Robert Lee Boley v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Bray
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    ROBERT LEE BOLEY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.         Record No. 1943-95-1           JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    JULY 23, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
    William F. Rutherford, Judge
    Michael D. Eberhardt for appellant.
    John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney
    General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    Robert Lee Boley (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial
    for possessing (1) cocaine with intent to distribute, (2)
    marijuana with intent to distribute, (3) a firearm, and (4) a
    firearm by a convicted felon.   On appeal, defendant contends that
    the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.    We
    agree and reverse each.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and we
    recite only those facts necessary to a disposition of this
    appeal.
    In accordance with well established principles, we assess
    the sufficiency of the evidence viewing the record in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom.    Martin v. Commonwealth, 4
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Va. App. 438, 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).    The judgment of a
    trial court, sitting without a jury, is entitled to the same
    weight as a jury verdict and will be disturbed only if plainly
    wrong or without evidence to support it.    Id.
    The record discloses that on November 18, 1994, Norfolk
    police found defendant, undressed and showering, in the hall
    bathroom of an apartment being searched pursuant to a warrant. 1
    Three additional persons, including defendant's brother, were in
    various rooms of the apartment.    The search revealed two
    revolvers, a semiautomatic pistol, a plastic bag containing
    marijuana, several boxes of ammunition, approximately $760 in
    cash, and a plastic bag containing 73 empty plastic bags located
    in bedrooms and closets.   Additionally, on or near a "speaker"
    resting on the living room floor, police found cocaine, a digital
    pager, and approximately 140 "color-coded" plastic bags.     On the
    floor beside the speaker, police discovered a "vinyl case" for
    electronic scales, $90 in cash, two cellular telephones and
    batteries, a key ring with several keys (one of which unlocked
    the apartment door), and a shoe containing thirteen individual
    plastic bags of marijuana.   A pager and "some jewelry" were also
    found "on a box in the hallway."
    Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, and admitted
    ownership of a "cellular phone, money, keys, and some
    jewelry . . . laying on the floor next to the speaker in the
    1
    The validity of this search warrant is not at issue.
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    front room."   These articles had been found to the "left of the
    speaker," a "foot or less" from the cocaine and "six or seven
    feet" from the closeted guns.
    Tameka Ellis, the lessee of the apartment, was not present
    during the search.   Various papers, including identification
    documents, and personal belongings located in a bedroom,
    suggested that defendant's brother resided in the apartment.      A
    Commonwealth witness had observed defendant in the apartment on
    two separate occasions over a period of six months.
    To support a conviction based upon
    constructive possession, "the Commonwealth
    must point to evidence of acts, statements,
    or conduct of the accused or other facts or
    circumstances which tend to show that the
    defendant was aware of both the presence and
    character of the substance and that it was
    subject to his dominion and control."
    Drew v. Commonwealth, 
    230 Va. 471
    , 473, 
    338 S.E.2d 844
    , 845
    (1986) (quoting Powers v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 474
    , 476, 
    316 S.E.2d 739
    , 740 (1984)).   "Suspicious circumstances, including
    proximity to a controlled drug, are insufficient to support a
    conviction."   Behrens v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 131
    , 135, 
    348 S.E.2d 430
    , 432 (1986).    However, while "mere proximity to the
    drugs is insufficient to establish possession, and occupancy of
    the [premises] does not give rise to a presumption of possession,
    Code § 18.2-250, both are factors which may be considered in
    determining whether a defendant possessed drugs."    Josephs v.
    Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 87
    , 100, 
    390 S.E.2d 491
    , 498 (1990) (en
    banc).   These principles of constructive possession are also
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    applicable in prosecutions for offenses related to firearm
    possession.   Blake v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 706
    , 708-09, 
    427 S.E.2d 219
    , 221 (1993).
    When the Commonwealth relies wholly on circumstantial
    evidence to prove constructive possession, "'all necessary
    circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and
    inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence.'"   Burchette v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.
    App. 432, 434, 
    425 S.E.2d 81
    , 83 (1992) (citations omitted).
    Here, defendant was found showering in a bath accessed by a
    hallway in the apartment, and the evidence established only that
    he entered the living room and bathroom.    No drugs or firearms
    were found on or near his person, and he engaged in no conduct
    suggestive of an awareness that contraband was present on the
    premises.   No evidence proved that he had an ownership or
    possessory interest in the apartment.   Thus, save defendant's
    presence, the proximity of his property to contraband, and a key
    to the apartment on his key ring, nothing in the record related
    him to the offenses.   While highly suspicious, these
    circumstances are insufficient to prove, to the exclusion of
    every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the drugs and
    weapons were subject to defendant's dominion and control.
    Accordingly, we reverse the convictions.
    Reversed and dismissed.
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