Dwayne M. Reid v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Bray
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    DWAYNE M. REID
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.        Record No. 1175-95-1        JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
    JULY 2, 1996
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
    Westbrook J. Parker, Judge
    Timothy E. Miller, Public Defender (Office of
    the Public Defender, on brief), for
    appellant.
    Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    The sole issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court
    lacked jurisdiction over this case because the juvenile and
    domestic relations district court judge failed to transfer all
    papers connected with the case to the circuit court within three
    days after receiving notice of the appeal of the transfer
    decision as required by Code § 16.1-269(E).    We hold that the
    three-day requirement is not jurisdictional.   Therefore, we
    affirm the convictions.
    Dwayne M. Reid was convicted in a bench trial of capital
    murder, robbery, and two counts of the use of a firearm in the
    commission of a felony after his case was transferred to the
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    circuit court from the juvenile and domestic relations court
    (juvenile court).    Reid contends that the circuit court did not
    have jurisdiction to try him because the juvenile court did not
    forward all of the papers connected with the case to the circuit
    court within three days of receiving notice of the defendant's
    appeal of the transfer decision, as required by Code
    § 16.1-269(E). 1   The principles and rationale set forth by the
    Supreme Court in Jamborsky v. Baskins, 
    247 Va. 506
    , 
    442 S.E.2d 636
    (1994), control our decision here.    Based on the Baskins
    decision, we hold that the three-day requirement of Code
    § 16.1-269(E) is directory and procedural, not mandatory and
    jurisdictional, and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
    delay in forwarding the papers to the circuit court.
    That portion of Code § 16.1-269(E) that requires the
    juvenile court judge to forward all papers connected with the
    1
    Former Code § 16.1-269(E) provided, in pertinent part:
    Within three days after receipt of [notice of
    an appeal of the transfer decision] the judge
    of the juvenile court shall forward to [the]
    circuit court all papers connected with the
    case, including the report required by this
    section, as well as a written order setting
    forth the reasons for the juvenile court's
    opinion that the case should be retained in
    [or transferred from] that court.
    Subsequent to the proceedings in the juvenile court and the
    circuit court in this case, the General Assembly replaced Code
    § 16.1-269 with Code § 16.1-269.6. The new statute provides that
    the juvenile court shall forward to the circuit court all of the
    papers connected with the case "[w]ithin seven days after receipt
    of notice of an appeal from the transfer decision." Code
    § 16.1-269.6(A).
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    case after appeal of the transfer decision to the circuit court
    "is procedural in that it does not convey a substantive right."
    
    Id. at 511,
    442 S.E.2d at 638.     Baskins dealt with the provision
    in former Code § 16.1-269(E) which stated that the circuit court
    "shall" examine the transfer decision within twenty-one days to
    determine compliance; this case deals with a provision of the
    same statute that has the same purpose -- expeditious review of
    the juvenile's transfer to circuit court, which "shall" be done
    within three days.   In Baskins, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
    "the use of 'shall,' in a statute requiring action by a public
    official, is directory and not mandatory unless the statute
    manifests a contrary intent."     
    Id. Because "Code
    § 16.1-269(E)
    contains no prohibitory or limiting language that prevents the
    [juvenile] court from" forwarding the papers connected with the
    case to the circuit court more than three days after receiving
    notice of an appeal of the transfer decision, failure to comply
    with the three-day requirement is not jurisdictional.       Thus, in
    the absence of evidence that the defendant was prejudiced by the
    delay in forwarding the papers, the judgment of the circuit court
    will not be disturbed on appeal.        
    Id. at 511,
    442 S.E.2d at
    638-39.
    Here, all of the papers connected with the case were on file
    with the circuit court and were available to the defendant prior
    to the circuit court hearing on the transfer decision.       The two
    continuances that were granted in the circuit court were the
    - 3 -
    defendant's motions and were not because of the delay in
    forwarding the papers.   Therefore, the circuit court did not err
    by holding that the delay in forwarding the papers did not
    prejudice the defendant and by retaining jurisdiction of the
    case.   Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's convictions.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1175951

Filed Date: 7/2/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014