Walter Everett Childress v. Appalachian Power Co. ( 1996 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Overton
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    WALTER EVERETT CHILDRESS
    v.         Record No. 0149-95-3          MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
    APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY                  FEBRUARY 13, 1996
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Jerry O. Talton for appellant.
    Richard D. Lucas (Abigail L. Perkins; Woods,
    Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., on brief), for
    appellee.
    Walter Childress appeals from the commission's opinion which
    relieved Appalachian Power, his employer, from liability for
    certain medical expenses.    Childress claims that this issue was
    not properly before the commission.    Employer cross-appeals from
    a separate finding that Childress did not unjustifiably refuse
    medical treatment.    On the first issue, we find that the medical
    expenses were not properly before the commission, and we vacate
    that portion of the commission's decision.    We further find that
    Childress did not unjustifiably refuse medical treatment and
    affirm the commission on that issue.
    Childress suffered a compensable injury in 1985 while
    working for Appalachian Power and, over the course of several
    years, experienced recurrent disability.    In 1994, Childress
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    refused a selected employment position offered by his employer.
    In addition, he had begun seeing a psychiatrist and seeking
    medical treatment from a physician not listed on the employer's
    offered panel.   The employer filed applications for a hearing,
    claiming that: (1) Childress unjustifiably refused the proffered
    selected employment; and (2) by seeking treatment with an
    unauthorized physician, Childress had in effect refused medical
    treatment.
    The commission, on review, found that Childress had not
    refused the selected position without justification.      It also
    found, however, that Childress' psychological problems and
    additional medical treatment were not compensable by the
    employer.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.     R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).         "[I]t
    is fundamental that a finding of fact made by the commission is
    conclusive and binding upon this court on review.      A question
    raised by conflicting medical opinion is a question of fact."
    Department of Corrections v. Powell, 
    2 Va. App. 712
    , 714, 
    347 S.E.2d 532
    , 533 (1986).   The fact that no contrary evidence
    exists in the record is of no consequence if credible evidence
    supports the commission's finding.       Wagner Enters., Inc. v.
    Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).
    The commission determined that Childress was physically
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    incapable of returning to the selective employment.   It based
    this determination upon submitted medical records from several
    physicians.    Credible evidence does exist to support the
    commission, and its decision must be affirmed.
    The commission also found that Childress' additional
    expenses were not the employer's responsibility.   This finding,
    however, was inappropriate for the commission to make.   No claim
    for benefits for those expenses had been made.   The only issues
    on the employer's application for hearing were the refusal of the
    selected employment and the refusal of medical treatment.      The
    commission found that the refusal of selective employment was not
    unjustified.   The deputy commissioner properly decided that
    seeking unauthorized care does not equate with an unjustified
    refusal of medical treatment.    Davis v. Brown & Williamson
    Tobacco Co., 
    3 Va. App. 123
    , 126, 
    348 S.E.2d 420
    (1986).     After
    those two issues were settled, the commission had no reason to
    make further findings, especially as no claim for benefits for
    those expenses had been made.
    Accordingly, the commission's decision with respect to the
    compensability of the psychological disability and the additional
    medical expenses is vacated.    The parties are free to initiate
    other proceedings to address this issue if they be so advised.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
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