Wells Farge v. Judy Walker-Reynolds ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
    WELLS FARGO
    AND
    CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE COMPANY            MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    PER CURIAM
    v.   Record No. 0931-96-4                       OCTOBER 1, 1996
    JUDY WALKER-REYNOLDS
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Lisa C. Healey; Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer &
    Boccarosse, on brief), for appellants.
    (Peter M. Sweeny, on brief), for appellee.
    Wells Fargo and its insurer contend that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in finding that Judy
    Walker-Reynolds ("claimant") proved that her post-February 6,
    1995 disability is causally related to her compensable November
    1, 1994 injury by accident.   Upon reviewing the record and the
    briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
    merit.   Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
    decision.   Rule 5A:27.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.    R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).    "The
    actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will
    not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    support the finding."   Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 
    7 Va. App. 684
    , 688, 
    376 S.E.2d 814
    , 817 (1989).    "Questions raised by
    conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission."
    Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).
    In finding that claimant sustained her burden of proving a
    compensable change in condition, the commission found as follows:
    [T]he evidence predominates that the
    claimant's symptoms after February 6, 1995,
    remain related to her November, 1994, fall.
    As Dr. [Donald L.] MacNay notes, the claimant
    has continued to have persistent, severe
    symptoms since the accident which did not let
    up. Dr. [Anthony] Debs states that the fall
    aggravated the claimant's pre-existing back
    problem. We are not persuaded by Dr. [Mayo]
    Friedlis' opinion that the claimant has
    reached her pre-injury state, and his view
    that the lumbar sprain would have resolved by
    February 6, 1995, absent a pre-existing back
    problem is speculative. Moreover, Dr. MacNay
    has treated the claimant since 1990, and is
    most qualified to determine whether the
    claimant had returned to her pre-injury
    state. Aggravation of a pre-existing
    condition is compensable if it results from a
    compensable injury by accident. Southern
    Iron Works, Inc. v. Wallace, 
    16 Va. App. 131
    ,
    
    428 S.E.2d 32
    (1993).
    As fact finder, the commission was entitled to weigh the
    medical evidence, to accept Dr. MacNay's opinion, and to reject
    Dr. Friedlis' opinion to the contrary.    In cases of conflicting
    medical evidence, "[t]he general rule is that when an attending
    physician is positive in his diagnosis . . . , great weight will
    be given by the courts to his opinion."    Pilot Freight Carriers,
    Inc. v. Reeves, 
    1 Va. App. 435
    , 439, 
    339 S.E.2d 570
    , 572 (1986).
    2
    Dr. MacNay's opinion constitutes credible evidence to support
    the commission's decision.   "The fact that there is contrary
    evidence in the record is of no consequence if there is credible
    evidence to support the commission's finding."   Wagner Enters.,
    Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    3