Samuel Ralph Robinson v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                         COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Clements
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    SAMUEL RALPH ROBINSON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0563-02-3               JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
    MAY 13, 2003
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE
    Clifford R. Weckstein, Judge
    Amanda E. Shaw (Office of the Public
    Defender, on brief), for appellant.
    Jennifer R. Franklin, Assistant Attorney
    General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
    on brief), for appellee.
    Samuel Ralph Robinson was convicted in a bench trial of
    possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony,
    in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2.    On appeal, Robinson contends
    the trial court erred in finding that Code § 18.2-308.2(A)
    prohibited him from possessing a firearm in his own backyard.
    Finding no error, we affirm Robinson's conviction.
    As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this
    case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential
    value, this opinion recites only those facts and incidents of the
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    proceedings as are necessary to the parties' understanding of the
    disposition of this appeal.
    The facts essential to this appeal are not in dispute.      On
    July 11, 2001, Robinson, a previously convicted felon, possessed
    and fired a revolver while standing in the backyard of his
    residence in the City of Roanoke.    Robinson's probation officer
    testified that he told Robinson in 1993, after Robinson was
    convicted of rape, that possessing a firearm thereafter would be a
    crime.
    On appeal, Robinson contends the version of Code
    § 18.2-308.2(A) in effect on July 11, 2001, 1 did not prohibit him
    from possessing a firearm in the curtilage of his residence. 2    The
    exception set forth in the 2001 amendment to the statute,
    permitting possession in the residence and curtilage of the
    residence, applied, he argues, to all firearms, not just stun
    weapons and tasers.   We disagree.
    1
    The version of Code § 18.2-308.2(A) in effect at the time
    of the subject offense provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
    It shall be unlawful for (i) any person who
    has been convicted of a felony . . . to
    knowingly and intentionally possess or
    transport any (a) firearm or (b) stun weapon
    or taser as defined in § 18.2-308.1 except in
    such person's residence or the curtilage
    thereof . . . .
    2
    The Commonwealth does not dispute that Robinson's backyard
    was a part of the curtilage of his residence.
    - 2 -
    We addressed the same issue in Alger v. Commonwealth, 
    40 Va. App. 89
    , 
    578 S.E.2d 51
     (2003).         In that case, Alger argued
    that possessing a shotgun in her own home on September 7, 2001,
    was not prohibited conduct under the version of Code
    § 18.2-308.2(A) in effect at that time.        Like Robinson, Alger
    contended "that the exception for possession inside the home or
    curtilage in the 2001 amendment applied to all firearms not just
    those enumerated in clause (b), stun weapons or tasers."        Id. at
    92, 
    578 S.E.2d at 52-53
    .      Finding that such an interpretation
    "would yield an absurd result," we rejected Alger's construction
    of the statute and concluded that "the exception appl[ied] only to
    stun weapons and tasers."      
    Id. at 94
    , 
    578 S.E.2d at 54
    .    We held,
    therefore, "that the 2001 amendments did not permit convicted
    felons to possess firearms . . . in their residence or the
    curtilage thereof."      
    Id. at 94-95
    , 
    578 S.E.2d at 54
    .
    The same reasoning and conclusions are equally applicable
    here.       Thus, for the reasons more particularly stated in Alger, we
    hold the trial court did not err in finding that Code
    § 18.2-308.2(A) prohibited Robinson from possessing a firearm in
    his own backyard. 3
    3
    Robinson also argues that his due process rights were
    violated because he was entitled to rely on the Code of Virginia
    as published when it varied from the Acts of Assembly. However,
    having rejected the interpretation of Code § 18.2-308.2(A) upon
    which Robinson's argument is based, we need not address the issue
    further.
    - 3 -
    Accordingly, we affirm Robinson's conviction.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0563023

Filed Date: 5/13/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021