Michael Anthony Edwards v. Commonwealth of Virginia , 68 Va. App. 284 ( 2017 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Beales and Alston
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
PUBLISHED
MICHAEL ANTHONY EDWARDS
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0902-16-2 JUDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR.
DECEMBER 19, 2017
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Steven C. McCallum, Judge
Gregory R. Sheldon (Bain Sheldon, PLC, on brief), for appellant.
J. Christian Obenshain, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Michael Edwards (“appellant”) appeals his murder conviction from the Circuit Court of
Chesterfield County (“trial court”), where a jury convicted him of killing Leyla Namiranian. On
appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss for
improper venue, and (2) finding sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We find that the
trial court did not err and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Leyla Namiranian (“Namiranian”) was last seen alive on April 4, 2012. That evening,
she hosted her friend Peter Paoli for dinner. Namiranian was unusually anxious throughout the
entire evening, frequently checking her cell phone and looking out the front door of her home.
Namiranian and Paoli ate dinner, exchanged gifts, and became intimate with each other. At
around 9:45 p.m., a neighbor observed a silver Cadillac driven by a “football-player type”
African-American male quickly reverse out of Namiranian’s driveway. When Paoli later
departed at around 11:00 p.m., Namiranian was alive and well.
At around 5:15 a.m. on April 5, a neighbor walking his dogs noticed a large,
African-American male in Namiranian’s front yard. A little more than an hour later, between
6:15 and 6:30 a.m., another neighbor heard two brief, high-pitched noises sounding like screams
come from the direction of Namiranian’s house. Namiranian never showed up for work on April
5, so a coworker began periodically calling her cell phone to check on her. The coworker
testified that on some calls the phone would ring several times, and on other calls, it would only
ring once and then transition to voicemail. After several failed attempts to get in contact with
Namiranian, the coworker became very concerned and contacted the police.
When the police arrived at Namiranian’s house, nothing in particular indicated that a
crime had occurred. The front door of the house was locked, no evidence of any forced entry
was observed, and Namiranian’s car was parked in the garage. Inside the house, there were no
signs of a struggle – nothing was broken or knocked over, and everything seemed in its proper
place. An investigation conducted by the police established that Namiranian was leading a
completely normal life, and was not planning any trips or moving from the area. Her mailbox
contained several envelopes, and Namiranian’s two cats were in the house. She had tickets for
an upcoming event in Washington, D.C. All of Namiranian’s personal items were in various
rooms, including her car keys, work bag, glasses, pills, hairbrush, and toothbrush. Her passport,
social security card, and citizenship documents were filed away in her home office. However,
the police did not find Namiranian’s two cell phones.
Further investigation by the police began yielding interesting details. Namiranian kept
two couches in her living room – one had a large, red blanket draped over it, the other did not.
However, the couch without a blanket had a rectangular discoloration across the cushions.
Additionally, Namiranian’s journal was found in her work bag, and it contained several entries
about her tumultuous relationship with appellant.
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Namiranian’s friend, Kimberly Pugh, testified about the history between Namiranian and
appellant. According to Pugh, the relationship began well but unraveled due to appellant’s
possessive and violent nature. Eventually, Namiranian broke it off. During an altercation in
February 2012, appellant choked Namiranian and threw her to the ground. Significantly,
Namiranian noted in her journal that she then ended the relationship permanently. Namiranian
wrote:
I’m going between fear and anger. I broke up with [appellant] for
the fourth and last time yesterday. He lost his mind with jealousy
in trying to choke me, but gave up. Thank God. I was never so
scared . . . I slept at Kim’s because I was afraid he’d come back.
Today I called – she called somebody – so he would stop calling
me, or thinking we would somehow get back together.
Appellant had once told Namiranian “one day, I’m gonna get you. Somehow, some way,
when you least expect it, I’m gonna get you.” Appellant would show up at Namiranian’s house
without warning, and Namiranian developed a significant fear of him. Neighbors also observed
him sitting in his car near her house on another occasion before her disappearance.
Appellant’s phone records revealed that between April 2 and April 4, the days leading up
to Namiranian’s disappearance, appellant called Namiranian eight different times, none of which
Namiranian answered or returned. The records also revealed that appellant did not call
Namiranian on April 5, April 6, or any other day after that.
