Shawn Jaquaye Featherston v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2022 )


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  •                                              COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    UNPUBLISHED
    Present: Judges Huff, Fulton and White
    SHAWN JAQUAYE FEATHERSTON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.     Record No. 0402-22-1                                         PER CURIAM
    DECEMBER 29, 2022
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
    Matthew A. Glassman, Judge
    (Elisabeth N. Culpepper, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for
    appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
    (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    The trial court convicted Shawn Jaquaye Featherston on guilty pleas of assault and battery
    on a law enforcement officer and driving under the influence after a prior DUI conviction with a
    BAC greater than .20. The trial court sentenced Featherston to a total of five years and six months’
    active incarceration. On appeal, Featherston asserts that the trial court abused its sentencing
    discretion. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral
    argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a);
    Rule 5A:27(a). Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    BACKGROUND
    On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the
    prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 
    74 Va. App. 225
    , 231 (2022)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 
    300 Va. 325
    , 329 (2021)). Doing so requires us to “discard the
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
    credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
    Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 
    295 Va. 323
    , 324 (2018)).
    On June 20, 2021, Featherston was arrested for felony DUI, assault and battery on a law
    enforcement officer, disorderly conduct, and obstruction of justice. Following discovery and two
    continuances, Featherston entered into a written plea agreement on December 20, 2021. In the
    plea agreement, Featherston agreed to plead guilty to the DUI and assault charges in exchange
    for the Commonwealth nolle prossing the remaining charges. The plea agreement provided that
    Featherston’s sentences would be decided by the trial court after argument. The agreement also
    provided that Featherston waived his right to seek reconsideration of his sentences by the trial
    court. Moreover, it provided that Featherston “waive[d] any right of appeal to the Court of
    Appeals of Virginia and the Virginia Supreme Court or any other appellate court.” Finally, the
    agreement stated that “the defendant waives any other post-conviction relief whatsoever,
    including, but not limited to, claims of actual innocence.” (Emphasis added). The sole
    post-conviction relief available to Featherston under the agreement was the “right to seek relief
    for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
    Before accepting Featherston’s guilty pleas, the trial court engaged in a thorough plea
    colloquy with him to ensure they were entered freely and voluntarily. Featherston confirmed
    that after discussing the charges with his attorney, he decided to plead guilty because he was, in
    fact, guilty. He understood that “the maximum punishment for each . . . offense[] [wa]s up to
    five years” in prison and that the sentencing guidelines were “not binding” on the court. During
    the colloquy, the trial court “read and summarized” the terms of the plea agreement, including
    the provision whereby Featherston “waive[d] any right to appeal to the Court of Appeals of
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    Virginia and the Virginia Supreme Court.” Featherston explicitly agreed that he had signed and
    understood the terms of the plea agreement.
    The Commonwealth proffered that Featherston was arrested after an individual reported
    that he was driving erratically on the night of June 19, 2021. The caller related that a car was
    “swerving” and had nearly collided with other vehicles while traveling approximately 100 miles
    per hour. Officer Privott responded to the call and intercepted Featherston in a parking lot.
    Featherston told Privott that he was traveling from a party in North Carolina where he had
    consumed three, eight-ounce beers. After Featherston performed poorly on several field sobriety
    tests, Privott arrested him for DUI and transported him to a police station for a breath test. Upon
    reaching the station, Featherston shoved Privott in the chest with both hands, stating, “When I
    get out of here, you’re the first one I’ll be looking for.” Featherston’s breath test revealed that
    his BAC was 0.25 grams per 210 liters of breath. Featherston had multiple prior DUI
    convictions, including a DUI conviction in 2012 for a third or subsequent offense, a felony.
    The trial court accepted Featherston’s guilty pleas and the plea agreement. The trial court
    found that Featherston had “freely and voluntarily entered his pleas” and convicted him of both
    offenses. On the assault and battery conviction, the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum
    six-month sentence. On the DUI conviction, the trial court sentenced Featherston to five years’
    incarceration. It found that the offense represented Featherston’s sixth DUI, that he was highly
    intoxicated, and that he was driving at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour. The trial court
    emphasized that it had an obligation to “protect the community” from Featherston and his
    substance abuse problems. Featherston appeals.
    ANALYSIS
    Featherston argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a five-year, six-
    month active term of incarceration because it failed to consider “relevant factors that should have
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    been given significant weight.” The record demonstrates, however, that Featherston knowingly,
    voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal the trial court’s judgment in his written plea
    agreement.
    The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that “general principles of contract law apply to
    plea agreements[.]” Wright v. Commonwealth, 
    275 Va. 77
    , 79 (2008). “In general, a party may
    contractually waive ‘any right conferred by law or contract.’” Radiance Capital Receivables
    Fourteen, LLC v. Foster, 
    298 Va. 14
    , 19 (2019) (quoting Gordonsville Energy, L.P. v. Va. Elec. &
    Power Co., 
    257 Va. 344
    , 356 (1999)). “If the party being charged with relinquishment of a right
    had knowledge of the right and intended to waive it, the waiver will be enforced.” Gordonsville
    Energy, 
    257 Va. at 356
    .
    “With few exceptions, most legal rights—whether common law, statutory, or
    constitutional—can be waived if the requisite formalities are observed.” Congdon v.
    Commonwealth, 
    57 Va. App. 692
    , 695 (2011). “Virginia has long held a criminal defendant can
    waive ‘his appeal of right’ if the circumstances demonstrate ‘his decision to waive his appeal was
    made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.’” Id. at 699 (quoting Davidson v. Commonwealth,
    
