David Lewis Goode v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1998 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Bumgardner
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    DAVID LEWIS GOODE, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1578-97-2             JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    OCTOBER 6, 1998
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHARLOTTE COUNTY
    Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge
    Maureen L. White (Theodore N. I. Tondrowski,
    on brief), for appellant.
    H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    A jury convicted David Lewis Goode, Jr. of voluntary
    manslaughter.    The defendant appeals contending that the evidence
    is insufficient to prove his guilt.    Finding the evidence is
    sufficient to sustain the verdict, we affirm.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the Commonwealth and grant to it all reasonable inferences
    fairly deducible therefrom.    See Higginbotham v. Commonwealth,
    
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).      Voluntary
    manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice,
    while in the heat of passion upon reasonable provocation or
    mutual combat.    See Barrett v. Commonwealth, 
    231 Va. 102
    , 105-06,
    
    341 S.E.2d 190
    , 192 (1986).   "[W]hether a killing was done in the
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    heat of passion upon reasonable provocation is a question of
    fact."     Canipe v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 629
    , 643, 
    491 S.E.2d 747
    , 754 (1997) (citation omitted).
    The evidence shows that a group of people including the
    victim, Daniel Clark, was drinking outside a store in Charlotte
    County.    The defendant drove up and parked.    His passenger got
    out, went over, and spoke to the victim.      The victim then went to
    the defendant's car and got in it.       From the point that the
    victim got in the defendant's car, the stories of the witnesses
    vary.    The witnesses differed over who was the aggressor and the
    timing and sequence of events.
    One Commonwealth witness, Joanne Townsend, who was only
    three feet from the car, stated that as soon as the victim sat in
    the car, the defendant raised a gun.      The victim knocked it down,
    and the gun discharged as the two fought over it.      After the gun
    discharged, the witness accounts converged again.      The victim got
    out of the car complaining of a wound to the lower abdomen.        He
    bled to death from the single gunshot wound.      The other injuries
    inflicted were a small cut over the defendant's eye and seven
    semicircular abrasions to the victim's face.      Those abrasions
    could not be caused by a fist.
    Joanne Townsend's testimony alone would prove the elements
    of the crime.    The jury believed it, and it was not contrary to
    human experience or inherently incredible.      Great deference is
    given to the fact finder who, having seen and heard the
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    witnesses, assesses their credibility and weighs their testimony.
    See Schneider v. Commonwealth, 
    230 Va. 379
    , 382, 
    337 S.E.2d 735
    ,
    736-37 (1985); Daung Sam v. Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 312
    , 318,
    
    411 S.E.2d 832
    , 835 (1991).    The fact finder's determination that
    a witness is credible "may only be disturbed on appeal if this
    Court finds that [the witness'] testimony was 'inherently
    incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it
    unworthy of belief.'"     Robertson v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 854
    , 858, 
    406 S.E.2d 417
    , 419 (1991) (quoting Fisher v.
    Commonwealth, 
    228 Va. 296
    , 299-300, 
    321 S.E.2d 202
    , 204 (1984)).
    A trial court's judgment will not be disturbed unless it is
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.     See Code
    § 8.01-680; Traverso v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 172
    , 176, 366
    S.E.3d 719, 721 (1988).
    The defendant argues that he is entitled to an acquittal
    based on justifiable homicide because he retrieved the gun in
    self-defense.   See Bailey v. Commonwealth, 
    200 Va. 92
    , 96, 
    104 S.E.2d 28
    , 31 (1958).   The defendant has the burden of going
    forward with evidence of self-defense, and the jury is entitled
    to accept or reject any testimony offered.     See Bridgeman v.
    Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 523
    , 528, 
    351 S.E.2d 598
    , 601 (1986).
    The defendant told the investigating officer that the victim
    entered the passenger side of his car and had hit him with
    something.   The defendant originally claimed that the gunshot
    came from outside the car.    After the investigator told him the
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    victim was dead and he had spoken to other witnesses, the
    defendant changed his story.   He said that to protect himself he
    reached under his seat and got the gun to frighten the victim.
    He claimed that the victim took the gun from him, they had
    scuffled, the defendant got the gun back, and it fired.
    The jury did not accept the defendant's version of the
    evidence nor his claim of self-defense.   Other evidence permitted
    the jury to find that the defendant was the aggressor, see Lamb
    v. Commonwealth, 
    141 Va. 481
    , 488, 
    126 S.E. 3
    , 5 (1925), and no
    evidence suggested that he retreated after he provoked the fight.
    See Dodson v. Commonwealth, 
    159 Va. 976
    , 979-80, 
    167 S.E. 260
    ,
    261 (1933) (citation omitted).    We hold that the evidence is
    sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of voluntary
    manslaughter.   Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
    Affirmed.
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