Appellant exhibited unusual behavior and demeanor on April 5. He reported late to work
at his job at Vitran Express in Ashland, Virginia, located off of Interstate 95. Appellant’s
supervisor testified that he called appellant between 12:00 and 1:00 p.m. that day because
appellant had not yet arrived, and appellant appeared upset and exhausted when he finally
reported at around 2:00 p.m. Additionally, appellant’s friend Carla Hargrove had attempted to
call him multiple times on the morning of April 5, but received no answer. Appellant called her
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back later that night, and told her to pretend that she had been with him during the morning of
April 5, should anyone ask her.
The police wanted to speak with appellant about Namiranian, but appellant declined the
opportunity. He refused to tell the police where he worked and then refused to meet in person.
Appellant finally agreed to talk with the police during the afternoon of April 6. He initially
denied being near Namiranian’s house on April 4 or April 5. However, once detectives showed
him his cell phone records proving he was in that vicinity, he admitted to being around
Namiranian’s house and leaving his car on her street overnight. A forensic analysis of his cell
phone revealed that he had deleted all of his text messages to Namiranian. Forensic technicians
recovered the messages, and one message from April 2 read “please don’t see him again. Okay.
Love you very much. Love you very, very much. I’m sorry,” suggesting appellant’s jealousy of
Namiranian’s current relationship. Appellant was also inconsistent with other details from the
previous two days, providing four different times at which he had reported to work on April 5.
The police searched appellant’s vehicle and found a bag in the trunk, containing a red
blanket, duct tape, and a bucket. They also found various cleaning supplies. Further analysis of
the blanket and bag revealed a hair consistent with Namiranian’s hair color, and another hair
found in the trunk was consistent with her DNA profile. Police then searched the car with a
canine trained to detect human remains, which sniffed the inside of the trunk and then alerted his
handler to the presence of human remains. Police also found multiple blood stains in the trunk.
The police thoroughly reviewed the cell phone records from appellant and Namiranian
and concluded that both individuals were near or inside Namiranian’s house during the night of
April 4 and throughout the morning of April 5. Both phones had pinged off a tower1 close to
1
“Pinging” occurs when a cell phone connects to a local cell tower and then links with
the cellular network, allowing the phone’s user to make calls, send or receive text messages, and
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Namiranian’s house during that time frame. Moving into the early afternoon of April 5, both
phones pinged to towers located away from her house. By around 2:00 p.m., both phones pinged
off a tower north of appellant’s home, adjacent to Interstate 95. Appellant’s pinged to the tower
near his work around 2:00 p.m., and around the same time Namiranian’s phones pinged to towers
close to a section of Interstate 95. The phones were found shattered and in several pieces in the
woods near the Atlee/Elmont exit.
The police continued investigating whether Namiranian was still alive somewhere, but
since April 4, 2012, all of her email, social media, and financial and credit accounts have
remained inactive, she never checked into any hospital in the Chesterfield County area, her name
never appeared on any flight manifests, and her passport was never logged at any airport.
Eventually, the authorities concluded that Namiranian is deceased, despite never finding her
body, and charged appellant with her murder.
At appellant’s five-day jury trial, the Commonwealth called 31 witnesses to establish its
case. Ultimately, the jury convicted appellant of second-degree murder and recommended a
30-year penitentiary sentence that the trial court imposed. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss
In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss the indictment because the Commonwealth did not prove that Chesterfield
County was the proper venue for this case. We disagree.
On appeal, we review “whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, is sufficient to support the [trial court’s] venue findings.” Williams v.
access the Internet. When analysts determine which tower a phone connected with, they are able
to approximate a location of the phone.
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Commonwealth, 289 Va. 326, 336, 771 S.E.2d 675, 680 (2015) (quoting Cheng v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604 (1990)). The burden is on the
Commonwealth to establish venue. Ware v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 520, 522, 201 S.E.2d 791,
793 (1974). Evidence on venue is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and
it must give rise to a “strong presumption that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction
of the court.” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (citation
omitted).
The failure to clearly prove venue is usually due to inadvertence,
flowing naturally from the familiarity of court, counsel, witnesses,
and jurors with the locality of the crime; therefore, this Court will
generally and properly lay hold of and accept as sufficient any
evidence in the case, direct or otherwise, from which the fact may
be reasonably inferred.
