , 865 (1989).
    The record clearly reflects a conflict in the testimony as
    to whether the claimant fell and hit his head on the ground.
    However, the commission placed weight on the fact that the
    claimant consistently reported to the employer, the hospital, the
    insurance carrier, and Dr. Brasfield that he first felt pain when
    trying to pry the door open before he claimed to have fallen.
    The deputy commissioner's finding that the emergency room records
    did not reflect that the injury was work-related is not supported
    by the record.
    More importantly, the commission notes that Dr. Brasfield's
    first report opined that the claimant may have been embellishing
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    his symptoms and that "other motives" might have been "in play"
    since the claimant had asked Dr. Brasfield to "disable" him
    before this injury.   However, after conducting a myelogram on
    March 23, 1995, Dr. Brasfield changed his diagnosis and stated
    affirmatively that the rupture of the claimant's C3 disk was not
    present before March 13, 1995 and, in his opinion, was causally
    related to his injury on March 13, 1995.
    Based upon Dr. Brasfield's diagnosis of the claimant's
    injury and his opinion as to the cause thereof, combined with the
    general consistency of the claimant's account of the accident,
    sufficient credible evidence exists in the record to support the
    commission's award.   Accordingly, the decision of the commission
    is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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