James Dale Archer v. Commonwealth ( 2002 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Humphreys
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    JAMES DALE ARCHER
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0327-02-2            JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    DECEMBER 17, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    Gary A. Hicks, Judge
    John H. Click, Jr. (Blackburn, Conte,
    Schilling & Click, P.C., on brief), for
    appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    James Dale Archer appeals his conviction of driving under
    the influence, Code § 18.2-266.   He contends the police
    improperly administered the sobriety checkpoint, which rendered
    his initial seizure unlawful.   We conclude the checkpoint was
    constitutional and affirm the conviction.
    The Virginia State Police planned to operate a sobriety
    checkpoint at the intersection of Nuckols Road and I-295.   State
    Police Sergeant Kerry L. Stiles filed a written DUI Sobriety
    Checkpoint Operational Plan in accordance with the Department of
    State Police Traffic Checking Detail, Memo - 1997 - No. 15.    The
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    operational plan provided that the officers would screen every
    vehicle "unless . . . vehicles back up more than 500 feet from
    the designated checking point.   The first alternate method will
    be to check every 5th vehicle.   The second alternate method will
    be to check every 10th vehicle."   If the backups continued, the
    operations would be ceased until the distance between vehicles
    exceeded the stopping distance for that speed zone.   The
    Division Supervisor approved the plan.
    The checkpoint was set up at night from 8:00 - 11:00 p.m.
    while a concert was being held at Innsbrook at the Pavilion.
    Sergeant Stiles was the on-site supervisor for the checkpoint.
    He ensured that the roadblock was conducted safely for the
    public and the field officers operating it, and he decided when
    "to start and stop traffic checking at the detail."   Flares and
    signs for the checkpoint were posted 500 feet from the
    checkpoint to assist Sergeant Stiles in measuring the traffic
    backup.
    The traffic became extremely heavy when the concert ended.
    Sudden rushes from traffic lights caused the traffic to back up
    much farther than 500 feet.   When the rushes created such a
    backup, Sergeant Stiles would order the checkpoint to shut down.
    He ordered the officers to cease checking cars three times when
    traffic backed up more than 500 feet.
    Sergeant Stiles had "given the go-ahead" to resume
    operating the checkpoint when Trooper Lail stopped the
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    defendant.   Trooper Lail was one of the troopers actually
    stopping vehicles.   When he stopped the defendant, the troopers
    "were checking every vehicle."   As a result of the stop, Trooper
    Lail charged the defendant with driving under the influence.
    Sergeant Stiles did not proceed in sequence through the
    alternative methods of checking every fifth car and then every
    tenth car before ceasing operation of the checkpoint.   He
    explained, "based on my experience, I know [those methods] would
    not have worked."    Sergeant Stiles ordered resumption of the
    checkpoint when "it was safe for us to start checking . . .
    every vehicle, without having to back up more than 500 feet."
    The defendant concedes the checkpoint was suspended for safety
    reasons but maintains that Sergeant Stiles unlawfully deviated
    from the approved plan by not employing the alternative methods
    for clearing traffic. 1
    Sobriety checkpoints are constitutional.    Simmons v.
    Commonwealth, 
    238 Va. 200
    , 203, 
    380 S.E.2d 656
    , 658 (1989);
    Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 
    496 U.S. 444
    , 455
    (1990).   "To ensure that an individual's expectation of privacy
    is not subjected to arbitrary invasion solely at the unfettered
    discretion of police officers in the field, seizures at
    roadblocks must be carried out pursuant to plans embodying
    1
    The Traffic Checking Detail Memo provides that officers
    "shall immediately change to the designated alternate screening
    method . . . once a traffic back-up occurs . . . ."
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    explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of the individual
    officer."     Hall v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 972
    , 972, 
    406 S.E.2d 674
    , 675 (1991).    "The validity of a checkpoint depends
    upon the amount of discretion remaining with the field officers
    operating the roadblock."     Crouch v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 214
    , 218, 
    494 S.E.2d 144
    , 146 (1997).