Williams, 289 Va. at 336, 771 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting Randall v. Commonwealth, 183 Va. 182,
187, 31 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1944)).
Here, the applicable venue statute is Code § 19.2-248, which provides, in relevant part,
that “if a mortal wound, or other violence or injury, be inflicted . . . and death ensues therefrom
in another county or city, the offense may be prosecuted in either.”2 Appellant argues that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that Chesterfield County was a proper venue for his trial. We
note that the Commonwealth can establish venue using either direct or circumstantial evidence.
Foster-Zahid v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 430, 442, 477 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1996). In this
2
We note that the Commonwealth relied on Code § 19.2-244 at trial and oral argument,
which provides, in relevant part, that “the prosecution of a criminal case shall be had in the
county or city in which the offense was committed.” We find that Code § 19.2-248 is more
applicable. Moreover, proceeding under Code §§ 19.2-244 or -247 would have required the
various jurisdictions involved in this case to collaborate with one another to formalize a set
theory on the factual circumstances of the case, because neither Code §§ 19.2-244 nor -247
contain the geographical flexibility found within Code § 19.2-248. The record does not reflect
that any discussion between the jurisdictions ever occurred.
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case, the Commonwealth relied on circumstantial evidence to establish Chesterfield County as a
proper venue.
On the last day she was seen alive, April 4, 2012, Namiranian hosted a friend for dinner
at her house in Chesterfield County. Cell phone tower evidence showed that appellant was
around Namiranian’s house for several hours between the night of April 4 and the morning of
April 5. Namiranian’s neighbors noticed appellant’s car parked outside the house, and he
admitted the same to the police. One neighbor noticed an individual fitting appellant’s
description in Namiranian’s front yard in the early morning of April 5. Another neighbor heard
noises sounding like screams come from the direction of Namiranian’s house shortly thereafter.
By the afternoon of April 5, both Namiranian’s and appellant’s cell phones pinged from towers
located away from the house. Namiranian’s phones were found discarded on the side of
Interstate 95. Inside Namiranian’s house, police found all of her personal belongings, including
her luggage, passport, glasses, purse, and car keys, and even her cats were still there. When
police searched appellant’s car, a canine alerted police to the presence of human remains, blood
stains were noticeable in the trunk, and they found a blanket that had a hair on it matching
Namiranian’s hair color. Although police recovered no blood or hair evidence from inside the
house, appellant had a bucket and cleaning supplies in his car, suggesting that he wrapped up
Namiranian’s body in the blanket, and thoroughly cleaned the house to erase any evidence of the
murder.
Based on the evidence presented, the Commonwealth established a strong inference that
on the night of April 4, appellant went into Namiranian’s house in Chesterfield County for
several hours and either mortally wounded or murdered her there,3 and then disposed of her body
3
We recognize that venue would be established under Code § 19.2-248 if any violence
leading to Namiranian’s death occurred within the home, no matter how minor. Thus, our
analysis does not purport to diminish Code § 19.2-248’s applicability in other cases with
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elsewhere. With all reasonable inferences drawn in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient under Code § 19.2-248 to establish venue in
Chesterfield County.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth met its burden of proof regarding venue in
this case and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.
II. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Convict Appellant of Murder
In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that appellant murdered Namiranian and that the Commonwealth did not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We disagree.
A. Circumstantial Evidence
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, we review the evidence “in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254, 584 S.E.2d 444, 446
(2003) (en banc) (quoting Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 250, 356 S.E.2d 443, 444
(1987)). “In so doing, we must discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the
Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and
all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335,
348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998) (quoting Cirios v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292, 295, 373
S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988)). This Court will “presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct
and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”
Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 257, 584 S.E.2d at 447.
different facts. In this case, however, we believe that the Commonwealth’s evidence showed
that Namiranian was likely killed within her home.
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“Murder at common law is a homicide committed with malice, either express or
implied.” Tizon v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 1, 11, 723 S.E.2d 260, 265 (2012) (quoting
Pugh v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 667, 292 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1982)). “Malice inheres in the
‘doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will.’”
