Jonathan T Ward v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:  Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Elder and
    Senior Judge Hodges
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    JONATHAN T. WARD
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2799-01-3                   JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
    APRIL 8, 2003
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRAYSON COUNTY
    J. Colin Campbell, Judge
    Phillip W. Jones for appellant.
    (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Amy L.
    Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting
    on brief.
    Jonathan T. Ward (appellant) appeals from his bench trial
    conviction for petit larceny based on his taking two cassette
    tapes from the temporary residence of his wife, from whom he was
    then separated.    On appeal, he contends the trial court
    erroneously (1) allowed the Commonwealth to argue facts not in
    evidence and relied on those facts in convicting him of the
    charged offense and (2) concluded the evidence was sufficient to
    support his conviction.     We hold the evidence, based on the
    facts found by the trial court, was insufficient to support
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    appellant's conviction.    We reverse and dismiss without reaching
    appellant's additional assignment of error.
    On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence
    and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth.     Higginbotham v. Commonwealth,
    
    216 Va. 349
    , 352, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    , 537 (1975).       On issues of
    witness credibility, we defer to the conclusions of "the fact
    finder[,] who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the
    witnesses."    Schneider v. Commonwealth, 
    230 Va. 379
    , 382, 
    337 S.E.2d 735
    , 736-37 (1985).    On appeal, we may reverse the trial
    court's findings of fact only if they are plainly wrong or
    without evidence to support them.        Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).
    "Larceny is defined as the wrongful or fraudulent taking of
    personal goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another,
    without his assent, and with the intention to deprive the owner
    thereof permanently."     Jones v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 295
    ,
    300, 
    349 S.E.2d 414
    , 417-18 (1986).       Except as modified by
    statute, see, e.g., Code § 18.2-192, only tangible personal
    property may be the subject of larceny.        Owolabi v.
    Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 78
    , 80-81, 
    428 S.E.2d 14
    , 15 (1993).
    At common law, "one co-owner (e.g., a partner, tenant in common,
    joint tenant) cannot steal from the other co-owner."        Wayne R.
    LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 8.4(c), at 720 (2d
    ed. 1986).    Further, "[i]t is not larceny to take a chattel from
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    its possessor under a bona fide, though mistaken, claim of
    right."   Roger D. Groot, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in
    Virginia, at 335 (4th ed. 1998); see Pierce v. Commonwealth, 
    205 Va. 528
    , 533, 
    138 S.E.2d 28
    , 31-32 (1964).   A statement of such
    belief, if found credible by the trial court, negates a finding
    of criminal intent.   Pierce, 
    205 Va. at 533
    , 138 S.E.2d at 32.
    In light of the above principles, we agree with the
    Commonwealth's concession that the trial court erred when it
    ruled that appellant was guilty of larceny because the content
    of the audiotape belonged to appellant's wife.   The court
    clearly distinguished between the tape itself and the "recording
    on the tape."   As set out above, only tangible personal property
    may be the subject of larceny.    Thus, the trial court's
    rationale underlying the conviction was erroneous.
    Furthermore, the trial court's implicit findings of fact
    compel the conclusion that appellant did not act with the
    requisite criminal intent.   Appellant testified it was the
    custom during his marriage for him and his wife to purchase
    blank cassette tapes, record music on them, and hand-label them
    with their initials, "T & D."    The tapes appellant took bore
    those initials.   Appellant admitted taking the tapes but
    testified he was "'certain' that the tapes were his 'or at least
    ours.'"   The trial court made an implicit finding that appellant
    had at least a good faith belief that he had a claim of right to
    the tapes.   Appellant's claim of right negated a finding that
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    appellant acted with the requisite intent to steal the tapes.
    Thus, we hold the evidence, as found by the trial court, was
    insufficient to support appellant's conviction.
    This result does not contravene Stewart v. Commonwealth,
    
    219 Va. 887
    , 889, 
    252 S.E.2d 329
    , 331 (1979), in which the
    Supreme Court, interpreting Code § 55-35, held that a husband
    may be convicted of larceny of the separate property of his
    wife.    The husband in Stewart admitted the property at issue
    belonged to his wife and made no claim that he took the property
    under a bona fide claim of right.     219 Va. at 889, 
    252 S.E.2d at 330
    .    Here, based on the facts as found by the trial court, the
    holding in Stewart is inapplicable.
    For these reasons, we reverse and dismiss appellant's
    conviction without reaching appellant's additional assignment of
    error.
    Reversed and dismissed.
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