Darius Leroy Collins v. Commonwealth ( 2005 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Kelsey and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
DARIUS LEROY COLLINS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1907-04-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
OCTOBER 4, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge
Stephen B. Plott (Collins & Plott, PLC, on brief), for appellant.
Deana A. Malek, Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams
Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Darius Leroy Collins appeals convictions of armed statutory burglary in violation of Code
§ 18.2-90 and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.
Collins contends the evidence was insufficient to prove he intended to commit a robbery when he
entered the victim’s residence. We disagree, and affirm.
BACKGROUND
“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (citation omitted).
The evidence proved that Robert Block responded to a knock on his door and, when he
opened the door, he saw Collins. Collins stuck his head inside Block’s apartment, looked
around, asked for Josh, and left. Moments later, there was another knock on the door. When
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Block opened the door, Collins pointed a firearm at Block, pushed his way into the apartment
and stated, “Get the fuck down.” Kurt Keady was visiting Block, and Keady and Block
disarmed Collins.
Collins testified that he went to Block’s apartment with Scott Davis because Davis owed
Block money. Collins testified that Davis and Block conversed in the outside foyer of Block’s
apartment and that Block went inside his apartment, returning a short time later with a pistol.
Collins testified that Block hit him with the pistol. Collins denied entering Block’s apartment.
Collins was charged with armed statutory burglary, two counts of attempted robbery, and
three counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. At the conclusion of the
evidence, the trial judge dismissed the two counts of attempted robbery and the related firearm
charges. The trial judge stated the evidence was “just not quite sufficient to prove an attempt to
rob because I could just as easily hypothesize that [Collins] was going to [commit] murder . . . or
some other thing that qualifies under the statutory burglary charge.”
ANALYSIS
Collins argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of statutory burglary,
reasoning that, because the evidence was insufficient to prove a specific intent to rob as required
for attempted robbery, the evidence was also insufficient to prove the armed statutory burglary
charge.1 For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Code § 18.2-90 provides in part:
If any person in the nighttime enters without breaking or in the
daytime breaks and enters or enters and conceals himself in a
dwelling house . . . with intent to commit murder, rape, robbery or
arson in violation of §§ 18.2-77, 18.2-79 or § 18.2-80, he shall be
deemed guilty of statutory burglary, which offense shall be a Class
3 felony. However, if such person was armed with a deadly
1
Collins contends the armed burglary charge was based upon his unlawful entry into the
apartment with the intent to commit a robbery.
-2-
weapon at the time of such entry, he shall be guilty of a Class 2
felony.
“‘[W]hether the required intent exists is generally a question for the trier of fact.’”
Haywood v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 562, 565-66, 458 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1995) (citation
omitted).
When an unlawful entry is made into the dwelling of another, the
presumption is that the entry is made for an unlawful purpose. The
specific purpose, meaning specific intent, with which such an entry
is made may be inferred from the surrounding facts and
circumstances. Thus, the [trier of fact] was entitled to draw on all
the circumstances shown by the evidence to determine what [the
defendant’s] intent actually was when he entered the apartment.
Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 524, 323 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1984) (internal citations
omitted).
[A] person often acts with two or more criminal intentions. A
person may commit a crime with more than one purpose, and the
fact that the act is done with two or more specific objectives does
not mean that the Commonwealth has failed to prove the specific
intent to commit the charged crime. Thus, when the
Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused
has committed a criminal act with both a primary and a secondary
purpose in mind, both or either of which purposes are criminal, the
Commonwealth has met its burden of proving the element of
specific intent.
Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 530-31, 446 S.E.2d 451, 463 (1994) (en banc)
(Coleman, J., concurring).
Collins was indicted for unlawfully entering Block’s residence “with the intent to commit
robbery or a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-90.” Although the trial judge determined there
was insufficient evidence to support the attempted robbery charges, he found that Collins had
“some criminal responsibility” for unlawfully entering Block’s apartment while armed with a
firearm. Collins entered Block’s residence, pointed a firearm at Block, and ordered Block and
Keady to get down. Instead of complying with Collins’ command, Block and Keady fought
-3-
back. The determination of Collins’ intent when he unlawfully entered Block’s apartment was a
question for the trier of fact. There was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to infer that
Collins’ specific intent when he unlawfully entered the apartment with a firearm was to commit
one of the felonies enumerated in Code § 18.2-90, such as murder. Accordingly, we affirm
Collins’ convictions for armed statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-90 and the related
use of a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.
Affirmed.
-4-