Id. (quoting Dawkins v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 55, 61, 41 S.E.2d 500, 503 (1947)). In proving
that a crime occurred, “[t]here is no distinction in the law between the weight or value to be
given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. The finder of fact is entitled to consider all of
the evidence, without distinction, in reaching its determination.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265
Va. 505, 512-13, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). And “[w]hile no single piece of evidence may be
sufficient, the combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may lead a
reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479,
619 S.E.2d 16, 32 (2005).
We begin our analysis by recognizing that no law exists in Virginia requiring the
Commonwealth to produce a victim’s dead body to obtain a conviction for murder. See Epperly
v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 229-30, 294 S.E.2d 882, 890-91 (1982).4 In this case,
Namiranian’s body was never found, but the Commonwealth presented substantial and probative
circumstantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had motive and
opportunity to murder and that he carried out the murder of Namiranian.
4
Virginia is part of the majority of jurisdictions that follow this principle. See, e.g.,
Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1991); Nebraska v. Edwards, 767
N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 2009); Arizona v. Hall, 65 P.3d 90 (Ariz. 2003); Michigan v. Fisher, 483
N.W.2d 452 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Illinois v. Faulkner, 542 N.E.2d 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989);
Pennsylvania v. Smith, 588 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1989); Ohio v. Nicely, 529 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio 1988);
Rawlings v. Oklahoma, 740 P.2d 153 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Hurley v. Maryland, 483 A.2d
1298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Utah v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984); California v.
Manson, 139 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); New Jersey v. Zarinsky, 362 A.2d 611 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Washington v. Lung, 423 P.2d 72 (Wash. 1967).
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Namiranian and appellant had a mercurial romantic past. Namiranian eventually became
scared of appellant, and this fear escalated to the point of an actual physical confrontation in
which appellant choked Namiranian. After that incident, Namiranian resolved to end her
relationship with appellant, but appellant found it difficult to move on. Namiranian told her
friend Kimberly Pugh that appellant had once threatened her, stating “one day I’m gonna get
you. Somehow, some way, when you least expect it, I’m gonna get you.”
Namiranian’s personal journal contained various statements exhibiting Namiranian’s fear
of appellant. In a journal entry from February 19, 2012, Namiranian wrote:
I’m going between fear and anger. I broke up with [appellant] for
the fourth and last time yesterday. He lost his mind with jealousy
in trying to choke me, but gave up. Thank God. I was never so
scared . . . I slept at Kim’s because I was afraid he’d come back.
Today I called – she called somebody – so he would stop calling
me, or thinking we would somehow get back together.
Appellant’s cell phone records showed that in the days leading up to Namiranian’s
disappearance, appellant attempted to contact Namiranian almost every day, but stopped after
April 4, the last day she was ever seen. On April 2, appellant had sent Namiranian a text saying
“[P]lease don’t see him again. Okay. Love you very much. Love you very, very much. I’m
sorry.” Clearly, appellant knew Namiranian was involved with another man but was unable to
move on from her, supplying him with the motive to murder Namiranian.
Appellant also had the opportunity to murder Namiranian. A significant amount of
evidence placed appellant near Namiranian’s house between April 4 and April 5. Appellant’s
cell phone records showed that his phone pinged off a tower near Namiranian’s house during the
night of April 4 and throughout the morning of April 5. When appellant’s cell phone finally left
the area near Namiranian’s house late in the morning on April 5, Namiranian’s cell phones
moved along with his, pinging off of the same towers. Namiranian’s neighbors testified that they
saw appellant’s car in the area on April 4, and he admitted that it was parked there that night.
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Another neighbor witnessed an African-American male, “about 6’2”, 250 pounds, a big man,”
walking across Namiranian’s lawn early in the morning on April 5.5 Appellant admitted to the
police that he had access to Namiranian’s house, explaining the lack of evidence of any forced
entry. It was also around early morning on April 5 that another neighbor heard two loud,
high-pitched screams emanate from the direction of Namiranian’s house.
In the early afternoon of April 5, appellant showed up late to work without explanation
and appeared exhausted and upset. Appellant worked at a building close to Interstate 95,
affording him the opportunity to dump Namiranian’s phones out his car window on the way
there. The shattered cell phones were recovered in several pieces, strewn alongside Interstate 95.
