Brenda Sue Trail v. Rallys ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
    BRENDA SUE TRAIL
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1103-96-3                           PER CURIAM
    OCTOBER 15, 1996
    RALLY'S
    AND
    MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE
    INSURANCE COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Brenda Sue Trail, pro se, on brief).
    (Richard D. Lucas; Carter, Brown & Osborne,
    on brief), for appellees.
    Brenda Sue Trail contends that the Workers' Compensation
    Commission erred in limiting her benefits to one week of
    disability.   She contends that she was entitled to receive
    (1) compensation benefits for periods of partial incapacity
    between September 16, 1994 and February 7, 1995; and (2) the cost
    of medical treatment rendered to her after September 26, 1995 or
    for any emergency room treatment.     Upon reviewing the record and
    the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
    without merit.   Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
    decision.   Rule 5A:27.
    I.
    The commission found from the evidence that Trail had back
    surgery in 1981 and continued to experience chronic back pain.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    On September 7, 1994, Trail suffered a compensable injury by
    accident when she slipped on a wet floor and fell onto her left
    buttock.   An emergency room physician diagnosed her injury as a
    contused left buttock.
    On September 12, 1994, Trail began treatment with Dr. Hetzal
    Hartley, who diagnosed her injury as a contused left hip and an
    acute low back strain.    Dr. Hartley excused Trail from her pre-
    injury job as a fast food prep worker from September 12, 1994
    through September 16, 1994.   On September 16, 1994, Dr. Hartley
    released Trail to "modified duty" not involving lifting more than
    twenty pounds or bending to the floor.    On September 30, 1994,
    Dr. Hartley noted that Trail's pain had subsided and released her
    to full duty.
    In November 1994, Trail returned to Dr. Hartley, complaining
    of recurrent back pain.   Dr. Hartley diagnosed Trail as having
    recurrent low back strain and placed her on "modified duty."     Dr.
    Hartley continued to treat Trail, placing her on light-duty
    status until December 28, 1994, when he again released her to
    full duty because her low back pain had subsided.   On January 3,
    1995, after Trail again complained of pain, Dr. Hartley placed
    Trail on light duty and ordered an MRI.   On February 7, 1995, Dr.
    Hartley again released Trail to full duty.   He reiterated his
    decision to release Trail on February 23, 1995 and March 1, 1995.
    Dr. Hartley referred Trail to Dr. Murray Joiner, a physiatrist.
    Dr. Joiner diagnosed Trail as suffering from pain/piriformis
    2
    syndrome, left lower extremity sciatica, and a pre-existing
    unrelated disk defect.   Dr. Joiner treated Trail with various
    conservative modalities and also referred her to two
    neurosurgeons, Dr. James M. Vascik and Dr. Ward W. Stevens.
    Neither Dr. Vascik nor Dr. Stevens viewed Trail as a surgical
    candidate.    Instead, both doctors recommended that she continue
    under Dr. Joiner's conservative care.
    Trail repeatedly sought treatment at the hospital emergency
    room for subjective complaints of pain.      Emergency room personnel
    advised her to follow up with Dr. Joiner.      Dr. Joiner noted that
    he could not find any medical reason for Trail's multiple
    emergency room visits, and he concluded that Trail was a "symptom
    magnifier."   His conclusions were based upon her benign physical
    examination and the absence of any findings on objective testing.
    On September 26, 1995, Dr. Joiner released Trail to full duty.
    He reported "no medical explanation for her ongoing complaints"
    and "no reason for ongoing medical intervention."      Dr. Joiner
    opined that Trail's complaints and her apparent psychological
    problem were unrelated to her compensable injury.
    After Dr. Joiner released Trail, she continued to seek
    treatment at the emergency room.       As a result of one of these
    visits, Trail was referred to Dr. Thomas Shuler, an orthopedist.
    On October 30, 1995, Dr. Shuler indicated that he did not find
    any "orthopedic surgical problem."
    On January 15, 1996, Dr. Joiner indicated that Trail had
    3
    received "the full [gamut] of treatment intervention including
    passive physical therapy interventions, conditioning programs,
    use of multiple modalities, extensive soft tissue work, multiple
    trigger point injections, and nerve blocks."    He opined that
    Trail exaggerated her disability on a functional capacity
    evaluation and that her numerous visits to the emergency room had
    unreasonably burdened the health care system.   Dr. Joiner
    concluded that Trail represented "a case of frank symptom
    magnification."
    II.
    Trail bore the burden of proving that her disability was
    causally related to her compensable injury by accident.    She also
    bore the burden of showing that her emergency room medical
    treatment was necessary, causally related to her compensable
    injury by accident, and necessitated by an emergency.     See Payne
    v. Master Roofing & Siding, Inc., 
    1 Va. App. 413
    , 415, 
    339 S.E.2d 559
    , 560 (1986).   The medical records and opinions of Drs.
    Hartley and Joiner amply support the commission's finding that
    Trail failed to prove that her medical treatment and disability
    after September 26, 1995 were causally related to her compensable
    injury.   In addition, Dr. Joiner's opinion that Trail's emergency
    room visits were not medically necessary supports the
    commission's decision that employer was not responsible for the
    cost of such treatment.
    As a partially disabled employee, Trail bore the burden of
    4
    proving that she made a reasonable good faith effort to procure
    suitable work.     See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Bateman, 4 Va.
    App. 459, 464, 
    359 S.E.2d 98
    , 101 (1987).    Trail testified that
    she applied for jobs at fast food restaurants, supermarkets, and
    motels.   All of the positions involved duties similar to her pre-
    injury job and were incompatible with her physical restrictions.
    Based upon her testimony, the commission upheld the deputy
    commissioner's finding that Trail did not apply for these jobs in
    good faith, "but merely to pursue her own aims."    The
    commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon us.     See
    Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835 (1970).
    Thus, credible evidence in this record supports the
    commission's award of temporary total disability benefits for the
    period of September 9, 1994 through September 16, 1994, and the
    commission's refusal to award disability benefits for any other
    period of time on the ground that Trail did not make a good faith
    effort to market her residual work capacity.    The commission also
    appropriately refused to hold employer responsible for the cost
    of Trail's emergency room visits or for any medical treatment
    rendered after September 26, 1995.
    III.
    After the deputy commissioner's January 19, 1996 decision,
    Trail filed various receipts, medical bills, medical reports, and
    letters from lay witnesses with the commission.    In addition,
    5
    Trail later filed various receipts, medical records, and medical
    bills.   However, Trail did not file a petition, required pursuant
    to Rule 3.3, requesting the full commission to consider these
    documents on review as after-discovered evidence.   Trail also has
    not alleged any basis upon which these documents could qualify as
    after-discovered evidence.   See Williams v. People's Life Ins.
    Co., 
    19 Va. App. 530
    , 532, 
    452 S.E.2d 881
    , 883 (1995).
    Accordingly, in rendering our decision, we did not consider those
    documents.   We can only consider evidence that was properly
    before the commission when it made its decision.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1103963

Filed Date: 10/15/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014