    At the time Trooper Lail stopped the defendant, the
    troopers were checking all cars.    They exercised no discretion
    in selecting whom to stop, and they were in strict compliance
    with the plan.    Even if their supervisor had earlier deviated
    from the plan, that would not render the stop of the defendant
    unlawful.   At the time of stopping the defendant, the roadblock
    was being operated with the literal compliance that the
    defendant demands.
    Sergeant Stiles's deviation from the plan did not render
    the stop impermissible.    Temporarily halting the checkpoint
    operation was an approved method to clear traffic.    When traffic
    backed up beyond 500 feet, an approved safety criterion,
    Sergeant Stiles ordered the troopers to cease screening all
    vehicles, an approved method.    Sergeant Stiles skipped
    intermediate methods of screening and stopped operations
    completely; the one method he knew would work to clear the
    congestion.    Sergeant Stiles exercised discretion expressly
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    granted in the plan and the training manual. 2      His decision was
    reasonable and necessary given the volume of traffic and the
    need to ensure officer and public safety.
    Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 527
    , 532, 
    489 S.E.2d 714
    , 717 (1997), aff'd en banc, 
    27 Va. App. 319
    , 
    498 S.E.2d 464
    (1998), approved the operation of a checkpoint even though the
    supervising officer chose a site not listed in the approved
    plan.       That officer did not participate in conducting the
    checkpoint.      He was the supervisor, and the field officers had
    no discretion in conducting the checkpoint.       The deviation by
    the supervising officer was not "of sufficient significance to
    render the checkpoint unreasonable and unconstitutionally
    impermissible."       Id.   "[O]ur focus is on the actions of the
    specific trooper who stopped appellant . . . [who] did not
    exercise his discretion" in doing so.        Raymond v. Commonwealth,
    
    17 Va. App. 64
    , 66, 
    435 S.E.2d 151
    , 153 (1993) (presence of
    supervisor, who chose site and time, at checkpoint "does not
    render the entire checkpoint operation invalid").        See also
    Burns v. Commonwealth, 
    261 Va. 307
    , 323, 
    541 S.E.2d 872
    , 883,
    cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1043
     (2001) (roadblock carried out
    pursuant to plan with neutral criteria is constitutional if it
    "limits the discretion and conduct of the . . . officers
    2
    The Traffic Checking Detail Memo specifically provides,
    "Occasional traffic back-ups may be handled by allowing all
    stopped vehicles to pass through the checkpoint to prevent a
    traffic hazard, then resuming the specified screening method."
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    actually stopping vehicles"); Simmons, 238 Va. at 203, 380
    S.E.2d at 658.   Cf. Brown v. Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 21
    , 
    454 S.E.2d 758
     (1995) (when troopers involved in operating site
    relocate to pre-approved site for unauthorized reason the
    seizure is unconstitutional).
    In this case, the trooper who actually stopped the
    defendant did not exercise unfettered discretion.    He did not
    exercise any discretion. 3   Trooper Lail began and stopped
    screening vehicles when Sergeant Stiles ordered him to do so.
    When the checkpoint was in operation, he followed orders and
    stopped all vehicles.    The danger denounced in Delaware v.
    Prouse, 
    440 U.S. 648
    , 663 (1979), that field officers would
    exercise "unbridled" discretion by randomly stopping vehicles,
    did not exist.   Sergeant Stiles was the supervisor of the
    troopers actually operating the checkpoint, and he exercised the
    discretion in implementing the plan.    The troopers who operated
    the checkpoint exercised no discretion, and the presence of
    their supervising officer at the site did not render the
    operation of the checkpoint invalid.    Raymond, 17 Va. App. at
    66, 435 S.E.2d at 153.
    3
    The Traffic Checking Detail Memo provides: "Participating
    sworn employees should not deviate from the operational plan.
    Vehicles will not be stopped on a discretionary basis."
    (Emphasis added).
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    We conclude the checkpoint was properly planned and
    executed.   Accordingly, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
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