Commonwealth v. Michael James Rigney ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Kelsey and Senior Judge Willis
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2204-02-3 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
FEBRUARY 4, 2003
MICHAEL JAMES RIGNEY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
B. A. Davis, III, Judge Designate
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
Henry G. Crider for appellee.
On appeal from the trial court's suppression of Michael James
Rigney's statements, the Commonwealth argues that Rigney was not
in custody when interrogated and, thus, the officer was not
required to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We reverse the trial court's
suppression of Rigney's statements and remand the case for trial,
if the Commonwealth be so advised.
BACKGROUND
Deputy Sheriff H. Gatewood received a Crimestoppers tip
that Rigney, a convicted felon, possessed firearms in his home.
Having confirmed that Rigney had been convicted of a felony,
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Gatewood went to Rigney's home wearing his uniform and holstered
weapon. Rigney's wife invited Gatewood in. Upon entering the
home, Gatewood saw a gun cabinet containing firearms. Rigney's
wife awakened Rigney and told him the deputy wanted to speak to
him. Gatewood told Rigney of the complaint and stated he needed
to speak with him about it and would record the conversation.
Rigney agreed, and they sat at Rigney's kitchen table. Rigney
admitted being a convicted felon and possessing one firearm in
the gun cabinet and another that his brother had in his truck.
Rigney acknowledged that he was not allowed to possess firearms.
Gatewood told Rigney he would not arrest him then, but that an
indictment would likely follow. After seizing the weapons,
Gatewood left the home.
ANALYSIS
When a motion to suppress is reviewed on
appeal, the burden is on the appellant to
show that the ruling, when the evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to
the [prevailing party below], constituted
reversible error. We review the trial
court's findings of historical fact only for
"clear error," but we review de novo the
trial court's application of defined legal
standards, such as "reasonable suspicion"
and "custodial interrogation," to the
particular facts of a case.
Ford v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 249, 255, 503 S.E.2d 803, 805
(1998) (citations omitted). "'[P]olice officers are not
required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they
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question,' and Miranda warnings are not required when the
interviewee's freedom has not been so restricted as to render
him or her 'in custody.'" Harris v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App.
554, 564, 500 S.E.2d 257, 261-62 (1998) (citation omitted).
Custodial interrogation is defined as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." The
totality of the circumstances viewed from
the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the
suspect's position must be considered when
determining whether the suspect is in
custody when questioned. "It is only when a
suspect's freedom of movement is curtailed
to a degree associated with formal arrest
that the suspect is entitled to the full
protection of Miranda."
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 260, 267, 391 S.E.2d 592,
596 (1990) (citations omitted).
Gatewood's assertion that he suspected Rigney was a
convicted felon in possession of firearms did not transform the
conversation into a custodial interrogation. "The Miranda
warnings are not required merely because . . . the investigation
has centered on the person being questioned." Kauffmann v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 400, 404-05, 383 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1989)
(citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
Among the circumstances to be considered
when making the determination of whether a
suspect was "in custody" are (1) the manner
in which the individual is summoned by the
police, (2) the familiarity or neutrality of
the surroundings, (3) the number of officers
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present, (4) the degree of physical
restraint, (5) the duration and character of
the interrogation, and (6) the extent to
which the officers' beliefs concerning the
potential culpability of the individual
being questioned were manifested to the
individual. No single factor is dispositive
of the issue.
Harris, 27 Va. App. at 565, 500 S.E.2d at 262 (citations
omitted).
Gatewood was invited into Rigney's home by Rigney's wife.
He announced his purpose and sat at the kitchen table with
Rigney to discuss his investigation. Although Gatewood was
armed, he never drew his weapon or otherwise threatened Rigney.
He told Rigney he was not going to arrest him and, despite
Rigney's confession and the presence of the firearms, left the
home without arresting him. Rigney's freedom of movement was
not curtailed to any degree associated with arrest. Under these
circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt compelled
to speak with the officer or unable to ask him to leave the
home.
Rigney's reliance on Wass v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 27,
359 S.E.2d 836 (1987), is misplaced. In Wass, the law
enforcement presence, in number, character and action, resembled
a military operation and was so overwhelming that no reasonable
person would have felt free to resist any demand made on him.
Id. at 34, 359 S.E.2d at 840. Here, Rigney met one deputy
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sheriff, in his own home, seated at his own kitchen table, a
familiar and neutral place. The encounter consisted of a calm
discussion about the allegation, with no show of force or any
physical restraint. Thus, the encounter was consensual, not
custodial, and Miranda warnings were not required.
The trial court erred by granting the motion to suppress
Rigney's statements. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings,
should the Commonwealth be so advised.
Reversed and remanded.
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