    244 Va. 129
    , 132 (1992)). “[M]ost courts ‘are persuaded that because other important constitutional
    rights of the defendant may be waived by plea agreement, the right to appeal, which is not even
    guaranteed by the Constitution, but by statute, should also be subject to waiver.’” Id. at 696
    (quoting 7 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 27.5(c), at 75-76 (3d ed. 2007)); see also Burke
    v. Burke, 
    52 Va. App. 183
     (2008) (holding a litigant can contractually waive her right of an appeal
    from a circuit court order). “Express waivers can be made through a writing, an oral statement, or a
    combination of both.” Griffin v. Commonwealth, 
    65 Va. App. 714
    , 719 (2016).
    In this case, the plea agreement specifically states: “[T]he defendant waives any right of
    appeal to the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Virginia Supreme Court or any other appellate
    -4-
    court. Additionally, the defendant waives any other post-conviction relief whatsoever, including,
    but not limited to, claims of actual innocence.” (Emphasis added). Moreover, the trial court
    explicitly read those provisions to Featherston during the plea colloquy, and he confirmed that he
    understood them. Finally, Featherston acknowledged by signing the agreement “that the effects
    thereof have been fully explained to him by his attorney,” that he “ha[d] entered into this agreement
    freely and voluntarily,” and that “there ha[d] been no other inducements, promises, threats or
    coercion of any kind imposed upon the defendant nor suggested to the defendant by the Attorney for
    the Commonwealth.” Accordingly, as the record affirmatively demonstrates that Featherston
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal the trial court’s judgment to this
    Court, we decline to consider his arguments. Congdon, 57 Va. App. at 699.1
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    1
    We decline Featherston’s request to disregard his waiver and to review his sentences under
    either the good cause or the ends of justice exceptions in Rule 5A:18. Featherston’s sole argument
    in support of application of these exceptions is that his sentences were “unnecessarily harsh and
    cruel.” Even assuming, arguendo, that the exceptions applied, we do not engage in a
    proportionality review in cases that do not involve life sentences without the possibility of
    parole. Cole v. Commonwealth, 
    58 Va. App. 642
    , 654 (2011). Both of Featherston’s sentences
    fell within statutory limits. See Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-57(C), 18.2-266, 18.2-270(C)(2).
    Sentences that fall within statutory limits “will not be overturned as being an abuse of
    discretion.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 
    292 Va. 555
    , 564 (quoting Alston v.
    Commonwealth, 
    274 Va. 759
    , 772 (2007)).
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Document Info

Docket Number: 0402221

Filed Date: 12/29/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/29/2022