Phillip Robert Brooks v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2017 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Malveaux and Senior Judge Frank
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Newport News, Virginia
PHILLIP ROBERT BROOKS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1228-16-1 JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX
DECEMBER 27, 2017
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Christopher W. Hutton, Judge
Francis D. Mazzio, III, Deputy Public Defender (Mark A. Phillips,
Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Phillip Robert Brooks (“appellant”) was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses, in
violation of Code § 18.2-178. On appeal, appellant argues that a fatal variance existed between the
allegations of the indictment and the evidence introduced at trial. Appellant further argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to strike because the Commonwealth’s evidence relied on the
testimony of an incredible witness. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
On appeal, “we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.”
Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) (en banc)
(quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004)).
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
In 2011, Olivia Shaw and appellant were involved in a romantic relationship. On
December 22, 2011, appellant asked Shaw if she would cash a check for him because he did not
have a bank account or identification. She refused the request at first because “it just didn’t seem
right,” but acquiesced when appellant asked again the next day. Appellant told Shaw that his
aunt was giving him the check, but would only write it out if he had someone to cash it for him.
Appellant called his cousin and said that he had someone to cash a check, and Shaw “gave him
[her] information.”
Appellant’s cousin arrived at Shaw’s apartment and handed appellant a check, which was
made out to Shaw in the amount of $1,500 from the Bank of America account of Cheryl Tucker.
The three then went to a branch of Old Point National Bank located on West Queen Street in
Hampton. When they arrived, the cousin told Shaw to deposit the check in the ATM. Shaw was
unable to deposit the check in the ATM because she did not have her PIN number. She returned
home to check her banking records to try to find her PIN number. Eventually she called the
number on her debit card to try to obtain the PIN number. Shaw was told to speak with someone
at the bank branch, so she returned to Old Point National Bank on West Queen Street with
appellant and his cousin. A teller told her to call Bank of America to see if sufficient funds were
available to cash the check. She relayed that information to appellant, who told her to “just . . .
get the check and leave.” She did so, and suggested that they go to a Bank of America branch,
but appellant declined this offer. Instead, all three went to another Old Point National Bank
branch on Executive Drive in Hampton. There, Shaw was able to deposit the check in a
drive-through ATM. After depositing the check, Shaw withdrew $100, the only amount
available to withdraw at the time. The remaining $1,400 cleared the bank the next day, at which
time Shaw went to the original Old Point National Bank branch on West Queen Street with
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appellant and his cousin. She withdrew the remaining $1,400 through a counter check made out
to “cash,” and gave appellant the money.
A week or two after depositing the check, Nichole Liedel, a security officer with Old
Point National Bank, called Shaw to inform her that there was a stop payment order on the check
she had deposited. As a result, Shaw’s account was overdrawn. Liedel told Shaw that unless she
repaid the amount deposited, the bank would contact the police. In January 2012, Shaw began
making $40 monthly payments to Old Point National Bank. She continued these payments until
May 2014. At that point, $535.22 remained to be repaid to the bank.
After learning about the stop payment order on the check, Shaw tried to contact appellant
by leaving him voicemails, but he did not return her calls. Shaw did not know where appellant
lived. She contacted Cheryl Tucker, whom she believed was appellant’s aunt, by using the
contact information on the check. Tucker is not appellant’s aunt, and told Shaw that her house
had been broken into and her checks had been stolen. Shaw went to the police department to file
a report, but was informed that she could not do anything because she did not have appellant’s
address or any of his identifying information.
In 2014, Shaw saw appellant in her neighborhood and went back to the police department
to file a report. Appellant was subsequently indicted for obtaining money by false pretenses, in
violation of Code § 18.2-178. The indictment specifically charged appellant with “obtain[ing]
by false pretense or token, United States Currency, having a value of $200.00 or more, belonging
to Olivia Shaw, in violation of [Code] § 18.2-178 of the Code of Virginia (1950) as amended.”
