Ezzat Zein v. Nora H. Zein ( 1996 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
    EZZAT ZEIN
    v.   Record No. 1476-95-4                       MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    PER CURIAM
    NORA H. ZEIN                                     FEBRUARY 20, 1996
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    Quinlan H. Hancock, Judge
    (Richard C. Shadyac, Jr.; Richard B. Orsino; Shadyac &
    Shadyac, on briefs), for appellant.
    (Kenneth H. Rosenau; Susan H. Rosenau; Rosenau &
    Rosenau, on brief), for appellee.
    Ezzat Zein (husband) appeals the decision of the circuit
    court awarding spousal support to Nora H. Zein (wife) and
    deciding other issues.     The husband raises the following
    questions on appeal:
    (1) whether the trial court erred in
    determining the value of husband's
    business;
    (2)   whether the trial court failed to
    consider the statutory factors
    before granting a monetary award to
    wife;
    (3)   whether the trial court failed to
    consider the statutory factors
    before allocating the parties'
    debt;
    (4)   whether the trial court erred in
    determining husband's income;
    (5)   whether the trial court erred in
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    awarding wife spousal support;
    (6)   whether the trial court abused its
    discretion by awarding wife $25,000
    in attorney's fees; and
    (7)   whether the trial court's equitable
    distribution decision was
    inequitable, punitive, and
    unsupported by the evidence.
    Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
    that this appeal is without merit.    Accordingly, we summarily
    affirm the decision of the trial court.   Rule 5A:27.
    "The judgment of a trial court sitting in equity, when based
    upon an ore tenus hearing, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it."     Box v. Talley,
    
    1 Va. App. 289
    , 293, 
    338 S.E.2d 349
    , 351 (1986).    We note that in
    the proceeding below "'[t]he credibility of witnesses was crucial
    to the determination of the facts, and the findings of the trial
    court based upon the judge's evaluation of the testimony of
    witnesses heard ore tenus are entitled to great weight.'"
    Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 
    19 Va. App. 77
    , 83, 
    448 S.E.2d 666
    , 670
    (1994) (citation omitted).
    Equitable Distribution
    "Fashioning an equitable distribution award lies within the
    sound discretion of the trial judge and that award will not be
    set aside unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
    support it."    Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 
    10 Va. App. 728
    , 732, 
    396 S.E.2d 675
    , 678 (1990).   "Unless it appears from the record that
    the trial judge has not considered or has misapplied one of the
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    statutory mandates, this Court will not reverse on appeal."
    Ellington v. Ellington, 
    8 Va. App. 48
    , 56, 
    378 S.E.2d 626
    , 630
    (1989).
    The parties' single largest marital asset was the husband's
    business, Zein, Inc.   The wife's expert opined that the net value
    of the business was $282,708.   The husband's expert valued the
    business at $48,920.   Both experts admitted that they did not
    have all relevant information when evaluating the business.
    While the trial court found the wife's expert to be more
    credible, it noted that it "was not impressed with the testimony
    of either witness."    The trial court did not, and was not
    required to, "accept as conclusive the opinion of an expert."
    Lassen v. Lassen, 
    8 Va. App. 502
    , 507, 
    383 S.E.2d 471
    , 474
    (1989).
    The trial court gave greatest weight to the fact that the
    valuation made by the wife's expert was consistent with the
    husband's admissions in numerous unrelated submissions to the
    Internal Revenue Service, the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service, his bank, and the company from whom he leased his car.
    While the husband characterized those filings as "puffing," the
    trial court rejected the husband's testimony, noting that it "did
    not and does not believe most of what [husband] testified to
    during the trial of this case."   Credible evidence supports the
    trial court's determination of the value of Zein, Inc.
    Noting the husband's property transfers and other dealings,
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    the trial court observed that "this is a fifteen year marriage
    and other than three children [wife] doesn't have much to show
    for it."   The husband lives in the former marital home, which is
    now owned by his brother.   The business, though a marital asset,
    was not jointly owned and not subject to division.   Code
    § 20-107.3(C).
    Code § 20-107.3(C) provides, in part, that "[t]he court
    shall also have the authority to apportion and order the payment
    of the debts of the parties, or either of them, that are incurred
    prior to the dissolution of the marriage, based upon the factors
    listed in subsection E."    "The purpose and nature of the debt,
    and for and by whom any funds were used, should be considered in
    deciding whether and how to credit or allot debt."    Gamer v.
    Gamer, 
    16 Va. App. 335
    , 341, 
    429 S.E.2d 618
    , 623 (1993).     The
    husband admitted that he incurred $25,000 in credit card debt
    after the parties separated and that he obtained joint credit
    cards without the wife's knowledge.   The trial court accepted the
    wife's testimony that she was responsible for $1,560 in credit
    card debt.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    holding the husband responsible for payment of any additional
    outstanding debts owed by Zein, Inc. or by the husband.
