Lenwood Lamont Kirby, III v. Commonwealth ( 2002 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Frank
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    LENWOOD LAMONT KIRBY, III
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1788-01-3              JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    OCTOBER 8, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
    Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge
    Dwight G. Rudd (Office of the Public
    Defender, on brief), for appellant.
    Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General
    (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    The trial court convicted Lenwood Lamont Kirby of assault
    and battery on a family or household member, third offense. 1   On
    appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    Code § 18.2-57.2 provides:
    A. Any person who commits an assault and
    battery against a family or household member
    shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
    B. On a third or subsequent conviction for
    assault and battery against a family or
    household member . . . such person shall be
    guilty of a Class 6 felony.
    convicting him of a felony (Code § 18.2-57.2(B)), rather than a
    misdemeanor (Code § 18.2-57.2(A)).     Finding no error, we affirm.
    The defendant was indicted for a felony, and the
    Commonwealth met its burden of proving each element of that
    felony.   The defendant concedes it did so:   he unlawfully
    assaulted his girlfriend, and he had two prior convictions of
    that offense.   However, the defendant contends the trial court
    was required to consider convicting of a lesser offense because
    the latest assault was "not the type of felony touching that
    should be" a felony.
    The defendant would require that a trial court consider
    convicting of an offense other than the one proven.    This
    argument is most often raised at jury trials and is known as
    "jury nullification."   A jury has the "'"physical power to
    disregard the law"'" but does not "'"have the moral right to
    decide the law according to their own notions or pleasure."'"
    Sims v. Commonwealth, 
    134 Va. 736
    , 763, 
    115 S.E. 382
    , 391 (1922)
    (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 
    86 Va. 466
    , 472, 
    10 S.E. 745
    ,
    747 (1890) (quoting United States v. Battiste, 2 Sumn. 240, 
    24 F. Cas. 1042
    , 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14545))).
    Accordingly, a jury has the power of nullification but defense
    counsel is not entitled to urge the jury to exercise this power.
    United States v. Moylan, 
    417 F.2d 1002
    , 1006 (4th Cir. 1969).     A
    jury has this power to refuse to apply the law to the proven
    - 2 -
    facts because criminal trials are decided by general verdict and
    the Commonwealth cannot appeal such decisions.
    When a court sits without a jury, it has the power to
    convict of something less than that which the Commonwealth
    proved, but a defendant has no right to have it do so.   Just as
    "it is the duty of juries . . . to take the law from the court
    and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be," Sparf
    & Hansen v. United States, 
    156 U.S. 51
    , 102 (1894); 
    Sims, 134 Va. at 763
    , 115 S.E. at 391, so it is the duty of the judge.    We
    will not mandate that a trial court disregard the law and
    substitute its notion of law for that defined by the General
    Assembly.
    The Commonwealth proved the defendant committed the felony
    charged.    The trial court was required to give judgment to that
    effect, and it did not err in doing so.   Accordingly, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1788013

Filed Date: 10/8/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021