At trial, after the Commonwealth presented its case, appellant moved to strike the
evidence. He argued that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence
presented by the Commonwealth, based upon Gardner v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 18, 546
S.E.2d 686 (2001). Appellant argued that, as in Gardner, the bank was the victim of the larceny,
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and not Shaw. The Commonwealth argued that Gardner was not dispositive because in that case,
the person named in the indictment was never in possession of the funds, while Shaw took
possession of the money and then transferred it to appellant. Appellant also moved to strike the
evidence because Shaw was not a credible witness.
The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth’s interpretation of Gardner and denied the
motion to strike based upon a fatal variance. It also denied the motion to strike in regard to
Shaw’s credibility, finding that the credibility determination was an issue for the finder of fact,
the jury. The jury convicted appellant of obtaining money by false pretenses, in violation of
Code § 18.2-178.
II. ANALYSIS
Fatal Variance
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the
evidence because a fatal variance existed between the indictment and the proof at trial.
Appellant asserts that the language of the indictment charged appellant with obtaining currency
belonging to Shaw, while the Commonwealth’s evidence showed that the currency belonged to
Old Point National Bank.
“An indictment is a written accusation of a crime and is intended to inform the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” Hairston v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.
211, 213, 343 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1986). “A variance occurs when the criminal pleadings differ
from the proof at trial.” Purvy v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 260, 266, 717 S.E.2d 847, 850
(2011). “[A] variance will be deemed fatal ‘only when the proof is different from and irrelevant
to the crime defined in the indictment and is, therefore, insufficient to prove the commission of
the crime charged.’” Id. at 267, 717 S.E.2d at 850 (quoting Stokes v. Commonwealth, 49
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Va. App. 401, 406, 641 S.E.2d 780, 783 (2007)). “In short, the ‘offense as charged must be
proved.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 541, 560, 127 S.E. 368, 374 (1925)).
In support of his argument that currency described in the indictment was the property of
the bank, and not Shaw, appellant cites the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Gardner v.
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 18, 546 S.E.2d 686 (2001). In Gardner, defendant, the granddaughter
of George Gardner, went to a bank branch and “presented to a teller a withdrawal slip for
$725.00 ostensibly signed by George Gardner and stating that ‘Latasha is allowed to receive and
sign this [withdrawal slip].’ The teller paid the defendant $725.00 in cash.” Id. at 20, 546
S.E.2d at 687 (alteration in original). Gardner had neither signed the withdrawal slip nor given
defendant permission to sign his name. Id. Before the bank charged the grandfather’s account
with the amount of the withdrawal, it learned that defendant was not authorized to make the
withdrawal. Id. The grandfather’s account “was not debited with this seven hundred and
twenty-five dollars,” and the bank was “out the money.” Id. Defendant was indicted “for
obtaining by false pretenses United States currency of a value greater than $200.00, ‘the property
of George Gardner,’ with the intent to defraud him.” Id. at 19, 546 S.E.2d at 686 (emphasis
added).
Defendant argued on appeal that a fatal variance existed between the indictment and the
evidence because the Commonwealth pled an offense of larceny by false pretenses from
defendant’s grandfather but proved a different offense of larceny by false pretenses from the
bank. Id. at 20, 546 S.E.2d at 687. The Supreme Court agreed with defendant, acknowledging
that “[t]he relationship between a financial institution and its depositor is that of debtor and
creditor. The funds become the property of the bank immediately on deposit, and the bank
becomes the debtor of the depositor.” Id. (quoting Bennet v. First & Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 233
Va. 355, 360, 355 S.E.2d 888, 890-91 (1987)). The Court held that the money withdrawn
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without authorization was the property of the bank, not Gardner. Id. at 25, 546 S.E.2d at 690.
Thus, the bank was the victim. Id. This failure to identify the correct victim, the Court
concluded, constituted a fatal variance. Id.
Appellant argues Gardner controls in this case, as the evidence adduced at trial proved
that the currency allegedly obtained by false pretense was the property of Old Point National
Bank, and not Shaw. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth’s evidence in this case showed
that appellant allegedly obtained currency from Shaw’s bank account through the check drawn
on Cheryl Tucker’s account. However, because that check was fraudulent and subject to a stop
payment order, Old Point National Bank did not have the authority to advance the funds to Shaw
and thus the currency that appellant allegedly obtained was never Shaw’s property.
