Walter Lynn Simmons v. Commonwealth ( 1995 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Elder and Fitzpatrick
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    WALTER LYNN SIMMONS
    v.   Record No. 1782-94-2              MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA                 DECEMBER 29, 1995
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    James E. Kulp, Judge
    Craig S. Cooley for appellant.
    Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Walter Lynn Simmons appeals his conviction for the rape of
    Leticia Laster on April 16, 1994.   He claims that the evidence
    was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial
    judge erred in excluding testimony concerning the victim's
    reputation for truthfulness.    We find that the evidence was
    sufficient and that the trial judge was correct in excluding the
    evidence, and therefore affirm.
    The victim in this case was Mr. Simmons' eleven-year-old
    stepdaughter.   The rape occurred at Simmons' home while his wife,
    the victim's mother, was visiting family in New York.     Simmons
    was convicted based on the testimony of the victim, who gave a
    detailed account of the rape.   The victim told her mother about
    the rape a few days after it occurred, and her mother informed
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Simmons' sister.    Both women testified about Simmons' statements
    concerning his contact with the victim, and this testimony
    corroborated the victim's account.      The nurse who examined the
    victim provided corroborating physical evidence.     The jury
    acquitted the defendant of an additional count of rape and of
    attempted sodomy.
    When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
    we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly
    deducible therefrom.   We should affirm the judgment unless it
    appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong or
    without evidence to support it."     Higginbotham v. Commonwealth,
    
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).
    The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded
    their testimony are matters exclusively for the jury.      Gray v.
    Commonwealth, 
    233 Va. 313
    , 344, 
    356 S.E.2d 157
    , 174 (1985); Myers
    v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 634
    , 635, 
    400 S.E.2d 803
    , 804
    (1991).   It is the jury's function to weigh the evidence and
    resolve any conflicts in the evidence.      Lewis v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 574
    , 582, 
    383 S.E.2d 736
    , 741 (1989) (en banc).
    Simmons' attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is
    essentially an attack on the victim's credibility.     However, the
    jury has resolved this issue in favor of the victim.     That
    finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless as a matter of
    law, the victim's testimony was inherently incredible, or so
    contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.
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    Fisher v. Commonwealth, 
    228 Va. 296
    , 299-300, 
    321 S.E.2d 202
    ,
    204 (1984); Willis and Bell v. Commonwealth, 
    218 Va. 560
    , 563,
    
    238 S.E.2d 811
    , 812-13 (1977).
    The victim's testimony was not unbelievable as a matter of
    law, and in fact was corroborated by the testimony of other
    witnesses.   Two of these witnesses recounted Simmons' own
    statements, which were highly incriminating.   The evidence is
    sufficient to sustain the conviction for rape.
    The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in
    excluding testimony about the victim's reputation for
    truthfulness.   A trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
    Hunter v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 717
    , 724, 
    427 S.E.2d 197
    , 202
    (1993).
    The defense attempted to introduce testimony by Cloe Wilson,
    a sixteen-year-old who lived with the victim and her family for
    two and one half months around the time of the rape.    Ms. Wilson
    testified on voir dire that she had discussed the victim's
    reputation for truthfulness with the victim's mother and sister
    and with someone in the neighborhood, whom she did not name.
    When evidence on reputation for truth is rejected, the
    proponent of the evidence must make a proffer of the expected
    answer in order to preserve the issue for appeal.   Mostyn v.
    Commonwealth, 
    14 Va. App. 920
    , 924, 
    420 S.E.2d 519
    , 521 (1992).
    Although Simmons on voir dire of Ms. Wilson described the sources
    of her proposed testimony, he did not make a proffer of the
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    substance of the testimony.
    We do not need to invoke the good cause or the ends of
    justice exception to waive the requirement of a proffer, because
    the trial judge clearly did not abuse his discretion in excluding
    this evidence.   The testimony would have consisted primarily of
    the victim's reputation for truthfulness within her immediate
    family, with only one unidentified witness from the neighborhood.
    Testimony about truthfulness must concern the witness' "bad
    general reputation for truth and veracity in the community where
    he lives or works, or among his neighbors and acquaintances
    . . . ."   Clark v. Commonwealth, 
    202 Va. 787
    , 789, 
    120 S.E.2d 270
    , 272 (1961) (emphasis added). 1    The trial judge in his
    discretion could have found that the testimony offered here had
    too narrow a basis to be admissible as evidence of the victim's
    1
    The community from which a child's reputation is drawn
    may be more circumscribed than for an adult. See Commonwealth v.
    Healey, 
    27 Mass. App. Ct. 30
    , 39, 
    534 N.E.2d 301
    , 307 (Ct. App.
    1989). However, the testimony concerning the child's reputation
    should emanate from an identifiable group, and the sources of the
    information on reputation should be sufficiently numerous to
    assure trustworthy testimony. Id. Here, given the nature of the
    proposed testimony, we do not need to identify the eleven-year-
    old victim's community for purposes of reputation testimony. It
    was well within the trial judge's discretion to decide that
    testimony based on information from only two family members,
    combined with one unidentified individual from the neighborhood,
    had too few sources to assure trustworthy testimony. Compare
    Commonwealth v. Arthur, 
    31 Mass. App. Ct. 178
    , 179-80, 
    575 N.E.2d 1147
    , 1148 (Ct. App. 1991) (evidence on reputation for
    truthfulness properly admitted where the impeaching witness
    identified a discrete community, i.e., the victim's eighth grade
    class, and a substantial number of students within that community
    had expressed views to the witness about the victim's reputation
    for veracity.)
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    general reputation for truthfulness.   For these reasons, we
    affirm the defendant's conviction for rape.
    Affirmed.
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