Later that night, appellant spoke to his friend Carla Hargrove over the phone, and asked her to
tell anyone who inquired that they had been together that day, in a clear attempt to formulate an
alibi for his whereabouts.
Additionally, while several canine searches of Namiranian’s house and the surrounding
area did not produce any leads, the police eventually found more evidence implicating appellant.
During a search of appellant’s car, a canine alerted to the presence of human remains in the
trunk, a hair matching Namiranian’s hair color was recovered from a red blanket, and another
hair corresponding to Namiranian’s DNA profile was recovered from the trunk. The police also
observed blood stains in the trunk, and a roll of duct tape in the backseat had traces of male and
female DNA on it.
Within Namiranian’s house itself, the police observed that she owned two couches – one
had a large, red blanket draped over the top, while the second did not. However, a close
5
While we normally would not repeatedly reference a perpetrator’s ethnicity, we believe
it prudent here because the Commonwealth relied exclusively on circumstantial evidence in this
case, and thus it is highly material that on April 4 and April 5, the time frame during which the
Commonwealth alleged the murder occurred, Namiranian’s neighbors observed an individual
fitting appellant’s description both in ethnicity and physical build.
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inspection of the second couch revealed a noticeable, rectangular discoloration, indicating that
something rectangular-shaped had been sitting on it for a long period of time, protecting the
fabric from light. A reasonable jury could conclude that the second couch had an identical large,
red blanket draped over it, which appellant removed and used during the disposal of
Namiranian’s body. A red blanket was recovered from the trunk of appellant’s car. Moreover,
police discovered a bucket and various cleaning supplies in appellant’s car, suggesting to a
reasonable factfinder that appellant had undertaken the task of cleaning up any evidence of the
murder before departing from the house.
Finally, considering the totality of the evidence, it is clear that appellant displayed
express malice in killing Namiranian. “Express malice is evidenced when ‘one person kills
another with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design.’” Canipe v. Commonwealth, 25
Va. App. 629, 642, 491 S.E.2d 747, 753 (1997) (quoting Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273,
280, 322 S.E.2d 216, 220 (1984) (citation omitted)). Appellant demonstrated a significant
feeling of “ill will” toward Namiranian through a series of statements and actions. See Tizon, 60
Va. App. at 11, 723 S.E.2d at 265. He had previously threatened Namiranian, stating “I’m gonna
get you.” He choked Namiranian and threw her on the ground during the February 2012
altercation, and his April 2 text message to her revealed his enduring jealousy over her new
relationship. Appellant then lurked around Namiranian’s house on the night of April 4, biding
his time until he could catch her alone and off-guard. Furthermore, appellant’s act of wrapping
Namiranian’s body in a blanket and disposing of it so that it would never be found indicates a
knowledge that his actions were “without just cause or excuse.” Id. The decisive and calculated
methods employed by appellant evince his “formed design” of the murder. See Canipe, 25
Va. App. at 642, 491 S.E.2d at 753. Appellant ensured that Namiranian’s body would never be
found, and he attempted to eliminate all physical evidence of the murder by cleaning
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Namiranian’s house, undercutting the possibility that appellant killed Namiranian accidentally.
In that vein, we note that nothing within the Commonwealth’s evidence suggested that the killing
may have been accidental.
For the aforementioned reasons, we find that the Commonwealth’s evidence was
sufficient to prove that appellant committed second-degree murder.
B. The Jury Rejected Appellant’s Hypothesis of Innocence
Appellant also argues that the Commonwealth did not exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence, and thus he cannot be convicted of second-degree murder. “The
statement that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence is
simply another way of stating that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785. However, “[m]erely because [a]
defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth does not mean that
every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been excluded. What weight
should be given evidence is a matter for the [factfinder] to decide.” Haskins v. Commonwealth,
44 Va. App. 1, 9, 602 S.E.2d 402, 406 (2004) (quoting Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 462,
467, 138 S.E.2d 22, 27 (1964). “By finding [a] defendant guilty, therefore, the factfinder ‘has
found by a process of elimination that the evidence does not contain a reasonable theory of
innocence.’” Id. (citing United States v. Kemble, 197 F.2d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 1952)).