    We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision
    to grant the wife a monetary award equivalent to one-half the net
    value of Zein, Inc.   The trial court's opinion manifests that it
    considered the statutory factors when making the equitable
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    distribution decision.   "The court need not quantify or elaborate
    exactly what weight was given to each of the factors," provided
    its findings are based upon credible evidence.     Taylor v. Taylor,
    
    5 Va. App. 436
    , 444, 
    364 S.E.2d 244
    , 249 (1988).    The proof
    offered for a number of the parties' financial transactions was
    largely testimonial, and the trial court was entitled to
    determine whether that testimony was credible.   The husband has
    not demonstrated that the trial court's findings of fact
    underlying its equitable distribution decision were clearly
    erroneous or that it abused its discretion.
    Spousal Support
    In its letter opinion, the trial court found as follows:
    [T]he inescapable conclusion is that
    [husband] has gone to great lengths to
    misrepresent his income, his assets and the
    value of Zein, Inc. He has taken advances
    from Zein, Inc. and paid personal debts,
    including child support, which clearly proves
    that his yearly income, at a minimum is
    between $75,000.00 and $100,000.00 per year.
    Credible evidence supports the trial court's finding.    The
    husband wrote checks from the Zein, Inc. business account to pay
    his personal expenses.   The husband's unrelated representations
    to third parties about his earnings provided additional support
    for the trial court's conclusion that the husband's income was at
    least $75,000.   Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's
    determination of the husband's income.
    "In determining spousal support, a trial court has broad
    discretion and 'the appellate court will not interfere with such
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    discretion, unless it is clear that some injustice has been
    done.'"    Morris v. Morris, 
    3 Va. App. 303
    , 309, 
    349 S.E.2d 661
    ,
    664 (1986) (citation omitted).
    In awarding spousal support, the chancellor
    must consider the relative needs and
    abilities of the parties. He is guided by
    the nine factors that are set forth in Code
    § 20-107.1. When the chancellor has given
    due consideration to these factors, his
    determination will not be disturbed on appeal
    except for a clear abuse of discretion.
    Collier v. Collier, 
    2 Va. App. 125
    , 129, 
    341 S.E.2d 827
    , 829
    (1986).
    The trial court's opinion demonstrates that it considered
    the statutory factors before setting the amount of spousal
    support.   The trial court found the husband's income to be
    greater than he claimed, and the wife's assets at the end of the
    marriage to be few.   Credible evidence supports the trial court's
    assessment.   The wife testified that her annual income was
    $12,000, although earlier in the marriage and prior to the birth
    of the parties' three children, she had earned as much as
    $44,000.   At the time of the hearing, the husband lived in the
    marital home purchased by his brother at foreclosure for
    $237,000, while the wife and the parties' children lived with her
    father.    The husband drove a leased Mercedes, while the wife
    drove her father's 1986 Pontiac.       Thus, the record contained
    evidence from which the trial court could determine that the
    wife's standard of living had declined and that the wife was in
    need of support.
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    We find no grounds to reverse the trial court's award based
    upon the husband's argument that the trial court improperly
    relied upon the pendente lite award in setting the amount of
    permanent spousal support.   In its letter opinion, the trial
    court ordered the parties to submit spousal support and child
    support worksheets for further consideration.      After the
    submission of the worksheets and accompanying argument, the trial
    court ruled that "the spousal support I felt was correct at
    $846.30."   The husband has not demonstrated a clear abuse of
    discretion.   Therefore, we will not disturb the spousal support
    decision.
    Attorney's Fees
    An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the
    sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal
    only for an abuse of discretion.       Graves v. Graves, 
    4 Va. App. 326
    , 333, 
    357 S.E.2d 554
    , 558 (1987).      The key to a proper award
    of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the circumstances.
    McGinnis v. McGinnis, 
    1 Va. App. 272
    , 277, 
    338 S.E.2d 159
    , 162
    (1985).
    The trial court specifically found that "the fact is that
    [husband] has failed to provide truthful information in both
    discovery and trial" and that "[a]s a consequence [wife] has had
    to spend considerable time on this case."      The wife incurred over
    $50,000 in attorney's fees, including costs associated with
    extensive and expensive discovery.      Based on the number of issues
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    involved, the husband's lack of cooperation with discovery, and
    the respective abilities of the parties to pay, we cannot say
    that the award was unreasonable or that the trial court abused
    its discretion in awarding the wife $25,000 in attorney's fees.
    Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is summarily
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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