Melvin Sprouse v. Orange County Department of Social Services ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Frank, McClanahan and Senior Judge Willis
    MELVIN SPROUSE
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.        Record No. 1329-06-2                                          PER CURIAM
    MARCH 6, 2007
    ORANGE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
    OF SOCIAL SERVICES
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY
    Daniel R. Bouton, Judge
    (Christian A. Brashear, on brief), for appellant. Appellant
    submitting on brief.
    (Robert F. Beard; Michael J. Hallahan, II, Guardian ad litem, for the
    minor child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad
    litem submitting on brief.
    Melvin Sprouse appeals the trial court’s decision terminating his residual parental rights to
    his minor son, D.M., pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and 16.1-283(C)(2). Finding no error, we
    affirm.
    We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant
    to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
    Human Dev., 
    13 Va. App. 123
    , 128, 
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 462 (1991). “‘[T]ermination of [residual]
    parental rights is a grave, drastic and irreversible action.’” Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
    Human Dev., 
    12 Va. App. 877
    , 883, 
    407 S.E.2d 25
    , 28-29 (1991) (quoting Lowe v. Dept. of Pub.
    Welfare of the City of Richmond, 
    231 Va. 277
    , 280, 
    343 S.E.2d 70
    , 72 (1986)). When
    considering termination of a parent’s residual parental rights to a child, “the paramount
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
    at 463. On review, “[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all the evidence,
    considered the statutory requirements, and made its determination based on the child’s best
    interests.” Farley v. Farley, 
    9 Va. App. 326
    , 329, 
    387 S.E.2d 794
    , 795 (1990). “The trial court’s
    judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463
    (quoting Peple v. Peple, 
    5 Va. App. 414
    , 422, 
    364 S.E.2d 232
    , 237 (1988)).
    In light of these standards, and based upon our review of the record (including the trial
    court’s findings as reflected in its April 27, 2006 order for involuntary termination of residual
    parental rights, the written statement of facts, and the trial court’s written additions to the record
    made in accordance with Rule 5A:8), we conclude that the trial court’s decision finding that there
    was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of Sprouse’s residual parental rights to
    D.M. under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and 16.1-283(C)(2), as being in the child’s best interests, was
    not plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
    decision.
    Affirmed.
    -2-