Additionally, “the jury’s verdict cannot be overturned on appeal unless no rational trier of fact
could have come to the conclusion it did.” Stevens v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 234, 248,
616 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2005). “The issue is whether a reasonable jury, upon consideration of all
the evidence, could have rejected [appellant’s] theories in his defense and [find] him guilty of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785.
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Appellant contends that Namiranian could have voluntarily disappeared and that she
simply decided to abandon her current life and start anew elsewhere, or alternatively, that “the
Commonwealth’s evidence could only truly prove that [Namiranian] was probably dead.”
Appellant argues that Namiranian’s journal entries revealed her to be a “sad, lonely woman
[who] was unhappy at work” and who “dreamed about being in a different place.” Appellant
relies on these characterizations to assert the hypothesis that “Namiranian elected to live life in
absentia,” and argues that the Commonwealth never excluded that possibility.
However, the items that Namiranian would still have needed in a new life were all
recovered from her house, except for her cell phones, which were found in pieces alongside
Interstate 95. Namiranian’s hairbrush and toothbrush, pets, car keys, and car were all at her
house. Her passport, birth certificate, and citizenship documents were safely stored away.
Namiranian had purchased tickets for an upcoming event in Washington, D.C., and there was no
activity in any of her social media accounts or bank accounts after April 4. Because appellant’s
and Namiranian’s cell phones moved together on April 5, both pinging off of towers located
away from Namiranian’s house, it can be inferred that appellant took Namiranian’s phones with
him after he left and attempted to dispose of them.
In positing his hypothesis of innocence, appellant undervalues the significant volume of
the Commonwealth’s evidence and overemphasizes the absence of Namiranian’s body. The
absence of the body is the only fact to which appellant’s hypothesis is anchored, and that fact
alone cannot prevent the tide of significant circumstantial evidence from sweeping his hypothesis
away. Contrary to appellant’s theory, “[t]he unlikelihood of [a victim’s] voluntary disappearance
is circumstantial evidence entitled to weight equal to that of [other] evidence.” Epperly, 224 Va.
at 229, 294 S.E.2d at 890. Courts have rejected efforts to “place a premium on stealthy murder
and successful concealment of the victim’s body.” Id. Thus, Virginia jurisprudence already
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contains examples of how a factfinder could interpret the absence of a body as probative
evidence in a murder prosecution, and the principle does not support appellant’s hypothesis.
Furthermore, appellant specifically argued the “Namiranian is living life in absentia”
theory to the jury during his closing arguments and the jury rendered a guilty verdict, thus
necessarily rejecting appellant’s hypothesis. We recognize that “a factfinder cannot ‘arbitrarily’
choose, as between two equally plausible interpretations, one that incriminates [appellant].”
Haskins, 44 Va. App. at 9, 602 S.E.2d at 406 (citing Dixon v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 798, 803,
173 S.E. 521, 523 (1934)). If, “after the factfinder ‘resolves all conflicts in the evidence’ . . . the
evidence of guilt or innocence remains anywhere near equipoise – that is, the facts are ‘equally
susceptible to two or more constructions’ – then reasonable doubt exists as a matter of law.” Id.(quoting Feigley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 717, 724, 432 S.E.2d 520, 525 (1993)).
However, when a factfinder rejects a hypothesis of innocence as unreasonable, the “verdict
cannot be overturned on appeal unless no rational trier of fact could have come to the conclusion
it did.” Stevens, 46 Va. App. at 248, 616 S.E.2d at 761 (emphasis added). Put another way,
“[t]he issue is whether a reasonable jury, upon consideration of all the evidence, could have
rejected [appellant’s] theories in his defense and found him guilty of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Hudson, 265 Va. at 513, 578 S.E.2d at 785 (emphasis added).
Here, all the evidence presented at trial could, and did, lead a rational trier of fact to
determine that appellant had the motive and opportunity to murder Namiranian and that he
succeeded in killing her. In reaching that conclusion, the jury rejected appellant’s theory that
Namiranian began living a life “in absentia,” and the evidence supports as much. The
Commonwealth is not required to address and disprove every conceivable possibility of what
could have occurred. Rather, it is only required to eliminate all reasonable hypotheses of
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innocence. The Commonwealth accomplished that here. Thus, we decline to disturb the jury’s
verdict.
Based on the evidence presented we cannot say the trial court was plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it when it convicted appellant of second-degree murder.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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