We disagree with appellant’s theory of possession. The money obtained by false pretense
was Shaw’s $1,500 authorized withdrawal from her own account at Old Point National Bank,
which she subsequently gave to appellant. When Shaw obtained $100 from the ATM and cashed
the counter check for $1,400, she had possession of the $1,500; it no longer belonged to the
bank. See id. at 22, 546 S.E.2d at 688 (explaining that the funds were the property of the bank
“until the instant the defendant obtained ownership through her use of the forged withdrawal
slip”). The money was in Shaw’s possession once she obtained it from the ATM and cashed the
counter check; thus, appellant obtained possession of the money from Shaw, not the bank, when
she gave it to him. The indictment, therefore, correctly specified that the funds belonged to
Shaw. Accordingly, there was no variance between the language of the indictment and the
evidence introduced at trial.
In the instant case, unlike Gardner, the relationship between a depositor and their bank is
not at issue, as Shaw obtained money from her own account and then gave it to appellant. This
was the currency obtained by false pretense. Here, the depositor/bank relationship at issue in
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Gardner exists only between Cheryl Tucker and Bank of America. However, the transfer of
money between them did not provide the basis for the charge of obtaining money by false
pretenses. Rather, the currency obtained by false pretense was the money in Shaw’s possession
that she subsequently gave to appellant. While Shaw later believed she was only able to
withdraw these funds as a result of an unauthorized transaction, the actual funds obtained were
from Shaw’s bank account that she was ultimately responsible for repaying. As such, Shaw was
properly named as the victim in the indictment, and therefore the trial court did not err in
denying the motion to strike on this ground.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the
evidence on the ground that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient because of the
Commonwealth’s reliance on the testimony of an incredible witness.
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal of a criminal conviction, “we
review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.” Pryor v.
Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 1, 4, 628 S.E.2d 47, 48 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson,
265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003)). “Viewing the record through this evidentiary
prism requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the
Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and
all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Cooper v. Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 558, 562,
680 S.E.2d 361, 363 (2009) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d
755, 759 (1980) (emphasis omitted)). “The jury’s verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App.
406, 410, 517 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1999) (quoting Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172,
176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988)).
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“Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the jury,
which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.” Lea
v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304, 429 S.E.2d 477, 479 (1993). The “conclusions of the
fact finder on issues of witness credibility ‘may only be disturbed on appeal if this Court finds
that [the witness’] testimony was “inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to
render it unworthy of belief.”’” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 315, 709 S.E.2d
175, 181 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Robertson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 854,
858, 406 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1991)). “To be ‘incredible,’ testimony ‘must be either so manifestly
false that reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to be false by objects or
things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Juniper v.
Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415, 626 S.E.2d 383, 417 (2006) (quoting Cardwell v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414, 164 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1968)).
Appellant contends that Shaw was an inherently incredible witness because she requested
a counter check drawn on her account, instead of simply withdrawing the remaining $1,400.
Further, Shaw agreed to pay back the funds to her bank. These actions, according to appellant,
were only reasonable if Shaw knew she was passing a bad check.
Here, Shaw testified before the jury as to the circumstances surrounding her cashing of a
check from the account of Cheryl Tucker and subsequent withdrawal of funds from her own
account. While appellant claims that Shaw’s testimony was inherently incredible because her
story was a fabrication to conceal guilt, the jury as fact finder credited her testimony. On appeal,
we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the jury to believe Shaw’s account. It is important to
note that “[t]he living record contains many guideposts to the truth which are not in the printed
record,” and an appellate court, not having the benefit of these guideposts, “should give great
weight to the conclusions of those who have seen and heard them.” Bradley v. Commonwealth,
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196 Va. 1126, 1136, 86 S.E.2d 828, 834 (1955). Giving such weight to the jury’s credibility
determination, we hold that Shaw’s testimony was not inherently incredible or so contrary to
human experience as to render it unworthy of belief. Consequently, the trial court did not err in
denying appellant’s motion to strike on this ground.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding no fatal variance between the indictment
and the evidence adduced at trial. Further, as Shaw’s testimony was not inherently incredible,
the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of obtaining money by false pretenses.
Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
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