Vic T. Dye v. Helen Cregger Dye ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
VIC T. DYE
v. Record No. 1971-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
PER CURIAM
HELEN CREGGER DYE FEBRUARY 13, 1996
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SMYTH COUNTY
Charles B. Flannagan, II, Judge
(Robert Austin Vinyard; Vinyard and Moise,
on brief), for appellant.
(John H. Tate, Jr.; Gwyn & Tate, on brief),
for appellee.
Vic T. Dye (husband) appeals the equitable distribution
decision of the circuit court awarding Helen Cregger Dye (wife)
seventy-five percent interest in the marital share of the
parties' residence. Husband contends the trial court erred when
it failed to award him a fifty percent interest. Upon reviewing
the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this
appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
As husband recognizes, Virginia's equitable distribution
scheme does not provide "a statutory presumption of equal
distribution." Papuchis v. Papuchis, 2 Va. App. 130, 132, 341
S.E.2d 829, 830-31 (1986). "Moreover, in reviewing an equitable
distribution award, we rely heavily on the trial judge's
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
discretion in weighing the particular circumstances of each
case." Aster v. Gross, 7 Va. App. 1, 8, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837
(1988). The award "will not be set aside unless it is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it." Srinivasan v.
Srinivasan, 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990).
The final decree demonstrates that the trial court
considered the statutory factors and complied with the statutory
requirements. The real and personal property of the parties was
classified and valued. The decree expressly noted that the court
"has considered the factors mentioned in § 20-107.3(E)," and
referred to the factors "which the Court believes are fully set
forth" in wife's memorandum.
The marital residence had formerly belonged to wife's family
and wife retained an inherited twenty-five percent interest as
her separate property. The trial court awarded wife seventy-five
percent of the remaining share of the residence, which was
classified as marital property and valued at $22,875.00. While
wife received a larger share of this piece of realty, another
piece of real estate was divided equally between the parties. In
addition, husband received the greater portion of the parties'
intangible marital property, receiving property worth $16,492.38,
compared to wife's share worth $11,243.88.
The trial court's equitable distribution scheme was not
plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, we
cannot say the trial court erred or abused its discretion by
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awarding wife a greater share of the marital home.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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