Karen Atkins v. Richmond Department of Soc Servs ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton
KAREN ATKINS
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record Nos. 3398—02-2 and PER CURIAM
3399-02-2 MAY 27, 2003
RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Randall G. Johnson, Judge
(Richard G. White, Jr., on briefs), for
appellant.
(Shunda T. Giles; Richmond City Attorney's
Office, on briefs) for appellee.
Karen Atkins appeals decisions terminating her parental
rights to her daughters pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). On
appeal, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to
support the termination. We disagree, and summarily affirm the
decisions of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences
fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't
of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991).
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
So viewed, the evidence established the children were born
August 30, 1995, and February 15, 2000, and lived with Atkins
and her husband, Timothy Atkins. On November 3, 2000, the
younger child was admitted to the hospital for injuries she
sustained while in the care of Atkins and her husband. Laurie
Coleman, a Child Protective Services employee, investigated the
incident. Her investigation revealed that the child sustained
her injuries while with her caretakers, that they were not
accidental, and could not have been caused from falling from her
crib as alleged by Atkins and her husband. Coleman met with
Atkins to discuss a plan to keep both children safe while in her
care. Atkins refused to provide Coleman with any information
regarding her husband. The Richmond Department of Social
Services removed the child from Atkins's home and placed her in
foster care.
On December 18, 2000, the Department received a complaint
alleging the older child was being abused and neglected by
Atkins and her husband. Atkins reported she and her husband
were arguing while her husband was driving. He removed his
hands from the steering wheel and began hitting Atkins. The car
collided with other vehicles. The Department sought the child's
removal from Atkins's home. On December 29, 2000, the juvenile
court denied the Department's request for emergency removal and
the child was returned to mother with a protective order
directing that Atkins's husband have no contact with the child.
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Atkins later allowed her husband to return to their home
and sent the child to live with her husband's mother. In
February 2001, fire destroyed Atkins's residence. Atkins said
her husband smashed items in the house with a sledgehammer after
an argument and then burned the residence. Atkins's husband
blamed her for the fire. He moved in with his mother, where he
had contact with the older child. The Department removed the
child on March 2, 2001, citing the violation of the protective
order and Atkins's neglect. The Department could not determine
Atkins's whereabouts at the time of the removal.
On March 5, 2001, Coleman met with Atkins to discuss
efforts she needed to make to regain custody of her two
children. Coleman advised Atkins to secure adequate housing,
attend parenting classes, and maintain contact with the foster
care worker. Atkins was ordered to obtain a substance abuse
assessment, to follow all treatment recommendations, and to
cooperate with domestic violence counseling.
The juvenile court disapproved the initial foster care plan
with the goal of returning home. The Department submitted a new
plan with the goal of adoption. From November 2000 through
January 2002, Atkins failed to attend parenting classes, to have
a psychological evaluation, to obtain substance abuse
assessment, and to attend the domestic violence program. She
continued to have contact with her husband, and lost custody of
her newborn baby because of continued domestic violence from her
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husband. Atkins maintained monthly visitation with the
children. Atkins failed, however, to maintain stable
employment.
On January 29, 2002, following a court hearing, Kimberly
McClintic, the foster care social worker to whom the case had
been reassigned, met with Atkins. McClintic informed Atkins she
needed to attend parenting classes and domestic violence
classes, have a substance abuse evaluation, and secure stable
housing and employment in order to regain custody of her
children. Although Atkins attended only six parenting classes,
she completed the substance abuse evaluation and mental health
assessment. Atkins never complied with the domestic violence
program as ordered by the court, repeatedly refused housing
referrals, and failed to secure stable, consistent housing or
provide verification of the housing she claimed she had. For
three months during the summer of 2002, Atkins failed to
maintain contact with the Department. She admitted past drug
use and involvement in large scale cocaine distribution.
Analysis
The statute permits termination of parental rights if the
trial judge finds by clear and convincing evidence, (i) that the
termination is in the best interests of the child, (ii) that
"reasonable and appropriate" services have been offered to help
the parent "substantially remedy the conditions which led to or
required continuation of the child's foster care placement," and
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(iii) that, despite those services, the parent has failed,
"without good cause," to remedy those conditions "within a
reasonable amount of time not to exceed twelve months from the
date the child was placed in foster care." Code
§ 16.1-283(C)(2). We are mindful of the principle that "[t]he
termination of residual parental rights is a grave, drastic and
irreversible action," Helen W. v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human
Dev., 12 Va. App. 877, 883, 407 S.E.2d 25, 28-29 (1991), but on
review of a termination order we "'presume[] [the trial judge
has] thoroughly weighed all the evidence [and] considered the
statutory requirements,'" Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human
Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (quoting
Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 796
(1990)). The judge is not required to state his or her findings
of fact and conclusions of law with specificity as long as the
record contains evidence to support the decision.
The evidence we have recited was sufficient to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, both (1) that the Department made
"reasonable and appropriate efforts" to help Atkins remedy the
conditions "which led to or required continuation of the child's
foster care placement" and (2) that Atkins, without good cause,
failed "to substantially remedy" those conditions within a
reasonable period of time. In reaching this conclusion, the
judge was required by Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) to "take into
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consideration the prior efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate
the parent."
Remedial Efforts
In her briefs, Atkins asserts she largely complied with the
Department's requirements for remedying the conditions which led
to foster care. The evidence established, however, that she
repeatedly failed to attend parenting classes, to complete a
domestic violence program, to obtain stable housing and
employment, and to submit to a substance abuse and mental health
assessment. The evidence proved Atkins continued to have
substantial contact with her abusive husband and failed to
protect the child by violating the court order prohibiting all
contact with him.
Evidence of Neglect of Other Children
Atkins also argues the trial judge impermissibly considered
evidence pertaining to the removal of her newborn son after the
daughters were placed in foster care.
"The admissibility of evidence is within the broad
discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion."
Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842
(1988). As we held in Logan, evidence of Atkins's
neglect of her other children demonstrates
she has a pattern of neglect, which is of
definite probative value when coupled with
her unwillingness to correct her
deficiencies in her care of [her daughters].
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Mindful of the court's primary goal of
ensuring [the children's] best interest, we
cannot say the court abused its discretion
by considering evidence of [mother's]
neglect of her other children.
13 Va. App. at 132-33, 409 S.E.2d at 465.
Relatives
Finally, Atkins contends the Department failed to produce
sufficient evidence that there were no relatives willing and
suitable to take custody of the children as required under Code
§ 16.1-283(A). "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be
considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was
stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the
ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of
Appeals to attain the ends of justice." Rule 5A:18. Atkins did
not present this argument to the trial court. Accordingly, Rule
5A:18 bars our consideration of this question on appeal.
Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the
good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18
For these reasons, we summarily affirm the decisions of the
trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
Affirmed.
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