Darrell Roosevelt Layne v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Elder
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    DARRELL ROOSEVELT LAYNE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.        Record No. 1492-95-3        BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
    OCTOBER 8, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WISE COUNTY
    J. Robert Stump, Judge
    (Jeffery L. Elkins; Adkins, Elkins &
    Hunnicutt, on brief), for appellant.
    Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney
    General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    Darrell Roosevelt Layne (appellant) appeals from a judgment
    of the Circuit Court of Wise County (trial court), that approved
    his jury trial conviction of carrying a concealed weapon, third
    offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.    On appeal, appellant
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
    conviction.   The Commonwealth asserts that appellant's appeal is
    procedurally barred and, in the alternative, that the evidence
    supports the conviction.
    "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom."     Martin v. Commonwealth,
    
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).    Viewed
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    accordingly, the record reveals that on March 29, 1994, at about
    9:52 a.m., Officer George Sewell (Sewell) of the Wise Police
    Department, responded to a report from a fellow officer that "a
    man [was] sick or drunk in a parked vehicle on Lake Street below
    the church."    Sewell found appellant, whom he knew, asleep in his
    pickup truck.   The truck was parked on a private dirt road.
    Sewell woke appellant and appellant opened the passenger door to
    facilitate conversation.
    Sewell saw several rounds of different caliber ammunition
    throughout the vehicle.    Appellant consented to a search of his
    vehicle, and Sewell found a .380 automatic handgun under the
    front passenger seat.   The gun was loaded with six rounds of
    ammunition, was placed completely under the seat, was not visible
    to common observation, and was "easily accessible" to appellant.
    Appellant told Sewell that he forgot the gun was in the truck
    and that he thought he could carry a concealed weapon in his own
    vehicle.   Appellant told Sewell that he was living in his truck
    because he had been "put out of" his trailer; however, when
    Sewell arrested appellant, appellant gave his address as "Lot 62,
    County Manor Trailer Park."    Sewell knew that appellant had lived
    in a trailer at that address.
    Melissa Joseph (Joseph), appellant's girlfriend, testified
    that she and appellant had lived together in the trailer until he
    moved out on March 21, 1994.    According to Joseph, appellant
    "lived in his truck," sleeping in it, while parked "close to the
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    trailer," at night.   She would wake appellant in the mornings and
    he would come back to the trailer when the children went to
    school.    Appellant still received mail at Joseph's address.
    Appellant did not recall when he moved from the trailer but
    said that it was before March 29, 1994.   He stated that he lived
    in his truck for a total of "about six months."   Appellant kept
    his possessions in his truck but continued to receive mail at the
    trailer.
    Appellant was indicted for violating the provisions of Code
    § 18.2-308 which forbids any person not exempted by the statute
    from carrying about his person, hidden from common observation,
    (i) any pistol, revolver, or other weapon designed or intended to
    propel a missile of any kind but further provides that the
    provisions thereof shall not apply to any person while in his own
    place of abode.   Appellant argues that under the facts presented
    at his trial, his truck was his place of abode and, therefore,
    the Commonwealth did not prove that he violated Code § 18.2-308.
    In support of his argument, appellant requested the trial
    court to instruct the jury as follows:
    If you believe that the defendant was in
    his own place of abode or the curtilage
    thereof, then you shall find him not guilty.
    Place of abode means one's home;
    habitation; place of dwelling; residence; or
    living place.
    The trial court granted the instructions.   Upon consideration
    thereof, the jury rejected appellant's contention that his truck,
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    under these facts, was his place of abode.
    On June 6, 1995, appellant filed a motion to correct a
    clerical error, alleging that he did not receive a copy of the
    April 18, 1995 order affirming his conviction and would "suffer
    great and irreparable harm" unless the court entered "a new
    order" allowing him time to note an appeal.   The trial court
    granted appellant's motion and, over the Commonwealth's
    objection, gave appellant thirty days to file a petition for
    appeal.
    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Assuming but not deciding that the trial court did have
    jurisdiction to enter the order extending appellant's time to
    note his appeal, we hold that the abode issue was fairly
    presented to the jury with clear instructions.    The jury weighed
    the evidence and determined that appellant was not in his place
    of abode or its curtilage when Sewell arrested him.   The evidence
    supports the jury's conclusion; thus, it will not be disturbed on
    appeal.   See Traverso v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 172
    , 176, 
    366 S.E.2d 719
    , 721 (1988).   While appellant and his girlfriend
    testified that he "lived" in his truck, the evidence also
    revealed that appellant considered his address to be that of his
    girlfriend's trailer.   His mail was delivered to that address and
    he gave Sewell that address when arrested.    The fact that there
    was a court order prohibiting appellant from being in the trailer
    is evidence which appellant chose to keep from the jury, and the
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    mere presence of such order did not require the trial court to
    find that appellant's truck was his place of abode.   The jury
    rejected appellant's argument, and we find that the evidence is
    sufficient to support the trial court's judgment that approved
    its verdict.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court
    is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1492953

Filed Date: 10/8/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014